<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225</id><updated>2011-04-21T19:52:03.271-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Shit Hit the FAN</title><subtitle type='html'>vänster/högerperspektivet är en konstruktion/spel/teater

Börja läs våra Politikers motioner / beslut underlag så ser du</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>81</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-6576506637105859499</id><published>2008-07-27T11:07:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.011-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Handlingsplanen - ett medel för hot och trakasserier</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Handlingsplanen - ett medel för hot och trakasserier&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;En arbetsförmedlare har skrivit in i den ”individuella handlingsplanen” för en långtidsarbetslös att:&lt;br /&gt;”Arbetsförmedlingen kan inte hjälpa till därför att: Allt har prövats för att medverka till att du kommer ut i arbete. Nu har vi ej något mer att erbjuda” och att ”Sker ingen anställning före 0410 15 avbryts ditt deltagande i aktivitetsgarantin”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Denne arbetsförmedlare tar sig genom detta friheten att skapa en egen bortre parentes i arbetslöshetsförsäkringen – en parentes som bara gäller för de arbetslösa han själv önskar.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;En bortre parentes som normalt inte kommer till allmänhetens kännedom. Att handlingsplanerna är individuella medför också att de är sekretesskyddade, och detta skyddar arbetsförmedlarna mot kontroll av myndighetsutövningen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Handlingsplanen som arbetsförmedlaren upprättar för varje arbetssökande – eventuellt i samverkan med denne, och i vissa fall med ett innehåll som den arbetssökande är överens med förmedlaren om – har genom AMS tolkning av lagens förarbeten kommit att kunna utnyttjas till tvång, hot och trakasserier mot arbetslösa.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Redan för ett år sedan kom rapporter om att arbetslösa förelagts handlingsplaner som innebar att de ”frivilligt” sluta i aktivitetsgarantin och därmed ställa sig själva utan ersättning. I fall de inte godkände sin handlingsplan blev de automatiskt avstängda för denna vägran, vilket gjorde dessa planer till ett verkligt moment 22.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Efter nyåret, då AMS också hade gått ut med ett påpekande om att detta inte var helt lämpligt, har det inte kommit rapporter om just denna typ av maktmissbruk. Det verkar dock inte helt säkert att de nya signalerna från AMS trängt igenom ens bland ansvarig personal på länsarbetsnämnderna.&lt;br /&gt;Förklaringen kan därför också tänkas vara att med det nya året fick arbetsförmedlingarna fått påfyllning i kassan, och därmed minskade pressen på förmedlarna att finna på nya vägar att frigöra platser åt nytillkommande långtidsarbetslösa i programmen. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jag har nu i stället framför mig en kopia på en handlingsplan där det står att den sökande kommer att bli avstängd från aktivitetsgarantin, och därmed alltså berövas inkomsterna till sin försörjning, vid ett visst datum - om han inte fått anställning innan dess. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;För att få en kommentar till saken ringde jag till AMS. &lt;br /&gt;Jag fick där tala med Kristina Lundborg på ”Regel och informationsgruppen”. Hon menade att som i detta konkreta fall får det inte gå till, men sedan försökte hon faktiskt komma undan med det gamla vanliga bedrägeriet att handlingsplanen ska författas i samverkan med den arbetssökande.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det framkom dock efter en del tjat att hon till och med kunde hänvisa till den sida i propositionen ”En tryggare och rättvisare arbetslöshetsförsäkring”, där AMS hämtat underlaget för att i sin regelbok kunna ge arbetsförmedlarna rätt att skriva in vad de önskar i handlingsplanen och sedan förelägga denna för den arbetssökande utan någon föregående samverkan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An offer you can’t refuse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tidigare, när det fanns jobb att anvisa till, gällde avstängningsreglerna enbart i fall man vägrade ta ett visst anvisat lämpligt arbete. Vart efter sådana arbeten blivit allt mera sällsynta och de arbetslösa blivit fler har kraven utvidgats till att gälla allt möjligt. &lt;br /&gt;Arbetslösa skall numera ställa upp på i stort sett vilka fånigheter som helst för att räknas som aktiva arbetssökande. Så kallade kurser i ämnen som inte har med vare sig vetenskap eller arbetsliv att göra till exempel, eller straffarbete av typen gräva en grop bara för att sedan åter fylla igen den. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Och än värre: De måste acceptera löne- och villkorsdiskriminering vilket det faktiskt innebär att jobba för bara bidraget på en vanlig arbetsplats och med vanliga arbetsuppgifter som åt andra ger anställning och lön enligt avtal.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Att vägra delta i åtgärd eller program innebär numera dessutom inte bara att man förlorar a-kassan. Socialtjänstlagen kräver uppställning den också, så att den som till exempel försöker hålla det fackliga löftet och därför vägrar arbeta på sämre villkor än vad som skulle gälla med kollektivavtal berövas även existensminimum.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;För många skötsamma&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Idag verkar problemet verkar vara att alltför många arbetslösa finner sig i eländet. Möjligheten till avanmälan till a-kassan, eller återkallande av aktivitetsstödet minskar inte antalet aktivt arbetssökande så mycket som skulle krävas för att hålla budgetramarna. Särskilt inte nu när tillströmningen av långtidsarbetslösa accelererar. Då blir det naturligtvis önskvärt att på olika sätt förmå de arbetslösa att sluta ”frivilligt”.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Givetvis skulle det vara mest önskvärt för dem som vill minska kostnaderna för de arbetslösas uppehälle om det gick att påvisa fusk. Det är nog också ur den synpunkten man bör betrakta de utvidgade kraven och skärpta villkoren.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Att Sveriges arbetarklass hukar och finner sig i stället för att fuska verkar dock tyvärr enbart att leda till fortsatta skärpningar av reglerna, ännu större rättslöshet gentemot arbetsförmedlaren och ännu mera omfattande workfare – krav på att arbetslösa skall utföra nyttigt arbete för bara bidraget. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I det enskilda fallet som jag inledde med har ännu ingen rättelse skett. Det självklara vore att den arbetslöse fick en ursäkt från den arbetsförmedlare som skrivit in ett olagligt hot i handlingsplanen, att han fick en ny förmedlare, och att det upprättades en ny handlingsplan – i samverkan med den arbetslöse. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Detta exempel handlar dock om en arbetslös och hans arbetsförmedlare, varför inga normala regler för anständighet gäller.&lt;br /&gt;Den arbetslöse har blivit uppkallad till chefen för arbetsförmedlingen. Det är allt.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-6576506637105859499?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/6576506637105859499/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=6576506637105859499' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/6576506637105859499'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/6576506637105859499'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/handlingsplanen-ett-medel-fr-hot-och.html' title='Handlingsplanen - ett medel för hot och trakasserier'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-4270440391920178075</id><published>2008-07-27T11:03:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.012-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Res er innan det är för sent</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Res er innan det är för sent&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Inget annat folk inom EU har blivit så manipulerat, bedraget och lurat som svenskarna vid anslutningen till EU.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi har förlorat på alla områden. Såväl materiellt, moraliskt, livskvalitemässigt, demokratiskt, rättssäkerhetsmässigt och välfärdsmässigt. &lt;br /&gt;Men generellt gäller för unionen att den innebär en rasering av de mänskliga värdena och en nedgång av det vi kallar för en högtstående civilisation. I stället har det blivit marknaden och den råa kapitalismen som fått fritt spelrum.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;När Sverige gick med i EU lovades svenska folket att företagen skulle stanna i landet.&lt;br /&gt;Alkohol-och drogpolitiken skulle vi själva bestämma över.&lt;br /&gt;Vi lovades också fortsatt frihet från salmonella. &lt;br /&gt;Vi skulle fortfarande vara neutrala och alliansfria.&lt;br /&gt;Etc. etc.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nyligen gick riksdagen emot övergångsregler. Detta gjorde man trots att vi har ca en miljon arbetslösa. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;En utredning om socialförsäkringssystemen är på gång som kan innebära att sjuk-och arbetslöshetsersättningar m.m. sänks drastiskt.&lt;br /&gt;Samtidigt som detta sker kan vi komma att få betala ofantliga ersättningar från socialförsäkringssystemet till de som nu söker sig hit från de nya EU-länderna.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Landets politiker är på väg att offra en hel ungdomsgeneration på alkoholens altare, liksom att många unga blir offer för ökat drogmissbruk, bl.a. för att vi inte själva får bevaka våra gränser. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Salmonellan skördar så gott som dagliga offer. Minst vartannat importerat kött- eller kycklingparti är salmonellasmittat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Skenbart talas det inom EU om mänskliga rättigheter etc. I praktiken bryter man i stället ned det mänskliga och humanistiska. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Fler och fler länder inom unionen legaliserar nu kvinnoförnedring i form av prostitution och bordellverksamhet.&lt;br /&gt;Även socialdemokratiska parlamentsledamöter menar att prostitution skall betraktas som vilken tjänst som helst. Inte trodde jag - trots att jag alltid varit motståndare till EU - att kvinnorna där skulle komma att betraktas som en handelsvara.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marit Paulsen skröt vitt och brett om att hon skulle se till att djurskyddet blev bättre. Ingenting har hänt. I dagarna avslogs ett förslag till förbättring, kallt och cyniskt. &lt;br /&gt;Miljögifter som vi förbjudit har EU godkänt.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nyligen behandlades en motion om vårt absolut viktigaste livsmedel - vattnet. Förslaget gick ut på att vattnet som vilken annan vara som helst skulle privatiseras. Det var bara slumpen som gjorde att frågan inte avgjordes nu, men den kommer upp på nytt, därför att det ligger så mycket pengar i den. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Så här skulle man kunna hålla på och räkna upp fråga efter fråga där det blir försämringar i stället för förbättringar.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tar inte svenska folkets självplågeri slut och vi reser oss mot våra fiender, dvs samtliga partier och regeringen, dröjer det inte länge förrän såväl ålders- som sjukpensioner sänks. Folk går en för tidig död till mötes för att det saknas sjukvårdsresurser. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kollektivavttalen som har varit löntagarnas trygghet kommer att förbjudas eftersom de anses hämma den fria konkurrensen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Res dig svenska folk, arbetare, löntagare, arbetslösa, pensionärer m.fl. innan det är för sent. Tro inte längre på de etablerade partierna. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Låt oss tillsammans skapa något nytt där människor med de ideal som Per-Albin, Wigfors, Möller, Tage Erlander, Gunnar Sträng och Olof Palme hade, får ta över. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi måste hjälpas åt att kasta ut de som i dag styr Sverige. De är våra fiender och kommer bara att försämra vår livskvalite, inskränka demokratin och rättssamhället och avskaffa den lilla välfärd vi ännu har kvar. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Du får inte nöja dig med att klaga. Du måste bli aktiv. Vi kan vinna om vi bara vill och startar kampen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Om inte, kan Du inte skylla ifrån dig när pensionen minskas till ett minimum.&lt;br /&gt;När Du måste söka socialbidrag då Du är sjuk eller arbetslös. &lt;br /&gt;När dina nära och kära går en för tidig död till mötes för att resurserna går till annat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi är inte fientliga till andra människor, vi har alla samma värde oavsett vilken plats på jorden vi befinner oss på. Men vi har ingen anledning att offra oss.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kom också ihåg att inkomstfördelningen i de länder vi nu stöder är helt olik vår. Där sitter i många fall en enormt rik överklass som beskattas för lågt. I praktiken blir det då så att vi stöder denna överklass så länge inkomstfördelningen inte förändras.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-4270440391920178075?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/4270440391920178075/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=4270440391920178075' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/4270440391920178075'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/4270440391920178075'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/res-er-innan-det-r-fr-sent.html' title='Res er innan det är för sent'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-8759721939648643324</id><published>2008-07-27T11:02:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.024-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Facket kräver: Arbeta utan kollektivavtal</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;Facket kräver: Arbeta utan kollektivavtal&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;”Syftet med arbetspraktik är att stärka den enskildes möjligheter att få ett arbete. Arbetspraktik på en arbetsplats kan anvisas för att få yrkesorientering, yrkes-praktik eller arbetslivserfarenhet. Arbetspraktik bör under handledning även kunna användas vid förberedelser inför start av näringsverksamhet.”, enligt AMS faktablad.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arbetspraktik innebär idag vanligtvis praktik inom vad som enligt svensk yrkesklassificering (SSYK) tillhör huvudgrupp 91, ”Servicearbete utan krav på särskild yrkesutbildning”.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Till sådant anvisas lite drygt 23 procent av de arbetslösa som tvingas praktikarbeta för att få behålla understödet – antingen a-kassa eller socialbidrag. De återstående 77 procenten praktiserande är fördelade över ungefär hundra olika yrken.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arbetspraktik inom servicearbeten utan krav på yrkesutbildning kan knappast ge vare sig nyttig yrkesorientering eller någon meningsfull praktik inför en kommande anställning. Antalet som har ett riktigt jobb inom dessa yrken minskar stadigt, och utgör idag enbart ca 4 procent av samtliga sysselsatta. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Faktum är att antalet som praktiserar närmar sig det totala antalet som har jobb där. Omkring 10.800 praktiserar och 16.800 har arbete som hänförs till SSYK 91. Om trenden fortsätter kommer antalet praktiserande vara fler än dem som har jobb inom några få år.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Av de syften som AMS offentliggör i sitt faktablad återstår därmed för denna dryga femtedel av de arbetspraktiserande enbart arbetslivserfarenheten. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Värdet av den erfarenhet som fås genom praktik i ett servicearbete utan krav på särskild yrkesutbildning torde vara rätt obetydlig. Alldeles speciellt idag, när antalet arbetstillfällen minskar inom de flesta yrken, och det därmed finns arbetslösa med utbildning och aktuella erfarenheter till varje utlyst jobb.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Extra argument&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det finns dock ett par ytterligare motiveringar till varför dessa arbetspraktiserande inte skall ha rätt till anställning, lön och övriga villkor enligt normala lagar och avtal fastän de ”utför arbete åt annan”. Dessa motiveringar står icke i AMS faktablad, och har inte heller givits utrymme i lagtexten. De återfinns i lagarnas förarbeten, i utredningar och propositioner.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Den första motiveringen till arbetsplikten härrör ur arbetararistokratins längtan efter påtagliga privilegier. Arbetararistokratin är de välavlönade yrkesarbetare, kvartsbasar och rörelsefunktionärer som i debatten kallas för medelklass. De är egentligen enbart aspiranter - på en framtid inom det osjälvständiga småborgerskapet. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;För att medlemmarna i arbetararistokratin skall kunna uppleva individuella framgångar även under tider av motgång för de arbetande klasserna totalt sett, ordnas ökad spridning bakåt i tågordningen. &lt;br /&gt;Detta tillfredställer alla de konkurrensfixerade brackor som inte bryr sig om vart de kommer, utan nöjer sig med den skenbara framgången i att ha fler bakom sig.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Denna välinsuttna ”medelklass” populariserar workfare-politiken genom media, fack- och partiapparater. De agerar som om sådan tvångspolitik nu till skillnad från tidigare skulle vara nödvändig för att behålla försäkringssystemets legitimitet; för att den arbetslöse ska visa att han eller hon kan och vill ta ett jobb.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arbetspraktik innebär visserligen inte att deltagarna blir tvungna att ta ett jobb – anställning enligt lagar och avtal – utan att de tvingas underkasta sig arbetsdisciplin – ställa sig under arbetsledning - enbart för att få behålla bidraget. &lt;br /&gt;Men detta är ändå vad den nya uppgraderade ”arbets- studie och kompetenslinjen” erbjuder. Arbetslinjen innebar före dessa sjukliga utväxter något helt annat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Borgarklassens kärna, kapitalisterna och deras vapendragare, lanserar vanligtvis sina argument under beteckningen ”nationalekonomi”. Inom denna vetenskap anses workfare – med all rätt vara en press nedåt på löner och villkor. Dessutom ger förekomsten av påtvingat arbete under förnedrande former möjligheten att måla upp en hotbild som fungerar pådrivande på redan tidigare anställda.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jag ska dock inte gå in på varför nationalekonomin hävdar att det innebär framsteg när kapitalisterna och den övriga borgarklassen görs rikare på de arbetandes bekostnad, och detta till råga på allt genom att arbetslösa tvingas utföra arbetsuppgifter på orättvisa och förnedrande villkor. Det bygger på axiom – påståenden som inte behöver bevisas – inom den liberala ekonomiska teoribildningen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Den riktiga borgarklassens argument går sällan hem direkt hos de breda massorna av arbetande. Det som däremot kan få fäste bland de allra okunnigaste, är arbetararistokratins misstänkliggörande av de sämst ställda i samhället. Inte heller detta fungerar dock så mycket genom övertygelse som genom administration. Det avgörande är kontrollen över debattens inriktning; att än så länge kan arbetararistokraterna förhindra att frågan om workfare ens diskuteras.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är ändå - trots att den grundläggande principen i dessa kretsar är ”tyst min mun så får du socker” - lite förvånande att hela den Svenska fackföreningsrörelsen (nu åter utan undantag sedan SAC gett sin arbetslöshetskomitté munkavle) kräver av sina egna medlemmar att dessa, om de blir utkastade från sina arbetsplatser, skall utföra arbete som inte omfattas av vare sig kollektivavtal eller andra fackliga rättigheter!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-8759721939648643324?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/8759721939648643324/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=8759721939648643324' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/8759721939648643324'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/8759721939648643324'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/facket-krver-arbeta-utan-kollektivavtal.html' title='Facket kräver: Arbeta utan kollektivavtal'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-5803760740486481004</id><published>2008-07-27T11:00:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.025-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Världens mest grundlurade folk</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Världens mest grundlurade folk &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tiden efter EU-inträdet har inneburit det största lurendrejeriet från politikernas sida någonsin i svensk historia. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vid inträdet i EU ställde politikerna ut en rad löften för att få svenska folket att säga ja till inträde i unionen. Alla dessa löften har brutits. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi skulle t ex få behålla vår alkoholpolitik, vi skulle även fortsättningsvis vara befriade från salmonella. Vår allians- och neutralitetspolitik skulle vi ha kvar. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Företagen skulle stanna kvar i Sverige etc. etc. Men allt var lögn. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Med EU kom också den renodlade marknadsekonomin. Genom avreglering skulle alla varor och tjänster bli billigare, såsom el, tele, kollektivtrafik etc etc. Men det var lögn. Det blev tvärtom. Mycket dyrare för konsumenterna. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Svenska folket blev fattigare och företag och aktieägare rikare. I Norrland där en stor del av elkraften produceras förbjuder nu EU, Sverige att ge billigare el till enskilda och företag. Är månne målet att slå ut Norrland? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi bantar försvaret med många miljarder, inte minst i Norrland. Men de inbesparade miljarderna går inte tillbaka till Norrland, utan i stället utrustas en svensk insatsstyrka till en kostnad av ca tre miljarder. Denna insatsstyrka skall inte försvara Sverige. Den skall bestå av svenska flickor och pojkar som på order från Bryssel skall vara beredda att strida och offra sina liv var helst i världen EU-bestämmer.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Samtidigt ökar avgiften till EU och är uppe i 27 miljarder. Dessutom betalar lilla Sverige en del av stora och rika Englands EU-avgift. Hittills har vi betalt sju miljarder och kommer att fortsätta och betala tom 2007. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Detta gör gärna våra politiker alltmedan sjukvård, barnomsorg och äldre vård ropar efter resurser. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Förljugenheten inom energi- och miljöpolitiken är absurd. Vi lägger ner världens säkraste kärnkraftverk och köper kärnkrafts- och kolkraftsel från utlandet till avsevärt högre priser. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I Sverige låter vi EU avskaffa kollektivavtalen och i stället tar vi in utländsk arbetskraft från öststaterna som dumpar lönerna och våra egna arbetare blir arbetslösa. Den faktiska arbetslösheten är i dag dryga tio procent. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Men inte nog med detta. Nu har EU bestämt att vi i stället för 40 timmars arbetsvecka skall ha 65 timmars. Och inte hör vi något från Vanja Lundby-Vedin som bildat symbios med Göran Persson. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tro dock inte att alla delar denna skuldbörda. Medan de svenska medborgarna i allmänhet blir fattigare och fler blir arbetslösa, förbättrar politikerna hela tiden sina privilegier. Sålunda höjer de hela tiden sina löner och pensioner. Vidare höjer man kontinuerligt partibidragen och ger riksdagsmännen högt avlönade sekreterare. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Landets statsminister som talar om den nya solidariteten (folket skall offra sig för EU) har fått det så gott ställt att han kan dra sig tillbaka till en herrgård som kostat 12 miljoner. Genom väl tilltagen pension och rikligt jordbruksbidrag från EU har han ingen svårighet att både leva flott och göra sig skuldfri. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vissa kan väl tycka att det "rika" Sverige gott kan offra något för unionen. Då har man emellertid inte tänkt på följande. Medan vi i Sverige har tillämpat en fördelningspolitik som gjort det någorlunda drägligt för flertalet medborgare i Sverige intill EU-inträdet råder motsatt förhållande i flertalet EU-länder utanför norden. Det innebär att vi i stället stöder den rika överklassen i dessa länder så att den inte på något sätt behöver visa solidaritet med sina egna landsmän utan får behålla sina rikedomar ograverat. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Om de fem partierna, socialdemokraterna, moderaterna, folkpartiet, kristdemokraterna och centern vidhåller att inte låta svenska folket folkomrösta om EU:s konstitution innebär detta att Sverige inte bara förlorar demokratin, sin självständighet utan också kommer att bli ett land som inte har råd till god sjukvård, barnomsorg och äldreomsorg för alla medborgare.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi kommer att bli ett fattigt Sverige med stor arbetslöshet. Detta medan nomenklaturan skor sig som i forna Sovjetunionen. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vi måste därför handla innan det är för sent. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-5803760740486481004?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/5803760740486481004/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=5803760740486481004' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/5803760740486481004'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/5803760740486481004'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/vrldens-mest-grundlurade-folk.html' title='Världens mest grundlurade folk'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-2930230973300127296</id><published>2008-07-21T15:13:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.025-08:00</updated><title type='text'>SECRET PLAN TO KILL THE INTERNET BY 2012 LEAKED</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;object width="425" height="344"&gt;&lt;param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/ideC5HXeOzM&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1&amp;color1=0x5d1719&amp;color2=0xcd311b"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/ideC5HXeOzM&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=1&amp;color1=0x5d1719&amp;color2=0xcd311b" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"&gt;&lt;/embed&gt;&lt;/object&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-2930230973300127296?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/2930230973300127296/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=2930230973300127296' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/2930230973300127296'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/2930230973300127296'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/secret-plan-to-kill-internet-by-2012.html' title='SECRET PLAN TO KILL THE INTERNET BY 2012 LEAKED'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-5941205771067704285</id><published>2008-07-17T15:04:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.026-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Operations Research Technical Manual TM-SW7905.1</title><content type='html'>TOP SECRET Silent Weapons for &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Quiet Wars Operations Research Technical Manual TM-SW7905.1&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Welcome Aboard &lt;br /&gt;This publication marks the 25th anniversary of the Third World War, called the "Quiet War", being conducted using subjective biological warfare, fought with "silent weapons." &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This book contains an introductory description of this war, its strategies, and its weaponry. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;May 1979 #74-1120 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;--------------------------------------------------------------------------------&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Security&lt;br /&gt;It is patently impossible to discuss social engineering or the automation of a society, i.e., the engineering of social automation systems (silent weapons) on a national or worldwide scale without implying extensive objectives of social control and destruction of human life, i.e., slavery and genocide. &lt;br /&gt;This manual is in itself an analog declaration of intent. Such a writing must be secured from public scrutiny. Otherwise, it might be recognized as a technically formal declaration of domestic war. Furthermore, whenever any person or group of persons in a position of great power and without full knowledge and consent of the public, uses such knowledge and methodologies for economic conquest - it must be understood that a state of domestic warfare exists between said person or group of persons and the public. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The solution of today's problems requires an approach which is ruthlessly candid, with no agonizing over religious, moral or cultural values. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You have qualified for this project because of your ability to look at human society with cold objectivity, and yet analyze and discuss your observations and conclusions with others of similar intellectual capacity without the loss of discretion or humility. Such virtues are exercised in your own best interest. Do not deviate from them. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Historical Introduction&lt;br /&gt;Silent weapon technology has evolved from Operations Research (O.R.), a strategic and tactical methodology developed under the Military Management in England during World War II. The original purpose of Operations Research was to study the strategic and tactical problems of air and land defense with the objective of effective use of limited military resources against foreign enemies (i.e., logistics). &lt;br /&gt;It was soon recognized by those in positions of power that the same methods might be useful for totally controlling a society. But better tools were necessary. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Social engineering (the analysis and automation of a society) requires the correlation of great amounts of constantly changing economic information (data), so a high-speed computerized data-processing system was necessary which could race ahead of the society and predict when society would arrive for capitulation. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Relay computers were to slow, but the electronic computer, invented in 1946 by J. Presper Eckert and John W. Mauchly, filled the bill. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The next breakthrough was the development of the simplex method of linear programming in 1947 by the mathematician George B. Dantzig. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Then in 1948, the transistor, invented by J. Bardeen, W.H. Brattain, and W. Shockley, promised great expansion of the computer field by reducing space and power requirements. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With these three inventions under their direction, those in positions of power strongly suspected that it was possible for them to control the whole world with the push of a button. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Immediately, the Rockefeller Foundation got in on the ground floor by making a four-year grant to Harvard College, funding the Harvard Economic Research Project for the study of the structure of the American Economy. One year later, in 1949, The United States Air Force joined in. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 1952 the grant period terminated, and a high-level meeting of the Elite was held to determine the next phase of social operations research. The Harvard project had been very fruitful, as is borne out by the publication of some of its results in 1953 suggesting the feasibility of economic (social) engineering. (Studies in the Structure of the American Economy - copyright 1953 by Wassily Leontief, International Science Press Inc., White Plains, New York). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Engineered in the last half of the decade of the 1940's, the new Quiet War machine stood, so to speak, in sparkling gold-plated hardware on the showroom floor by 1954. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With the creation of the maser in 1954, the promise of unlocking unlimited sources of fusion atomic energy from the heavy hydrogen in sea water and the consequent availability of unlimited social power was a possibility only decades away. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The combination was irresistible. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Quiet War was quietly declared by the International Elite at a meeting held in 1954. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Although the silent weapons system was nearly exposed 13 years later, the evolution of the new weapon-system has never suffered any major setbacks. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This volume marks the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the Quiet War. Already this domestic war has had many victories on many fronts throughout the world. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Political Introduction&lt;br /&gt;In 1954 it was well recognized by those in positions of authority that it was only a matter of time, only a few decades, before the general public would be able to grasp and upset the cradle of power, for the very elements of the new silent-weapon technology were as accessible for a public utopia as they were for providing a private utopia. &lt;br /&gt;The issue of primary concern, that of dominance, revolved around the subject of the energy sciences. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Energy&lt;br /&gt;Energy is recognized as the key to all activity on earth. Natural science is the study of the sources and control of natural energy, and social science, theoretically expressed as economics, is the study of the sources and control of social energy. Both are bookkeeping systems: mathematics. Therefore, mathematics is the primary energy science. And the bookkeeper can be king if the public can be kept ignorant of the methodology of the bookkeeping. &lt;br /&gt;All science is merely a means to an end. The means is knowledge. The end is control. Beyond this remains only one issue: Who will be the beneficiary? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 1954 this was the issue of primary concern. Although the so-called "moral issues" were raised, in view of the law of natural selection it was agreed that a nation or world of people who will not use their intelligence are no better than animals who do not have intelligence. Such people are beasts of burden and steaks on the table by choice and consent. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Consequently, in the interest of future world order, peace, and tranquillity, it was decided to privately wage a quiet war against the American public with an ultimate objective of permanently shifting the natural and social energy (wealth) of the undisciplined and irresponsible many into the hands of the self-disciplined, responsible, and worthy few. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In order to implement this objective, it was necessary to create, secure, and apply new weapons which, as it turned out, were a class of weapons so subtle and sophisticated in their principle of operation and public appearance as to earn for themselves the name "silent weapons." &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In conclusion, the objective of economic research, as conducted by the magnates of capital (banking) and the industries of commodities (goods) and services, is the establishment of an economy which is totally predictable and manipulatable. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In order to achieve a totally predictable economy, the low-class elements of society must be brought under total control, i.e., must be housebroken, trained, and assigned a yoke and long-term social duties from a very early age, before they have an opportunity to question the propriety of the matter. In order to achieve such conformity, the lower-class family unit must be disintegrated by a process of increasing preoccupation of the parents and the establishment of government-operated day-care centers for the occupationally orphaned children. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The quality of education given to the lower class must be of the poorest sort, so that the moat of ignorance isolating the inferior class from the superior class is and remains incomprehensible to the inferior class. With such an initial handicap, even bright lower class individuals have little if any hope of extricating themselves from their assigned lot in life. This form of slavery is essential to maintain some measure of social order, peace, and tranquillity for the ruling upper class. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Descriptive Introduction of the Silent Weapon&lt;br /&gt;Everything that is expected from an ordinary weapon is expected from a silent weapon by its creators, but only in its own manner of functioning. &lt;br /&gt;It shoots situations, instead of bullets; propelled by data processing, instead of chemical reaction (explosion); originating from bits of data, instead of grains of gunpowder; from a computer, instead of a gun; operated by a computer programmer, instead of a marksman; under the orders of a banking magnate, instead of a military general. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It makes no obvious explosive noises, causes no obvious physical or mental injuries, and does not obviously interfere with anyone's daily social life. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yet it makes an unmistakable "noise," causes unmistakable physical and mental damage, and unmistakably interferes with the daily social life, i.e., unmistakable to a trained observer, one who knows what to look for. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The public cannot comprehend this weapon, and therefore cannot believe that they are being attacked and subdued by a weapon. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The public might instinctively feel that something is wrong, but that is because of the technical nature of the silent weapon, they cannot express their feeling in a rational way, or handle the problem with intelligence. Therefore, they do not know how to cry for help, and do not know how to associate with others to defend themselves against it. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When a silent weapon is applied gradually, the public adjusts/adapts to its presence and learns to tolerate its encroachment on their lives until the pressure (psychological via economic) becomes too great and they crack up. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Therefore, the silent weapon is a type of biological warfare. It attacks the vitality, options, and mobility of the individuals of a society by knowing, understanding, manipulating, and attacking their sources of natural and social energy, and their physical, mental, and emotional strengths and weaknesses. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Theoretical Introduction&lt;br /&gt;Give me control over a nation's currency, and I care not who makes its laws.&lt;br /&gt;-- Mayer Amschel Rothschild, 1743 - 1812) &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Today's silent weapons technology is an outgrowth of a simple idea discovered, succinctly expressed, and effectively applied by the quoted Mr. Mayer Amschel Rothschild. Mr. Rothschild discovered the missing passive component of economic theory known as economic inductance. He, of course, did not think of his discovery in these 20th-century terms, and, to be sure, mathematical analysis had to wait for the Second Industrial Revolution, the rise of the theory of mechanics and electronics, and finally, the invention of the electronic computer before it could be effectively applied in the control of the world economy. &lt;br /&gt;General Energy Concepts&lt;br /&gt;In the study of energy systems, there always appears three elementary concepts. These are potential energy, kinetic energy, and energy dissipation. And corresponding to these concepts, there are three idealized, essentially pure physical counterparts called passive components.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the science of physical mechanics, the phenomenon of potential energy is associated with a physical property called elasticity or stiffness, and can be represented by a stretched spring. &lt;br /&gt;In electronic science, potential energy is stored in a capacitor instead of a spring. This property is called capacitance instead of elasticity or stiffness. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the science of physical mechanics, the phenomenon of kinetic energy is associated with a physical property called inertia or mass, and can be represented by a mass or a flywheel in motion. &lt;br /&gt;In electronic science, kinetic energy is stored in an inductor (in a magnetic field) instead of a mass. This property is called inductance instead of inertia. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the science of physical mechanics, the phenomenon of energy dissipation is associated with a physical property called friction or resistance, and can be represented by a dashpot or other device which converts energy into heat. &lt;br /&gt;In electronic science, dissipation of energy is performed by an element called either a resistor or a conductor, the term "resistor" being the one generally used to describe a more ideal device (e.g., wire) employed to convey electronic energy efficiently from one location to another. The property of a resistance or conductor is measured as either resistance or conductance reciprocals. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In economics these three energy concepts are associated with: &lt;br /&gt;Economic Capacitance - Capital (money, stock/inventory, investments in buildings and durables, etc.) &lt;br /&gt;Economic Conductance - Goods (production flow coefficients) &lt;br /&gt;Economic Inductance - Services (the influence of the population of industry on output) &lt;br /&gt;All of the mathematical theory developed in the study of one energy system (e.g., mechanics, electronics, etc.) can be immediately applied in the study of any other energy system (e.g., economics). &lt;br /&gt;Mr. Rothchild's Energy Discovery&lt;br /&gt;What Mr. Rothschild had discovered was the basic principle of power, influence, and control over people as applied to economics. That principle is "when you assume the appearance of power, people soon give it to you." &lt;br /&gt;Mr. Rothschild had discovered that currency or deposit loan accounts had the required appearance of power that could be used to induce people (inductance, with people corresponding to a magnetic field) into surrendering their real wealth in exchange for a promise of greater wealth (instead of real compensation). They would put up real collateral in exchange for a loan of promissory notes. Mr. Rothschild found that he could issue more notes than he had backing for, so long as he had someone's stock of gold as a persuader to show his customers. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mr. Rothschild loaned his promissory notes to individual and to governments. These would create overconfidence. Then he would make money scarce, tighten control of the system, and collect the collateral through the obligation of contracts. The cycle was then repeated. These pressures could be used to ignite a war. Then he would control the availability of currency to determine who would win the war. That government which agreed to give him control of its economic system got his support. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Collection of debts was guaranteed by economic aid to the enemy of the debtor. The profit derived from this economic methodology mad Mr. Rothschild all the more able to expand his wealth. He found that the public greed would allow currency to be printed by government order beyond the limits (inflation) of backing in precious metal or the production of goods and services. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Apparent Capital as "Paper" Inductor&lt;br /&gt;In this structure, credit, presented as a pure element called "currency," has the appearance of capital, but is in effect negative capital. Hence, it has the appearance of service, but is in fact, indebtedness or debt. It is therefore an economic inductance instead of an economic capacitance, and if balanced in no other way, will be balanced by the negation of population (war, genocide). The total goods and services represent real capital called the gross national product, and currency may be printed up to this level and still represent economic capacitance; but currency printed beyond this level is subtractive, represents the introduction of economic inductance, and constitutes notes of indebtedness. &lt;br /&gt;War is therefore the balancing of the system by killing the true creditors (the public which we have taught to exchange true value for inflated currency) and falling back on whatever is left of the resources of nature and regeneration of those resources. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mr. Rothschild had discovered that currency gave him the power to rearrange the economic structure to his own advantage, to shift economic inductance to those economic positions which would encourage the greatest economic instability and oscillation. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The final key to economic control had to wait until there was sufficient data and high-speed computing equipment to keep close watch on the economic oscillations created by price shocking and excess paper energy credits - paper inductance/inflation. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Breakthrough&lt;br /&gt;The aviation field provided the greatest evolution in economic engineering by way of the mathematical theory of shock testing. In this process, a projectile is fired from an airframe on the ground and the impulse of the recoil is monitored by vibration transducers connected to the airframe and wired to chart recorders. &lt;br /&gt;By studying the echoes or reflections of the recoil impulse in the airframe, it is possible to discover critical vibrations in the structure of the airframe which either vibrations of the engine or aeolian vibrations of the wings, or a combination of the two, might reinforce resulting in a resonant self-destruction of the airframe in flight as an aircraft. From the standpoint of engineering, this means that the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the airframe in terms of vibrational energy can be discovered and manipulated. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Application in Economics&lt;br /&gt;To use this method of airframe shock testing in economic engineering, the prices of commodities are shocked, and the public consumer reaction is monitored. The resulting echoes of the economic shock are interpreted theoretically by computers and the psycho-economic structure of the economy is thus discovered. It is by this process that partial differential and difference matrices are discovered that define the family household and make possible its evaluation as an economic industry (dissipative consumer structure). &lt;br /&gt;Then the response of the household to future shocks can be predicted and manipulated, and society becomes a well-regulated animal with its reins under the control of a sophisticated computer-regulated social energy bookkeeping system. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eventually every individual element of the structure comes under computer control through a knowledge of personal preferences, such knowledge guaranteed by computer association of consumer preferences (universal product code, UPC; zebra-striped pricing codes on packages) with identified consumers (identified via association with the use of a credit card and later a permanent "tattooed" body number invisible under normal ambient illumination). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Summary&lt;br /&gt;Economics is only a social extension of a natural energy system. It, also, has its three passive components. Because of the distribution of wealth and the lack of communication and lack of data, this field has been the last energy field for which a knowledge of these three passive components has been developed. &lt;br /&gt;Since energy is the key to all activity on the face of the earth, it follows that in order to attain a monopoly of energy, raw materials, goods, and services and to establixh a world system of slave labor, it is necessary to have a first strike capability in the field of economics. In order to maintain our position, it is necessary that we have absolute first knowledge of the science of control over all economic factors and the first experience at engineering the world economy. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In order to achieve such sovereignty, we must at least achieve this one end: that the public will not make either the logical or mathematical connection between economics and the other energy sciences or learn to apply such knowledge. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is becoming increasingly difficult to control because more and more businesses are making demands upon their computer programmers to create and apply mathematical models for the management of those businesses. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is only a matter of time before the new breed of private programmer/economists will catch on to the far reaching implications of the work begun at Harvard in 1948. The speed with which they can communicate their warning to the public will largely depend upon how effective we have been at controlling the media, subverting education, and keeping the public distracted with matters of no real importance. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Economic Model&lt;br /&gt;Economics, as a social energy science has as a first objective the description of the complex way in which any given unit of resources is used to satisfy some economic want. (Leontief Matrix). This first objective, when it is extended to get the most product from the least or limited resources, comprises that objective of general military and industrial logistics known as Operations Research. (See simplex method of linear programming.) &lt;br /&gt;The Harvard Economic Research Project (1948-) was an extension of World War II Operations Research. Its purpose was to discover the science of controlling an economy: at first the American economy, and then the world economy. It was felt that with sufficient mathematical foundation and data, it would be nearly as easy to predict and control the trend of an economy as to predict and control the trajectory of a projectile. Such has proven to be the case. Moreover, the economy has been transformed into a guided missile on target. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The immediate aim of the Harvard project was to discover the economic structure, what forces change that structure, how the behavior of the structure can be predicted, and how it can be manipulated. What was needed was a well-organized knowledge of the mathematical structures and interrelationships of investment, production, distribution, and consumption. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To make a short story of it all, it was discovered that an economy obeyed the same laws as electricity and that all of the mathematical theory and practical and computer know-how developed for the electronic field could be directly applied in the study of economics. This discovery was not openly declared, and its more subtle implications were and are kept a closely guarded secret, for example that in an economic model, human life is measured in dollars, and that the electric spark generated when opening a switch connected to an active inductor is mathematically analogous to the initiation of war. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The greatest hurdle which theoretical economists faced was the accurate description of the household as an industry. This is a challenge because consumer purchases are a matter of choice which in turn is influenced by income, price, and other economic factors. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This hurdle was cleared in an indirect and statistically approximate way by an application of shock testing to determine the current characteristics, called current technical coefficients, of a household industry &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Finally, because problems in theoretical electronics can be translated very easily into problems of theoretical electronics, and the solution translated back again, it follows that only a book of language translation and concept definition needed to be written for economics. The remainder could be gotten from standard works on mathematics and electronics. This makes the publication of books on advanced economics unnecessary, and greatly simplifies project security. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Industrial Diagrams&lt;br /&gt;An ideal industry is defined as a device which receives value from other industries in several forms and converts them into one specific product for sales and distribution to other industries. It has several inputs and one output. What the public normally thinks of as one industry is really an industrial complex, where several industries under one roof produce one or more products. &lt;br /&gt;A pure (single output) industry can be represented oversimply by a circuit block as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The flow of product from industry #1 (supply) to industry #2 (demand) is denoted by 112. The total flow out of industry "K" is denoted by Ik (sales, etc.). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A three industry network can be diagrammed as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A node is a symbol of collection and distribution of flow. Node #3 receives from industry #3 and distributes to industries #1 and #3. If industry #3 manufactures chairs, then a flow from industry #3 back to industry #3 simply indicates that industry #3 is using part of its own output product, for example, as office furniture. Therefore the flow may be summarized by the equations: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Three Industrial Classes&lt;br /&gt;Industries fall into three categories or classes by type of output:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Class #1 - Capital (resources) &lt;br /&gt;Class #2 - Goods (commodities or use - dissipative) &lt;br /&gt;Class #3 - Services (action of population) &lt;br /&gt;Class #1 industries exist at three levels: &lt;br /&gt;Nature - sources of energy and raw materials. &lt;br /&gt;Government - printing of currency equal to the gross national product (GNP), and extension of currency in excess of GNP. &lt;br /&gt;Banking - loaning of money for interest, and extension (inflation/counterfeiting) of economic value through the deposit loan accounts. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Class #2 industries exist as producers of tangible or consumer (dissipated) products. This sort of activity is usually recognized and labeled by the public as "industry." &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Class #3 industries are those which have service rather than a tangible product as their output. These industries are called (1) households, and (2) governments. Their output is human activity of a mechanical sort, and their basis is population. &lt;br /&gt;Aggregation&lt;br /&gt;The whole economic system can be represented by a three-industry model if one allows the names of the outputs to be (1) capital, (2) goods, and (3) services. The problem with this representation is that it would not show the influence, say, the textile industry on the ferrous metal industry. This is because both the textile industry and the ferrous metal industry would be contained within a single classification called the "goods industry" and by this process of combining or aggregating these two industries under one system block they would lose their economic individuality. &lt;br /&gt;The E-Model&lt;br /&gt;A national economy consists of simultaneous flows of production, distribution, consumption, and investment. If all of these elements including labor and human functions are assigned a numerical value in like units of measure, say, 1939 dollars, then this flow can be further represented by a current flow in an electronic circuit, and its behavior can be predicted and manipulated with useful precision. &lt;br /&gt;The three ideal passive energy components of electronics, the capacitor, the resistor, and the inductor correspond to the three ideal passive energy components of economics called the pure industries of capital, goods, and services, respectively. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic capacitance represents the storage of capital in one form or another. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic conductance represents the level of conductance of materials for the production of goods. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic inductance represents the inertia of economic value in motion. This is a population phenomenon known as services. &lt;br /&gt;Economic Inductance&lt;br /&gt;An electrical inductor (e.g., a coil or wire) has an electric current as its primary phenomenon and a magnetic field as its secondary phenomenon (inertia). Corresponding to this, an economic inductor has a flow of economic value as its primary phenomenon and a population field as its secondary field phenomenon of inertia. When the flow of economic value (e.g., money) diminishes, the human population field collapses in order to keep the economic value (money) flowing (extreme case - war). &lt;br /&gt;This public inertia is a result of consumer buying habits, expected standard of living, etc., and is generally a phenomenon of self-preservation. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Inductive Factors to Consider&lt;br /&gt;Population &lt;br /&gt;Magnitude of the economic activities of the government &lt;br /&gt;The method of financing these government activities (See Peter-Paul Principle - inflation of the currency.) &lt;br /&gt;Translation&lt;br /&gt;(a few examples will be given.) &lt;br /&gt;Charge: coulombs; dollars (1939). &lt;br /&gt;Flow/Current: amperes (coulombs per second); dollars of flow per year. &lt;br /&gt;Motivating Force: volts; dollars (output) demand. &lt;br /&gt;Conductance: amperes per volt; dollars of flow per year per dollar demand. &lt;br /&gt;Capacitance: coulombs per volt; dollars of production inventory/stock per dollar demand. &lt;br /&gt;Time Flow Relationships and Self-Destructive Oscillations&lt;br /&gt;An ideal industry may be symbolized electronically in various ways. The simplest way is to represent a demand by a voltage and a supply by a current. When this is done, the relationship between the two becomes what is called an admittance, which can result from three economic factors: (1) foresight flow, (2) present flow, and (3) hindsight flow.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Foresight flow is the result of that property of living entities to cause energy (food) to be stored for a period of low energy (e.g., a winter season). It consists of demands made upon an economic system for that period of low energy (winter season). &lt;br /&gt;In a production industry it takes several forms, one of which is known as production stock or inventory. In electronic symbology this specific industry demand (a pure capital industry) is represented by capacitance and the stock or resource is represented by a stored charge. Satisfaction of an industry demand suffers a lag because of the loading effect of inventory priorities. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Present flow ideally involves no delays. It is, so to speak, input today for output today, a "hand to mouth" flow. In electronic symbology, this specific industry demand (a pure us industry) is represented by a conductance which is then a simple economic valve (a dissipative element). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hindsight flow is known as habit or inertia. In electronics this phenomenon is the characteristic of an inductor (economic analog = a pure service industry) in which a current flow (economic analog = flow of money) creates a magnetic field (economic analog = active human population) which, if the current (money flow) begins to diminish, collapse (war) to maintain the current (flow of money - energy). &lt;br /&gt;Other large alternatives to war as economic inductors or economic flywheels are an open-ended social welfare program, or an enormous (but fruitful) open-ended space program. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The problem with stabilizing the economic system is that there is too much demand on account of (1) too much greed and (2) too much population. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This creates excessive economic inductance which can only be balanced with economic capacitance (true resources or value - e.g., in goods or services). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The social welfare program is nothing more than an open-ended credit balance system which creates a false capital industry to give nonproductive people a roof over their heads and food in their stomachs. This can be useful, however, because the recipients become state property in return for the "gift," a standing army for the elite. For he who pays the piper picks the tune. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Those who get hooked on the economic drug, must go to the elite for a fix. In this, the method of introducing large amounts of stabilizing capacitance is by borrowing on the future "credit" of the world. This is a fourth law of motion - onset, and consists of performing an action and leaving the system before the reflected reaction returns to the point of action - a delayed reaction. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The means of surviving the reaction is by changing the system before the reaction can return. By this means, politicians become more popular in their own time and the public pays later. In fact, the measure of such a politician is the delay time. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The same thing is achieved by a government by printing money beyond the limit of the gross national product, and economic process called inflation. This puts a large quantity of money into the hands of the public and maintains a balance against their greed, creates a false self-confidence in them and, for awhile, stays the wolf from the door. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;They must eventually resort to war to balance the account, because war ultimately is merely the act of destroying the creditor, and the politicians are the publicly hired hit men that justify the act to keep the responsibility and blood off the public conscience. (See section on consent factors and social-economic structuring.) &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If the people really cared about their fellow man, they would control their appetites (greed, procreation, etc.) so that they would not have to operate on a credit or welfare social system which steals from the worker to satisfy the bum. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Since most of the general public will not exercise restraint, there are only two alternatives to reduce the economic inductance of the system. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let the populace bludgeon each other to death in war, which will only result in a total destruction of the living earth. &lt;br /&gt;Take control of the world by the use of economic "silent weapons" in a form of "quiet warfare" and reduce the economic inductance of the world to a safe level by a process of benevolent slavery and genocide. &lt;br /&gt;The latter option has been taken as the obviously better option. At this point it should be crystal clear to the reader why absolute secrecy about the silent weapons is necessary. The general public refuses to improve its own mentality and its faith in its fellow man. It has become a herd of proliferating barbarians, and, so to speak, a blight upon the face of the earth. &lt;br /&gt;They do not care enough about economic science to learn why they have not been able to avoid war despite religious morality, and their religious or self-gratifying refusal to deal with earthly problems renders the solution of the earthly problem unreachable to them. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is left to those few who are truly willing to think and survive as the fittest to survive, to solve the problem for themselves as the few who really care. Otherwise, exposure of the silent weapon would destroy our only hope of preserving the seed of the future true humanity. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Industry Equivalent Circuits&lt;br /&gt;The industry 'Q' can be given a block symbol as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Terminals #1 through #m are connected directly to the outputs of industries #1 and #m, respectively. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The equivalent circuit of industry 'Q' is given as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Characteristics: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;All inputs are at zero volts. &lt;br /&gt;A - Amplifier - causes output current IQ to be represented by a voltage EQ. Amplifier delivers sufficient current at EQ to drive all loads Y10 through YmQ and sink all currents i1Q through imQ. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The unit transconductance amplifier AQ is constructed as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;* Arrow denotes the direction of the flow of capital, goods, and services. The total demand is given as EQ, where EQ=IQ. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The coupling network YPQ symbolizes the demand which industry Q makes on industry P. the connective admittance YPQ is called the 'technical coefficient' of the industry Q stating the demand of industry Q, called the industry of use, for the output in capital, goods, or services of industry P called the industry of origin. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The flow of commodities from industry P to industry Q is given by iPQ evaluated by the formula: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;iPQ = YPQ* EQ.&lt;br /&gt;When the admittance YPQ is a simple conductance, this formula takes on the common appearance of Ohm's Law, &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;iPQ = gPQ* IQ.&lt;br /&gt;The interconnection of a three industry system can be diagrammed as follows. The blocks of the industry diagram can be opened up revealing the technical coefficients, and a much simpler format. The equations of flow are given as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stages of Schematic Simplification&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Generalization&lt;br /&gt;All of this may now be summarized. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let Ij represent the output of industry j, and &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ijk, the amount of the product of industry j absorbed annually by industry k, and &lt;br /&gt;ijo, the amount of the same product j made available for 'outside' use. Then &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Substituting the technical coefficiences, yjk &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;which is the general equation of every admittance in the industry circuit. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Final Bill of Goods&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;is called the final bill of goods or the bill of final demand, and is zero when the system can be closed by the evaluation of the technical coefficients of the 'non-productive' industries, government and households. Households may be regarded as a productive industry with labor as its output product. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Technical Coefficients&lt;br /&gt;The quantities yjk are called the technical coefficients of the industrial system. They are admittances and can consist of any combination of three passive parameters, conductance, capacitance, and inductance. Diodes are used to make the flow unidirectional and point against the flow. &lt;br /&gt;gjk = economic conductance, absorption coefficient &lt;br /&gt;yjk = economic capacitance, capital coefficient &lt;br /&gt;Ljk = economic inductance, human activity coefficient &lt;br /&gt;Types of Admittances&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Household Industry&lt;br /&gt;The industries of finance (banking), manufacturing, and government, real counterparts of the pure industries of capital, goods, and services, are easily defined because they are generally logically structured. Because of this their processes can be described mathematically and their technical coefficients can be easily deduced. This, however, is not the case with the service industry known as the household industry. &lt;br /&gt;Household Models&lt;br /&gt;When the industry flow diagram is represented by a 2-block system of households on the right and all other industries on the left, the following results: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The arrows from left to right labeled A, B, C, etc., denote flow of economic value from the industries in the left hand block to the industry in the right hand block called 'households'. These may be thought of as the monthly consumer flows of the following commodities. A - alcoholic beverages, B - beef, C - coffee, . . . . , U - unknown, etc. . . &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The problem which a theoretical economist faces is that the consumer preferences of any household is not easily predictable and the technical coefficients of any one household tend to be a nonlinear, very complex, and variable function of income, prices, etc. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Computer information derived from the use of the universal product code in conjuction with credit-card purchase as an individual household identifier could change this state of affairs, but the U.P.C. method is not yet available on a national or even a significant regional scale. To compensate for this data deficiency, an alternate indirect approach of analysis has been adopted known as economic shock testing. This method, widely used in the aircraft manufacturing industry, develops an aggregate statistical sort of data. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Applied to economics, this means that all of the households in one region or in the whole nation are studied as a group or class rather than individually, and the mass behavior rather than the individual behavior is used to discover useful estimates of the technical coefficients governing the economic structure of the hypothetical single-household industry. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Notice in the industry flow diagram that the values for the flows A, B, C, etc. are accessible to measurement in terms of selling prices and total sales of commodities. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One method of evaluating the technical coefficients of the household industry depends upon shocking the prices of a commodity and noting the changes in the sales of all of the commodities. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic Shock Testing&lt;br /&gt;In recent times, the application of Operations Research to the study of the public economy has been obvious for anyone who understands the principles of shock testing. &lt;br /&gt;In the shock testing of an aircraft airframe, the recoil impulse of firing a gun mounted on that airframe causes shock waves in that structure which tell aviation engineers the conditions under which some parts of the airplane or the whole airplane or its wings will start to vibrate or flutter like a guitar string, a flute reed, or a tuning fork, and disintegrate or fall apart in flight. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic engineers achieve the same result in studying the behavior of the economy and the consumer public by carefully selecting a staple commodity such as beef, coffee, gasoline, or sugar, and then causing a sudden change or shock in its price or availability, thus kicking everybody's budget and buying habits out of shape. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;They then observe the shock waves which result by monitoring the changes in advertising, prices, and sales of that and other commodities. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The objective of such studies is to acquire the know-how to set the public economy into a predictable state of motion or change, even a controlled self-destructive state of motion which will convince the public that certain "expert" people should take control of the money system and reestablish security (rather than liberty and justice) for all. When the subject citizens are rendered unable to control their financial affairs, they, of course, become totally enslaved, a source of cheap labor. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Not only the prices of commodities, but also the availability of labor can be used as the means of shock testing. Labor strikes deliver excellent tests shocks to an economy, especially in the critical service areas of trucking (transportation), communication, public utilities (energy, water, garbage collection), etc. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By shock testing, it is found that there is a direct relationship between the availability of money flowing in an economy and the real psychological outlook and response of masses of people dependent upon that availability. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For example, there is a measurable quantitative relationship between the price of gasoline and the probability that a person would experience a headache, feel a need to watch a violent movie, smoke a cigarette, or go to a tavern for a mug of beer. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is most interesting that, by observing and measuring the economic models by which the public tries to run from their problems and escape from reality, and by applying the mathematical theory of Operations Research, it is possible to program computers to predict the most probable combination of created events (shocks) which will bring about a complete control and subjugation of the public through a subversion of the public economy (by shaking the plum tree). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Introduction to the Theory of Economic Shock Testing&lt;br /&gt;Let the prices and total sales of commodities be given and symbolized as follows: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Commodities Price Function Total Sales &lt;br /&gt;alcoholic beverages A A &lt;br /&gt;beef B B &lt;br /&gt;coffee C C &lt;br /&gt;gasoline G G &lt;br /&gt;sugar S S &lt;br /&gt;tobacco T T &lt;br /&gt;unknown balance U U &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let us assume a simple economic model in which the total number of important (staple) commodities are represented as beef, gasoline, and an aggregate of all other staple commodities which we will call the hypothetical miscellaneous staple commodity 'M' (e.g., M is an aggregate of C, S, T, U, etc.). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Example of Shock Testing&lt;br /&gt;Assume that the total sales, P, of petroleum products can be described by the linear function of the quantities B, G, and M, which are functions of the prices of those respective commodities. &lt;br /&gt;P = aPG B + aPG G + aPM M&lt;br /&gt;Then where B, G, and M are functions of the prices of beef, gasoline, and miscellaneous, respectively, and aPB, aPG, and aPM are constant coefficients defining the amount by which each of the functions B, G, and M affect the sales, P, of petroleum products. We are assuming that B, G, and M are variables independent of each other. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If the availability or price of gasoline is suddenly changed, then G must be replaced by G +  G. This causes a change in the petroleum sales from P to P +  P. Also we will assume that B and M remain constant when G changes to G +  G. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(P +  P) = aPB B + aPG (G +  G) + aPMM. &lt;br /&gt;Expanding upon this expression, we get &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;P +  P = aPB B + aPG G + aPG  G + aPM M &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;and subtracting the original value of P we get for the change in P &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Change in P =  P = aPG  G &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dividing by  G we get &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;aPG =  P /  G . &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is a rate of change in P due only to an isolated change in G,  G. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In general, ajk is the partial rate of change in the sales effect j due to a change in the causal price function of commodity k. If the interval of time were infinitesimal, this expression would be reduced to the definition of the total differential of a function, P. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When the price of gasoline is shocked, all of the coefficients with round G (2G) in the denominator are evaluated at the same time. If B, G, and M were independent, and sufficient for description of the economy, then three shock tests would be necessary to evaluate the system. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There are other factors which may be represented the same way. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For example, the tendency of a docile sub-nation to withdraw under economic pressure may be given by &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;where G is the price of gasoline, WP is the dollars spent per unit time (referenced to say 1939) for war production during 'peace' time, etc. These quantities are presented to a computer in matrix format as follows: &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;and X1 = G Y1 = P - KP  &lt;br /&gt;X2 = B Y2 = F - KF  &lt;br /&gt;X3 = etc. Y3 = etc. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Finally, inverting this matrix, i.e., solving for the Xk terms of the Yj, we get, say, &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[bkj] [Yj ] = [Xk] .&lt;br /&gt;This is the result into which we substitute to get that set of conditions of prices of commodities, bad news on TV, etc., which will deliver a collapse of public morale ripe for take over. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once the economic price and sales coefficients ajk and bkj are determined, they may be translated into the technical supply and demand coefficients gjk, Cjk, and 1/Ljk. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shock testing of a given commodity is then repeated to get the time rate of change of these technical coefficients. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Introduction to Economic Amplifiers&lt;br /&gt;Economic amplifiers are the active components of economic engineering. The basic characteristic of any amplifier (mechanical, electrical, or economic) is that it receives an input control signal and delivers energy from an independent energy source to a specified output terminal in a predictable relationship to that input control signal. &lt;br /&gt;The simplest form of an economic amplifier is a device called advertising. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If a person is spoken to by a T.V. advertiser as if he were a twelve-year-old, then, due to suggestibility, he will, with a certain probability, respond or react to that suggestion with the uncritical response of a twelve-year-old and will reach into his economic reservoir and deliver its energy to but that product on impulse when he passes it in the store. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An economic amplifier may have several inputs and output. Its response might be instantaneous or delayed. Its circuit symbol might be a rotary switch if its options are exclusive, qualitative, "go" or "no-go", or it might have its parametric input/output relationships specified by a matrix with internal energy sources represented. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Whatever its form might be, its purpose is to govern the flow of energy from a source to an output sink in direct relationship to an input control signal. For this reason, it is called an active circuit element or component. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Economic Amplifiers fall into classes called strategies, and, in comparison with electronic amplifiers, the specific internal functions of an economic amplifier are called logistical instead of electrical. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Therefore, economic amplifiers not only deliver power gain but also, in effect, are used to cause changes in the economic circuitry. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the design of an economic amplifier we must have some idea of at least five functions, which are:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;the available input signals &lt;br /&gt;the desired output-control objectives, &lt;br /&gt;the strategic objective, &lt;br /&gt;the available economic power sources, &lt;br /&gt;the logistical options. &lt;br /&gt;The process of defining and evaluating these factors and incorporating the economic amplifier into an economic system has been popularly called game theory. &lt;br /&gt;The design of an economic amplifier begins with a specification of the power level of the output, which can range from personal to national. The second condition is accuracy of response, i.e., how accurately the output action is a function of the input commands. High gain combined with strong feedback helps to deliver the required precision. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Most of the error will be in the input data signal. Personal input data tends to be specified, while national input data tends to be statistical. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Short List of Inputs&lt;br /&gt;Questions to be answered:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;what &lt;br /&gt;where &lt;br /&gt;why &lt;br /&gt;when &lt;br /&gt;how &lt;br /&gt;who &lt;br /&gt;General sources of information:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;telephone taps &lt;br /&gt;analysis of garbage &lt;br /&gt;surveillance &lt;br /&gt;behavior of children in school &lt;br /&gt;Standard of living by:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;food &lt;br /&gt;shelter &lt;br /&gt;clothing &lt;br /&gt;transportation &lt;br /&gt;Social contacts:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;telephone - itemized record of calls &lt;br /&gt;family - marriage certificates, birth certificates, etc. &lt;br /&gt;friends, associates, etc. &lt;br /&gt;memberships in organizations &lt;br /&gt;political affiliation &lt;br /&gt;The Personal Paper Trail&lt;br /&gt;Personal buying habits, i.e., personal consumer preferences:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;checking accounts &lt;br /&gt;credit-card purchases &lt;br /&gt;"tagged" credit-card purchases - the credit-card purchase of products bearing the U.P.C. (Universal Product Code) &lt;br /&gt;Assets:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;checking accounts &lt;br /&gt;savings accounts &lt;br /&gt;real estate &lt;br /&gt;business &lt;br /&gt;automobile, etc. &lt;br /&gt;safety deposit at bank &lt;br /&gt;stock market &lt;br /&gt;Liabilities:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;creditors &lt;br /&gt;enemies (see - legal) &lt;br /&gt;loans &lt;br /&gt;Government sources (ploys)*:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Welfare &lt;br /&gt;Social Security &lt;br /&gt;U.S.D.A. surplus food &lt;br /&gt;doles &lt;br /&gt;grants &lt;br /&gt;subsidies &lt;br /&gt;* Principle of this ploy -- the citizen will almost always make the collection of information easy if he can operate on the "free sandwich principle" of "eat now, and pay later." &lt;br /&gt;Government sources (via intimidation):&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Internal Revenue Service &lt;br /&gt;OSHA &lt;br /&gt;Census &lt;br /&gt;etc. &lt;br /&gt;Other government sources -- surveillance of U.S. mail. &lt;br /&gt;Habit Patterns -- Programming&lt;br /&gt;Strengths and weaknesses:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;activities (sports, hobbies, etc.) &lt;br /&gt;see "legal" (fear, anger, etc. -- crime record) &lt;br /&gt;hospital records (drug sensitivities, reaction to pain, etc.) &lt;br /&gt;psychiatric records (fears, angers, disgusts, adaptability, reactions to stimuli, violence, suggestibility or hypnosis, pain, pleasure, love, and sex) &lt;br /&gt;Methods of coping -- of adaptability -- behavior:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;consumption of alcohol &lt;br /&gt;consumption of drugs &lt;br /&gt;entertainment &lt;br /&gt;religious factors influencing behavior &lt;br /&gt;other methods of escaping from reality &lt;br /&gt;Payment modus operandi (MO) -- pay on time, etc.:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;payment of telephone bills &lt;br /&gt;energy purchases &lt;br /&gt;water purchases &lt;br /&gt;repayment of loans &lt;br /&gt;house payments &lt;br /&gt;automobile payments &lt;br /&gt;payments on credit cards &lt;br /&gt;Political sensitivity:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;beliefs &lt;br /&gt;contacts &lt;br /&gt;position &lt;br /&gt;strengths/weaknesses &lt;br /&gt;projects/activities &lt;br /&gt;Legal inputs -- behavioral control (Excuses for investigation, search, arrest, or employment of force to modify behavior)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;court records &lt;br /&gt;police records -- NCIC &lt;br /&gt;driving record &lt;br /&gt;reports made to police &lt;br /&gt;insurance information &lt;br /&gt;anti-establishment acquaintances &lt;br /&gt;National Input Information&lt;br /&gt;Business sources (via I.R.S., etc):&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;prices of commodities &lt;br /&gt;sales &lt;br /&gt;investments in &lt;br /&gt;stocks/inventory &lt;br /&gt;production tools and machinery &lt;br /&gt;buildings and improvements &lt;br /&gt;the stock market &lt;br /&gt;Banks and credit bureaus:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;credit information &lt;br /&gt;payment information &lt;br /&gt;Miscellaneous sources:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;polls and surveys &lt;br /&gt;publications &lt;br /&gt;telephone records &lt;br /&gt;energy and utility purchases &lt;br /&gt;Short List of Outputs&lt;br /&gt;Outputs -- create controlled situations -- manipulation of the economy, hence society -- control by control of compensation and income.&lt;br /&gt;Sequence:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;allocates opportunities. &lt;br /&gt;destroys opportunities. &lt;br /&gt;controls the economic environment. &lt;br /&gt;controls the availability of raw materials. &lt;br /&gt;controls capital. &lt;br /&gt;controls bank rates. &lt;br /&gt;controls the inflation of the currency. &lt;br /&gt;controls the possession of property. &lt;br /&gt;controls industrial capacity. &lt;br /&gt;controls manufacturing. &lt;br /&gt;controls the availability of goods (commodities). &lt;br /&gt;controls the prices of commodities. &lt;br /&gt;controls services, the labor force, etc. &lt;br /&gt;controls payments to government officials. &lt;br /&gt;controls the legal functions. &lt;br /&gt;controls the personal data files -- uncorrectable by the party slandered. &lt;br /&gt;controls advertising. &lt;br /&gt;controls media contact. &lt;br /&gt;controls material available for T.V. viewing &lt;br /&gt;disengages attention from real issues. &lt;br /&gt;engages emotions. &lt;br /&gt;creates disorder, chaos, and insanity. &lt;br /&gt;controls design of more probing tax forms. &lt;br /&gt;controls surveillance. &lt;br /&gt;controls the storage of information. &lt;br /&gt;develops psychological analyses and profiles of individuals. &lt;br /&gt;controls legal functions [repeat of 15] &lt;br /&gt;controls sociological factors. &lt;br /&gt;controls health options. &lt;br /&gt;preys on weakness. &lt;br /&gt;cripples strengths. &lt;br /&gt;leaches wealth and substance. &lt;br /&gt;Table of Strategies&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Do this:                        To get this: &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Keep the public ignorant        Less public organization &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Maintain access to control      Required reaction to outputs (prices, &lt;br /&gt;points for feedback             sales) &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Create preoccupation            Lower defenses &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Attack the family unit          Control of the education of the young &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Give less cash and more         More self-indulgence and more data &lt;br /&gt;credit and doles &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Attack the privacy              Destroy faith in this sort of &lt;br /&gt;of the church                   government &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Social conformity               Computer programming simplicity &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Minimize the tax protest        Maximum economic data, minimum  &lt;br /&gt;                                enforcement problems &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Stabilize the consent           Simplicity coefficients &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Tighten control of variables    Simpler computer input data --  &lt;br /&gt;                                greater predictability &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Establish boundary              Problem simplicity / solutions of &lt;br /&gt;conditions                      differential and difference equations &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Proper timing                   Less data shift and blurring &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Maximize control                Minimum resistance to control &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Collapse of currency            Destroy the faith of the American  &lt;br /&gt;                                people in each other. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Diversion, the Primary Strategy&lt;br /&gt;Experience has prevent that the simplest method of securing a silent weapon and gaining control of the public is to keep the public undisciplined and ignorant of the basic system principles on the one hand, while keeping them confused, disorganized, and distracted with matters of no real importance on the other hand.&lt;br /&gt;This is achieved by:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;disengaging their minds; sabotaging their mental activities; providing a low-quality program of public education in mathematics, logic, systems design and economics; and discouraging technical creativity. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;engaging their emotions, increasing their self-indulgence and their indulgence in emotional and physical activities, by: &lt;br /&gt;unrelenting emotional affrontations and attacks (mental and emotional rape) by way of constant barrage of sex, violence, and wars in the media - especially the T.V. and the newspapers. &lt;br /&gt;giving them what they desire - in excess - "junk food for thought" - and depriving them of what they really need. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;rewriting history and law and subjecting the public to the deviant creation, thus being able to shift their thinking from personal needs to highly fabricated outside priorities. &lt;br /&gt;These preclude their interest in and discovery of the silent weapons of social automation technology. &lt;br /&gt;The general rule is that there is a profit in confusion; the more confusion, the more profit. Therefore, the best approach is to create problems and then offer solutions. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Diversion Summary&lt;br /&gt;Media: Keep the adult public attention diverted away from the real social issues, and captivated by matters of no real importance. &lt;br /&gt;Schools: Keep the young public ignorant of real mathematics, real economics, real law, and real history. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Entertainment: Keep the public entertainment below a sixth-grade level. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Work: Keep the public busy, busy, busy, with no time to think; back on the farm with the other animals. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Consent, the Primary Victory&lt;br /&gt;A silent weapon system operates upon data obtained from a docile public by legal (but not always lawful) force. Much information is made available to silent weapon systems programmers through the Internal Revenue Service. (See Studies in the Structure of the American Economy for an I.R.S. source list.) &lt;br /&gt;This information consists of the enforced delivery of well-organized data contained in federal and state tax forms, collected, assembled, and submitted by slave labor provided by taxpayers and employers. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Furthermore, the number of such forms submitted to the I.R.S. is a useful indicator of public consent, an important factor in strategic decision making. Other data sources are given in the Short List of Inputs. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Consent Coefficients - numerical feedback indicating victory status. Psychological basis: When the government is able to collect tax and seize private property without just compensation, it is an indication that the public is ripe for surrender and is consenting to enslavement and legal encroachment. A good and easily quantified indicator of harvest time is the number of public citizens who pay income tax despite an obvious lack of reciprocal or honest service from the government. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Amplification Energy Sources&lt;br /&gt;The next step in the process of designing an economic amplifier is discovering the energy sources. The energy sources which support any primitive economic system are, of course, a supply of raw materials, and the consent of the people to labor and consequently assume a certain rank, position, level, or class in the social structure, i.e., to provide labor at various levels in the pecking order. &lt;br /&gt;Each class, in guaranteeing its own level of income, controls the class immediately below it, hence preserves the class structure. This provides stability and security, but also government from the top. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As time goes on and communication and education improve, the lower-class elements of the social labor structure become knowledgeable and envious of the good things that the upper-class members have. They also begin to attain a knowledge of energy systems and the ability to enforce their rise through the class structure. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This threatens the sovereignty of the elite. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If this rise of the lower classes can be postponed long enough, the elite can achieve energy dominance, and labor by consent no longer will hold a position of an essential energy source. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Until such energy dominance is absolutely established, the consent of people to labor and let others handle their affairs must be taken into consideration, since failure to do so could cause the people to interfere in the final transfer of energy sources to the control of the elite. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is essential to recognize that at this time, public consent is still an essential key to the release of energy in the process of economic amplification. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Therefore, consent as an energy release mechanism will now be considered. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Logistics&lt;br /&gt;The successful application of a strategy requires a careful study of inputs, outputs, the strategy connecting the inputs and the outputs, and the available energy sources to fuel the strategy. This study is called logistics. &lt;br /&gt;A logistical problem is studied at the elementary level first, and then levels of greater complexity are studied as a synthesis of elementary factors. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This means that a given system is analyzed, i.e., broken down into its subsystems, and these in turn are analyzed, until by this process, one arrives at the logistical "atom," the individual. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is where the process of synthesis propery begins, at the time of birth of the individual. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Artificial Womb&lt;br /&gt;From the time a person leaves its mother's womb, its every effort is directed towards building, maintaining, and withdrawing into artificial wombs, various sorts of substitute protective devices or shells. &lt;br /&gt;The objective of these artificial wombs is to provide a stable environment for both stable and unstable activity; to provide a shelter for the evolutionary processes of growth and maturity - i.e., survival; to provide security for freedom and to provide defensive protection for offensive activity. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is equally true of both the general public and the elite. However, there is a definite difference in the way each of these classes go about the solution of problems. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Political Structure of a Nation - Dependency&lt;br /&gt;The primary reason why the individual citizens of a country create a political structure is a subconscious wish or desire to perpetuate their own dependency relationship of childhood. Simply put, they want a human god to eliminate all risk from their life, pat them on the head, kiss their bruises, put a chicken on every dinner table, clothe their bodies, tuck them into bed at night, and tell them that everything will be alright when they wake up in the morning. &lt;br /&gt;This public demand is incredible, so the human god, the politician, meets incredibility with incredibility by promising the world and delivering nothing. So who is the bigger liar? the public? or the "godfather"? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This public behavior is surrender born of fear, laziness, and expediency. It is the basis of the welfare state as a strategic weapon, useful against a disgusting public. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Action/Offense&lt;br /&gt;Most people want to be able to subdue and/or kill other human beings which disturb their daily lives, but they do not want to have to cope with the moral and religious issues which such an overt act on their part might raise. Therefore, they assign the dirty work to others (including their own children) so as to keep the blood off their hands. They rave about the humane treatment of animals and then sit down to a delicious hamburger from a whitewashed slaughterhouse down the street and out of sight. But even more hypocritical, they pay taxes to finance a professional association of hit men collectively called politicians, and then complain about corruption in government. &lt;br /&gt;Responsibility&lt;br /&gt;Again, most people want to be free to do the things (to explore, etc.) but they are afraid to fail. &lt;br /&gt;The fear of failure is manifested in irresponsibility, and especially in delegating those personal responsibilities to others where success is uncertain or carries possible or created liabilities (law) which the person is not prepared to accept. They want authority (root word - "author"), but they will not accept responsibility or liability. So they hire politicians to face reality for them. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Summary&lt;br /&gt;The people hire the politicians so that the people can:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;obtain security without managing it. &lt;br /&gt;obtain action without thinking about it. &lt;br /&gt;inflict theft, injury, and death upon others without having to contemplate either life or death. &lt;br /&gt;avoid responsibility for their own intentions. &lt;br /&gt;obtain the benefits of reality and science without exerting themselves in the discipline of facing or learning either of these things. &lt;br /&gt;They give the politicians the power to create and manage a war machine to:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;provide for the survival of the nation/womb. &lt;br /&gt;prevent encroachment of anything upon the nation/womb. &lt;br /&gt;destroy the enemy who threatens the nation/womb. &lt;br /&gt;destroy those citizens of their own country who do not conform for the sake of stability of the nation/womb. &lt;br /&gt;Politicians hold many quasi-military jobs, the lowest being the police which are soldiers, the attorneys and C.P.A.s next who are spies and saboteurs (licensed), and the judges who shout orders and run the closed union military shop for whatever the market will bear. The generals are industrialists. The "presidential" level of commander-in-chief is shared by the international bankers. The people know that they have created this farce and financed it with their own taxes (consent), but they would rather knuckle under than be the hypocrite. &lt;br /&gt;Thus, a nation becomes divided into two very distinct parts, a docile sub-nation [great silent majority] and a political sub-nation. The political sub-nation remains attached to the docile sub-nation, tolerates it, and leaches its substance until it grows strong enough to detach itself and then devour its parent. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;System Analysis&lt;br /&gt;In order to make meaningful computerized economic decisions about war, the primary economic flywheel, it is necessary to assign concrete logistical values to each element of the war structure - personnel and material alike. &lt;br /&gt;This process begins with a clear and candid description of the subsystems of such a structure. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Draft (As military service)&lt;br /&gt;Few efforts of human behavior modification are more remarkable or more effective than that of the socio-military institution known as the draft. A primary purpose of a draft or other such institution is to instill, by intimidation, in the young males of a society the uncritical conviction that the government is omnipotent. He is soon taught that a prayer is slow to reverse what a bullet can do in an instant. Thus, a man trained in a religious environment for eighteen years of his life can, by this instrument of the government, be broken down, be purged of his fantasies and delusions in a matter of mere months. Once that conviction is instilled, all else becomes easy to instill. &lt;br /&gt;Even more interesting is the process by which a young man's parents, who purportedly love him, can be induced to send him off to war to his death. Although the scope of this work will not allow this matter to be expanded in full detail, nevertheless, a coarse overview will be possible and can serve to reveal those factors which must be included in some numerical form in a computer analysis of social and war systems. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We begin with a tentative definition of the draft. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The draft (selective service, etc.) is an institution of compulsory collective sacrifice and slavery, devised by the middle-aged and elderly for the purpose of pressing the young into doing the public dirty work. It further serves to make the youth as guilty as the elders, thus making criticism of the elders by the youth less likely (Generational Stabilizer). It is marketed and and sold to the public under the label of "patriotic = national" service. &lt;br /&gt;Once a candid economic definition of the draft is achieved, that definition is used to outline the boundaries of a structure called a Human Value System, which in turn is translated into the terms of game theory. The value of such a slave laborer is given in a Table of Human Values, a table broken down into categories by intellect, experience, post-service job demand, etc. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Some of these categories are ordinary and can be tentatively evaluated in terms of the value of certain jobs for which a known fee exists. Some jobs are harder to value because they are unique to the demands of social subversion, for an extreme example: the value of a mother's instruction to her daughter, causing that daughter to put certain behavioral demands upon a future husband ten or fifteen years hence; thus, by suppressing his resistance to a perversion of a government, making it easier for a banking cartel to buy the State of New York in, say, twenty years. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Such a problem leans heavily upon the observations and data of wartime espionage and many types of psychological testing. But crude mathematical models (algorithms, etc.) can be devised, if not to predict, at least to predeterminate these events with maximum certainty. What does not exist by natural cooperation is thus enhanced by calculated compulsion. Human beings are machines, levers which may be grasped and turned, and there is little real difference between automating a society and automating a shoe factory. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These derived values are variable. (It is necessary to use a current Table of Human Values for computer analysis.) These values are given in true measure rather than U.S. dollars, since the latter is unstable, being presently inflated beyond the production of national goods and services so as to give the economy a false kinetic energy ("paper" inductance). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The silver value is stable, it being possible to buy the same amount with a gram of silver today as it could be bought in 1920. Human value measured in silver units changes slightly due to changes in production technology. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Enforcement&lt;br /&gt;Factor I &lt;br /&gt;As in every social system approach, stability is achieved only by understanding and accounting for human nature (action/reaction patterns). A failure to do so can be, and usually is, disastrous. &lt;br /&gt;As in other human social schemes, one form or another of intimidation (or incentive) is essential to the success of the draft. Physical principles of action and reaction must be applied to both internal and external subsystems. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To secure the draft, individual brainwashing/programming and both the family unit and the peer group must be engaged and brought under control. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Factor II - Father &lt;br /&gt;The man of the household must be housebroken to ensure that junior will grow up with the right social training and attitudes. The advertising media, etc., are engaged to see to it that father-to-be is pussy-whipped before or by the time he is married. He is taught that he either conforms to the social notch cut out for him or his sex life will be hobbled and his tender companionship will be zero. He is made to see that women demand security more than logical, principled, or honorable behavior. &lt;br /&gt;By the time his son must go to war, father (with jelly for a backbone) will slam a gun into junior's hand before father will risk the censure of his peers, or make a hypocrite of himself by crossing the investment he has in his own personal opinion or self-esteem. Junior will go to war or father will be embarrassed. So junior will go to war, the true purpose not withstanding. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Factor III - Mother &lt;br /&gt;The female element of human society is ruled by emotion first and logic second. In the battle between logic and imagination, imagination always wins, fantasy prevails, maternal instinct dominates so that the child comes first and the future comes second. A woman with a newborn baby is too starry-eyed to see a wealthy man's cannon fodder or a cheap source of slave labor. A woman must, however, be conditioned to accept the transition to "reality" when it comes, or sooner. &lt;br /&gt;As the transition becomes more difficult to manage, the family unit must be carefully disintegrated, and state-controlled public education and state-operated child-care centers must be become more common and legally enforced so as to begin the detachment of the child from the mother and father at an earlier age. Inoculation of behavioral drugs [Ritalin] can speed the transition for the child (mandatory). Caution: A woman's impulsive anger can override her fear. An irate woman's power must never be underestimated, and her power over a pussy-whipped husband must likewise never be underestimated. It got women the vote in 1920. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Factor IV - Junior &lt;br /&gt;The emotional pressure for self-preservation during the time of war and the self-serving attitude of the common herd that have an option to avoid the battlefield - if junior can be persuaded to go - is all of the pressure finally necessary to propel Johnny off to war. Their quiet blackmailings of him are the threats: "No sacrifice, no friends; no glory, no girlfriends." &lt;br /&gt;Factor V - Sister &lt;br /&gt;And what about junior's sister? She is given all the good things of life by her father, and taught to expect the same from her future husband regardless of the price. &lt;br /&gt;Factor VI - Cattle &lt;br /&gt;Those who will not use their brains are no better off than those who have no brains, and so this mindless school of jelly-fish, father, mother, son, and daughter, become useful beasts of burden or trainers of the same. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-5941205771067704285?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/5941205771067704285/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=5941205771067704285' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/5941205771067704285'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/5941205771067704285'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/operations-research-technical-manual-tm.html' title='Operations Research Technical Manual TM-SW7905.1'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-2194964696671871078</id><published>2008-07-17T11:54:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.026-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Henry Kissinger: Iran Attack About Oil, Not Nuke Program</title><content type='html'>Henry Kissinger: Iran Attack About Oil, Not Nuke Program &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sep 21, 2007 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In a new op-ed, Bilderberg luminary Henry Kissinger admits that U.S. hostility against Iran is not about the threat of nuclear proliferation, but as part of a larger agenda to seize Iranian oil supplies. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But the true meaning behind this is lost on Neo-Cons, who are still deluded into thinking that Americans benefit from the imperial looting of natural resources in the middle east. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In a Washington Post op-ed, Former US Secretary of State Kissinger comes clean on the true motives behind the planned military assault on Iran. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"An Iran that practices subversion and seeks regional hegemony - which appears to be the current trend - must be faced with lines it will not be permitted to cross. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The industrial nations cannot accept radical forces dominating a region on which their economies depend," writes Kissinger. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-2194964696671871078?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/2194964696671871078/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=2194964696671871078' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/2194964696671871078'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/2194964696671871078'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/henry-kissinger-iran-attack-about-oil.html' title='Henry Kissinger: Iran Attack About Oil, Not Nuke Program'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-6144342525217947344</id><published>2008-07-15T09:29:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.027-08:00</updated><title type='text'>O jiss I hope they will fight for a better hope then Democracy :(</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;O jiss I hope they will fight for a better hope then Democracy :(&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Democracy is just a illusion  it's like see a doll theater show year and year after and knowing the true power is behind the curtain&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The best thing you want is when the people rule and not politicans   ..&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Democracy just another word that means DEMON CRACY.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-6144342525217947344?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/6144342525217947344/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=6144342525217947344' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/6144342525217947344'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/6144342525217947344'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/o-jiss-i-hope-they-will-fight-for.html' title='O jiss I hope they will fight for a better hope then Democracy :('/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-8374271699655770942</id><published>2008-07-14T01:16:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.028-08:00</updated><title type='text'>I tell you a secret both have right</title><content type='html'>Do you belive in god ? Do you not belive in god?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I tell you a secret both have right.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-8374271699655770942?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/8374271699655770942/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=8374271699655770942' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/8374271699655770942'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/8374271699655770942'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/i-tell-you-secret-both-have-right.html' title='I tell you a secret both have right'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-9197787726284716933</id><published>2008-07-14T01:02:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.029-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Ja prata med en av försäkringkassans chefer</title><content type='html'>Mayday S O S  Sweden is a new Terror State...&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ja prata med en av försäkringkassans chefer.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Efter ett tal om att de skulle sänka antalet sjukskrivna med ett par procent.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Friskskriva folk  Jag fråga då har ni hittat en mirakel medecin eller så ?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;- Nah på order av sittande Regering Sossarna skall de sparas in - &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Så ni slänger ut de sjuka?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; - Japp de sjuka är de ingen som protesterar!!  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Men ja förlorar jobbet om jag inte lyder.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Märk väll hur Mona S sitter ushar sig över hur alliancen sitter förstör Samhället då sossarna gav direktiven alliancen utför dom..&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Det är nu dags för Svensken att ta Makten själv, släng ut Politikerna.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/510533558795200225-9197787726284716933?l=shithitthefan.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/feeds/9197787726284716933/comments/default' title='Kommentarer till inlägget'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=510533558795200225&amp;postID=9197787726284716933' title='0 kommentarer'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/9197787726284716933'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/510533558795200225/posts/default/9197787726284716933'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://shithitthefan.blogspot.com/2008/07/ja-prata-med-en-av-frskringkassans.html' title='Ja prata med en av försäkringkassans chefer'/><author><name>PG</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-510533558795200225.post-3816669948011845584</id><published>2008-07-13T17:14:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-17T14:58:13.029-08:00</updated><title type='text'>THE GRAND CHESSBOARD    ZBIGNIEW   BRZEZINSKI</title><content type='html'>ZBIGNIEW   BRZEZINSKI&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;American Primacy and Its - Geostrategic Imperatives&lt;br /&gt;SA5IC&lt;br /&gt;•A U m h i &lt;4-Q|i&lt;br /&gt;For my students—to help them shape tomorrow's world&lt;br /&gt;CONTENTS&lt;br /&gt;List of Maps ix&lt;br /&gt;List of Charts and Tables xi&lt;br /&gt;Introduction: Superpower Politics xiii&lt;br /&gt;1 Hegemony of a New Type 3&lt;br /&gt;The Short Road to Global Supremacy 3&lt;br /&gt;The First Global Power 10&lt;br /&gt;The American Global System 24&lt;br /&gt;2 The Eurasian Chessboard 30&lt;br /&gt;Geopolitics and Geostrategy 37&lt;br /&gt;Geostrategic Players and Geopolitical Pivots 40&lt;br /&gt;Critical Choices and Potential Challenges 48&lt;br /&gt;3 The Democratic Bridgehead 57&lt;br /&gt;Grandeur and Redemption 61&lt;br /&gt;America's Central Objective 71&lt;br /&gt;Europe's Historic Timetable 81&lt;br /&gt;vii&lt;br /&gt;viii CONTENTS&lt;br /&gt;4 The Black Hole 87&lt;br /&gt;Russia's New Geopolitical Setting 87&lt;br /&gt;Geostrategic Phantasmagoria 96&lt;br /&gt;The Dilemma of the One Alternative 118&lt;br /&gt;5 The Eurasian Balkans 123&lt;br /&gt;The Ethnic Cauldron 125&lt;br /&gt;The Multiple Contest 135&lt;br /&gt;Neither Dominion Nor Exclusion1 148&lt;br /&gt;6 The Far Eastern Anchor 151&lt;br /&gt;China: Not Global but Regional 158&lt;br /&gt;Japan: Not Regional but International 173&lt;br /&gt;America's Geostrategic Adjustment 185&lt;br /&gt;7 Conclusion 194&lt;br /&gt;A Geostrategy for Eurasia 197&lt;br /&gt;A Trans-Eurasian Security System 208&lt;br /&gt;Beyond the Last Global Superpower 209&lt;br /&gt;Index 217&lt;br /&gt;MAPS&lt;br /&gt;The Sino-Soviet Bloc and Three Central&lt;br /&gt;Strategic Fronts 7&lt;br /&gt;The Roman Empire at Its Height 11&lt;br /&gt;The Manchu Empire at Its Height 14&lt;br /&gt;Approximate Scope of Mongol Imperial Control, 1280 16&lt;br /&gt;European Global Supremacy, 1900 18&lt;br /&gt;British Paramountcy, 1860-1914 20&lt;br /&gt;American Global Supremacy 22&lt;br /&gt;The World's Geopolitically Central Continent&lt;br /&gt;and Its Vital Peripheries 32&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Chessboard 34&lt;br /&gt;The Global Zone of Percolating Violence 53&lt;br /&gt;France's and Germany's Geopolitical Orbits&lt;br /&gt;of Special Interest 64&lt;br /&gt;Is This Really "Europe"? 82&lt;br /&gt;Beyond 2010: The Critical Core of Europe's Security 85&lt;br /&gt;IX&lt;br /&gt;x MAPS&lt;br /&gt;Loss of Ideological Control&lt;br /&gt;and Imperial Retrenchment 94&lt;br /&gt;Russian Military Bases in the Former Soviet Space 108&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Balkans 124&lt;br /&gt;Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia 126&lt;br /&gt;The Turkic Ethnolinguistic Zone 137&lt;br /&gt;The Competitive Interests of Russia, Turkey, and Iran 138&lt;br /&gt;Caspian-Mediterranean Oil Export Pipelines 146&lt;br /&gt;Boundary and Territorial Disputes in East Asia 155&lt;br /&gt;Potential Scope of China's Sphere of Influence&lt;br /&gt;and Collision Points 167&lt;br /&gt;Overlap Between a Greater China and an&lt;br /&gt;American-Japanese Anti-China Coalition 184&lt;br /&gt;LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES&lt;br /&gt;The Continents: Area 33&lt;br /&gt;The Continents: Population 33&lt;br /&gt;The Continents: GNP 33&lt;br /&gt;European Organizations 58&lt;br /&gt;EU Membership: Application to Accession 83&lt;br /&gt;Demographic Data for the Eurasian Balkans 127&lt;br /&gt;Asian Armed Forces 156&lt;br /&gt;XI&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;INTRODUCTION&lt;br /&gt;Superpower Politics&lt;br /&gt;EVER SINCE THE CONTINENTS started interacting politically,&lt;br /&gt;some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of&lt;br /&gt;world power. In different ways, at different times, the peoples&lt;br /&gt;Inhabiting Eurasia—though mostly those from its Western European&lt;br /&gt;periphery—penetrated and dominated the world's other&lt;br /&gt;regions as individual Eurasian states attained the special status&lt;br /&gt;and enjoyed the privileges of being the world's premier powers.&lt;br /&gt;The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a tectonic&lt;br /&gt;shift in world affairs. For the first time ever, a non-Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;power has emerged not only as the key arbiter of Eurasian power&lt;br /&gt;relations but also as the world's paramount power. The defeat and&lt;br /&gt;collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance&lt;br /&gt;of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the&lt;br /&gt;sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia, however, retains Its geopolitical importance. Not only&lt;br /&gt;is its western periphery—Europe—still the location of much of the&lt;br /&gt;world's political and economic power, but its eastern region—&lt;br /&gt;Asia—has lately become a vital center of economic growth and rising&lt;br /&gt;political influence. Hence, the issue of how a globally engaged&lt;br /&gt;xin&lt;br /&gt;xiv INTRODUCTION&lt;br /&gt;America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships—&lt;br /&gt;and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a dominant&lt;br /&gt;and antagonistic Eurasian power—remains central to America's&lt;br /&gt;capacity to exercise global primacy.&lt;br /&gt;It follows that—in addition to cultivating the various novel dimensions&lt;br /&gt;of power (technology, communications, information, as&lt;br /&gt;well as trade and finance)—American foreign policy must remain&lt;br /&gt;concerned with the geopolitical dimension and must employ its influence&lt;br /&gt;in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental&lt;br /&gt;equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global&lt;br /&gt;primacy continues to be played, and that struggle involves&lt;br /&gt;geostrategy—the strategic management of geopolitical interests. It&lt;br /&gt;is noteworthy that as recently as 1940 two aspirants to global&lt;br /&gt;power, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, agreed explicitly (in the secret&lt;br /&gt;negotiations of November of that year) that America should&lt;br /&gt;be excluded from Eurasia. Each realized that the injection of American&lt;br /&gt;power into Eurasia would preclude his ambitions regarding&lt;br /&gt;global domination. Each shared the assumption that Eurasia is the&lt;br /&gt;center of the world and that he who controls Eurasia controls the&lt;br /&gt;world. A half century later, the issue has been redefined: will America's&lt;br /&gt;primacy in Eurasia endure, and to what ends might it be applied?&lt;br /&gt;The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign&lt;br /&gt;and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community, in&lt;br /&gt;keeping with long-range trends and with the fundamental interests&lt;br /&gt;of humankind. But in the meantime, it is imperative that no&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and&lt;br /&gt;thus also of challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive&lt;br /&gt;and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of&lt;br /&gt;this book.&lt;br /&gt;Zbigniew Brzezinski&lt;br /&gt;Washington, DC.&lt;br /&gt;April 1997&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 1&lt;br /&gt;Hegemony  of a New Type&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY is AS OLD AS MANKIND. But America's current global&lt;br /&gt;supremacy is distinctive in the rapidity of its emergence, in&lt;br /&gt;its global scope, and in the manner of its exercise. In the&lt;br /&gt;course of a single century, America has transformed itself—and&lt;br /&gt;has also been transformed by international dynamics—from a&lt;br /&gt;country relatively isolated in the Western Hemisphere into a&lt;br /&gt;power of unprecedented worldwide reach and grasp.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE SHORT ROAD TO GLOBAL SUPREMACY&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Spanish-American War in 1898 was America's first overseas&lt;br /&gt;war of conquest. It thrust American power far into the Pacific, beyond&lt;br /&gt;Hawaii to the Philippines. By the turn of the century, American&lt;br /&gt;strategists were already busy developing doctrines for a two-ocean&lt;br /&gt;naval supremacy, and the American navy had begun to challenge&lt;br /&gt;the notion that Britain "rules the waves." American claims of a special&lt;br /&gt;status as the sole guardian of the Western Hemisphere's security—&lt;br /&gt;proclaimed earlier in the century by the Monroe Doctrine&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3&lt;br /&gt;4 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;and subsequently justified by America's alleged "manifest destiny"—&lt;br /&gt;were even further enhanced by the construction of the&lt;br /&gt;Panama Canal, which facilitated naval domination over both the&lt;br /&gt;Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.&lt;br /&gt;The basis for America's expanding geopolitical ambitions was&lt;br /&gt;provided by the rapid industrialization of the country's economy. By&lt;br /&gt;the outbreak of World War I, America's growing economic might already&lt;br /&gt;accounted for about 33 percent of global GNP, which displaced&lt;br /&gt;Great Britain as the world's leading industrial power. This remarkable&lt;br /&gt;economic dynamism was fostered by a culture that favored experimentation&lt;br /&gt;and innovation. America's political institutions and&lt;br /&gt;free market economy created unprecedented opportunities for ambitious&lt;br /&gt;and iconoclastic inventors, who were not inhibited from pursuing&lt;br /&gt;their personal dreams by archaic privileges or rigid social&lt;br /&gt;hierarchies. In brief, national culture was uniquely congenial to economic&lt;br /&gt;growth, and by attracting and quickly assimilating the most&lt;br /&gt;talented individuals from abroad, the culture also facilitated the expansion&lt;br /&gt;of national power.&lt;br /&gt;World War I provided the first occasion for the massive projection&lt;br /&gt;of American military force into Europe. A heretofore relatively&lt;br /&gt;isolated power promptly transported several hundred thousand of&lt;br /&gt;its troops across the Atlantic—a transoceanic military expedition&lt;br /&gt;unprecedented in its size and scope, which signaled the emergence&lt;br /&gt;of a new major player in the international arena. Just as important,&lt;br /&gt;the war also prompted the first major American&lt;br /&gt;diplomatic effort to apply American principles in seeking a solution&lt;br /&gt;to Europe's international problems. Woodrow Wilson's famous&lt;br /&gt;Fourteen Points represented the injection into European geopolitics&lt;br /&gt;of American idealism, reinforced by American might. (A&lt;br /&gt;decade and a half earlier, the United States had played a leading&lt;br /&gt;role in settling a Far Eastern conflict between Russia and Japan,&lt;br /&gt;thereby also asserting its growing international stature.) The fusion&lt;br /&gt;of American idealism and American power thus made itself&lt;br /&gt;fully felt on the world scene.&lt;br /&gt;Strictly speaking, however, World War I was still predominantly&lt;br /&gt;a European war, not a global one. But its self-destructive character&lt;br /&gt;marked the beginning of the end of Europe's political, economic,&lt;br /&gt;and cultural preponderance over the rest of the world. In the&lt;br /&gt;course of the war, no single European power was able to prevail&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 5&lt;br /&gt;decisively—and the war's outcome was heavily influenced by the&lt;br /&gt;entrance into the conflict of the rising non-European power, America.&lt;br /&gt;Thereafter, Europe would become increasingly the object,&lt;br /&gt;rather than the subject, of global power politics.&lt;br /&gt;However, this brief burst of American global leadership did not&lt;br /&gt;produce a continuing American engagement in world affairs. Instead,&lt;br /&gt;America quickly retreated into a self-gratifying combination&lt;br /&gt;of isolationism and idealism. Although by the mid-twenties and&lt;br /&gt;early thirties totalitarianism was gathering strength on the European&lt;br /&gt;continent, American power—by then including a powerful&lt;br /&gt;two-ocean fleet that clearly outmatched the British navy—remained&lt;br /&gt;disengaged. Americans preferred to be bystanders to&lt;br /&gt;global politics.&lt;br /&gt;Consistent with that predisposition was the American concept&lt;br /&gt;of security, based on a view of America as a continental island.&lt;br /&gt;American strategy focused on sheltering its shores and was thus&lt;br /&gt;narrowly national in scope, with little thought given to international&lt;br /&gt;or global considerations. The critical international players&lt;br /&gt;were still the European powers and, increasingly, Japan.&lt;br /&gt;The European era in world politics came to a final end in the&lt;br /&gt;course of World War II, the first truly global war. Fought on three&lt;br /&gt;continents simultaneously, with the Atlantic and the Pacific&lt;br /&gt;Oceans also heavily contested, its global dimension was symbolically&lt;br /&gt;demonstrated when British and Japanese soldiers—representing,&lt;br /&gt;respectively, a remote Western European island and a&lt;br /&gt;similarly remote East Asian island—collided thousands of miles&lt;br /&gt;from their homes on the Indian-Burmese frontier. Europe and Asia&lt;br /&gt;had become a single battlefield.&lt;br /&gt;Had the war's outcome been a clear-cut victory for Nazi Germany,&lt;br /&gt;a single European power might then have emerged as globally&lt;br /&gt;preponderant. (Japan's victory in the Pacific would have&lt;br /&gt;gained for that nation the dominant Far Eastern role, but in all&lt;br /&gt;probability, Japan would still have remained only a regional hegemon.)&lt;br /&gt;Instead, Germany's defeat was sealed largely by the two extra-&lt;br /&gt;European victors, the United States and the Soviet Union,&lt;br /&gt;which became the successors to Europe's unfulfilled quest for&lt;br /&gt;global supremacy.&lt;br /&gt;The next fifty years were dominated by the bipolar American-&lt;br /&gt;Soviet contest for global supremacy. In some respects, the contest&lt;br /&gt;6 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;between the United States and the Soviet Union represented the&lt;br /&gt;fulfillment of the geopoliticians' fondest theories: it pitted the&lt;br /&gt;world's leading maritime power, dominant over both the Atlantic&lt;br /&gt;and the Pacific Oceans, against the world's leading land power,&lt;br /&gt;paramount on the Eurasian heartland (with the Sino-Soviet bloc&lt;br /&gt;encompassing a space remarkably reminiscent of the scope of the&lt;br /&gt;Mongol Empire). The geopolitical dimension could not have been&lt;br /&gt;clearer: North America versus Eurasia, with the world at stake.&lt;br /&gt;The winner would truly dominate the globe. There was no one else&lt;br /&gt;to stand in the way, once victory was finally grasped.&lt;br /&gt;Each rival projected worldwide an ideological appeal that was&lt;br /&gt;infused with historical optimism, that justified for each the necessary&lt;br /&gt;exertions while reinforcing its conviction in inevitable victory.&lt;br /&gt;Each rival was clearly dominant within its own space—unlike&lt;br /&gt;the imperial European aspirants to global hegemony, none of&lt;br /&gt;which ever quite succeeded in asserting decisive preponderance&lt;br /&gt;within Europe itself. And each used its ideology to reinforce its&lt;br /&gt;hold over its respective vassals and tributaries, in a manner somewhat&lt;br /&gt;reminiscent of the age of religious warfare.&lt;br /&gt;The combination of global geopolitical scope and the proclaimed&lt;br /&gt;universality of the competing dogmas gave the contest unprecedented&lt;br /&gt;intensity. But an additional factor—also imbued with&lt;br /&gt;global implications—made the contest truly unique. The advent of&lt;br /&gt;nuclear weapons meant that a head-on war, of a classical type, between&lt;br /&gt;the two principal contestants would not only spell their mutual&lt;br /&gt;destruction but could unleash lethal consequences for a&lt;br /&gt;significant portion of humanity. The intensity of the conflict was&lt;br /&gt;thus simultaneously subjected to extraordinary self-restraint on&lt;br /&gt;the part of both rivals.&lt;br /&gt;In the geopolitical realm, the conflict was waged largely on the&lt;br /&gt;peripheries of Eurasia itself. The Sino-Soviet bloc dominated most&lt;br /&gt;of Eurasia but did not control its peripheries. North America succeeded&lt;br /&gt;in entrenching itself on both the extreme western and extreme&lt;br /&gt;eastern shores of the great Eurasian continent. The defense&lt;br /&gt;of these continental bridgeheads (epitomized on the western&lt;br /&gt;"front" by the Berlin blockade and on the eastern by the Korean&lt;br /&gt;War) was thus the first strategic test of what came to be known as&lt;br /&gt;the Cold War.&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 7&lt;br /&gt;In the Cold War's final phase, a third defensive "front"—the&lt;br /&gt;southern—appeared on Eurasia's map (see map above). The Soviet&lt;br /&gt;invasion of Afghanistan precipitated a two-pronged American response:&lt;br /&gt;direct U.S. assistance to the native resistance in Afghanistan&lt;br /&gt;in order to bog down the Soviet army; and a large-scale buildup&lt;br /&gt;of the U.S. military presence In the Persian Gulf as a deterrent to&lt;br /&gt;any further southward projection of Soviet political or military&lt;br /&gt;power. The United States committed itself to the defense of the Persian&lt;br /&gt;Gulf region, on a par with its western and eastern Eurasian security&lt;br /&gt;interests.&lt;br /&gt;The successful containment by North America of the Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;bloc's efforts to gain effective sway over all of Eurasia—with both&lt;br /&gt;sides deterred until the very end from a direct military collision for&lt;br /&gt;fear of a nuclear war—meant that the outcome of the contest was&lt;br /&gt;eventually decided by nonmilitary means. Political vitality, ideological&lt;br /&gt;flexibility, economic dynamism, and cultural appeal became&lt;br /&gt;the decisive dimensions.&lt;br /&gt;The American-led coalition retained its unity, whereas the&lt;br /&gt;Sino-Soviet bloc split within less than two decades. In part, this&lt;br /&gt;8 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;was due to the democratic coalition's greater flexibility, in contrast&lt;br /&gt;to the hierarchical and dogmatic—but also brittle—character&lt;br /&gt;of the Communist camp. The former involved shared values,&lt;br /&gt;but without a formal doctrinal format. The latter emphasized dogmatic&lt;br /&gt;orthodoxy, with only one valid interpretative center. America's&lt;br /&gt;principal vassals were also significantly weaker than&lt;br /&gt;America, whereas the Soviet Union could not indefinitely treat&lt;br /&gt;China as a subordinate. The outcome was also due to the fact that&lt;br /&gt;the American side proved to be economically and technologically&lt;br /&gt;much more dynamic, whereas the Soviet Union gradually stagnated&lt;br /&gt;and could not effectively compete either in economic&lt;br /&gt;growth or in military technology. Economic decay in turn fostered&lt;br /&gt;ideological demoralization.&lt;br /&gt;In fact, Soviet military power—and the fear it inspired among&lt;br /&gt;westerners—for a long time obscured the essential asymmetry&lt;br /&gt;between the two contestants. America was simply much richer,&lt;br /&gt;technologically much more advanced, militarily more resilient&lt;br /&gt;and innovative, socially more creative and appealing. Ideological&lt;br /&gt;constraints also sapped the creative potential of the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union, making its system increasingly rigid and its economy increasingly&lt;br /&gt;wasteful and technologically less competitive. As&lt;br /&gt;long as a mutually destructive war did not break out, in a protracted&lt;br /&gt;competition the scales had to tip eventually in America's&lt;br /&gt;favor.&lt;br /&gt;The final outcome was also significantly influenced by cultural&lt;br /&gt;considerations. The American-led coalition, by and large, accepted&lt;br /&gt;as positive many attributes of America's political and social culture.&lt;br /&gt;America's two most important allies on the western and eastem&lt;br /&gt;peripheries of the Eurasian continent, Germany and Japan,&lt;br /&gt;both recovered their economic health in the context of almost unbridled&lt;br /&gt;admiration for all things American. America was widely&lt;br /&gt;perceived as representing the future, as a society worthy of admiration&lt;br /&gt;and deserving of emulation.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, Russia was held in cultural contempt by most of its&lt;br /&gt;Central European vassals and even more so by its principal and increasingly&lt;br /&gt;assertive eastern ally, China. For the Central Europeans,&lt;br /&gt;Russian domination meant isolation from what the Central Europeans&lt;br /&gt;considered their philosophical and cultural home: Western&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 9&lt;br /&gt;Europe and its Christian religious traditions. Worse than that, it&lt;br /&gt;meant domination by a people whom the Central Europeans, often&lt;br /&gt;unjustly, considered their cultural inferior.&lt;br /&gt;The Chinese, for whom the word "Russia" means "the hungry&lt;br /&gt;land," were even more openly contemptuous. Although initially&lt;br /&gt;the Chinese had only quietly contested Moscow's claims of universality&lt;br /&gt;for the Soviet model, within a decade following the Chinese&lt;br /&gt;Communist revolution they mounted an assertive challenge to&lt;br /&gt;Moscow's ideological primacy and even began to express openly&lt;br /&gt;their traditional contempt for the neighboring northern barbarians.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, within the Soviet Union itself, the 50 percent of the population&lt;br /&gt;that was non-Russian eventually also rejected Moscow's&lt;br /&gt;domination. The gradual political awakening of the non-Russians&lt;br /&gt;meant that the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris began&lt;br /&gt;to view Soviet power as a form of alien imperial domination by&lt;br /&gt;a people to whom they did not feel culturally inferior. In Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia, national aspirations may have been weaker, but here these&lt;br /&gt;peoples were fueled in addition by a gradually rising sense of Islamic&lt;br /&gt;identity, intensified by the knowledge of the ongoing decolonization&lt;br /&gt;elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;Like so many empires before it, the Soviet Union eventually imploded&lt;br /&gt;and fragmented, falling victim not so much to a direct military&lt;br /&gt;defeat as to disintegration accelerated by economic and&lt;br /&gt;social strains. Its fate confirmed a scholar's apt observation that&lt;br /&gt;[ejmpires are inherently politically unstable because subordinate&lt;br /&gt;units almost always prefer greater autonomy, and&lt;br /&gt;counter-elites in such units almost always act, upon opportunity,&lt;br /&gt;to obtain greater autonomy. In this sense, empires do not&lt;br /&gt;fall; rather, they fall apart, usually very slowly, though sometimes&lt;br /&gt;remarkably quickly.'&lt;br /&gt;'Donald Puchala. "The History of the Future of International Relations,"&lt;br /&gt;Ethics and International Affairs 8 (1994):183.&lt;br /&gt;10 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;THE FIRST GLOBAL POWER&lt;br /&gt;The collapse of its rival left the United States in a unique position.&lt;br /&gt;It became simultaneously the first and the only truly global power.&lt;br /&gt;And yet America's global supremacy is reminiscent in some ways&lt;br /&gt;of earlier empires, notwithstanding their more confined regional&lt;br /&gt;scope. These empires based their power on a hierarchy of vassals,&lt;br /&gt;tributaries, protectorates, and colonies, with those on the outside&lt;br /&gt;generally viewed as barbarians. To some degree, that anachronistic&lt;br /&gt;terminoJogy is not altogether inappropriate for some of the&lt;br /&gt;states currently within the American orbit. As in the past, the exercise&lt;br /&gt;of American "imperial" power is derived in large measure from&lt;br /&gt;superior organization, from the ability to mobilize vast economic&lt;br /&gt;and technological resources promptly for military purposes, from&lt;br /&gt;the vague but significant cultural appeal of the American way of&lt;br /&gt;life, and from the sheer dynamism and inherent competitiveness of&lt;br /&gt;the American social and political elites.&lt;br /&gt;Earlier empires, too, partook of these attributes. Rome comes&lt;br /&gt;first to mind. Its empire was established over roughly two and a&lt;br /&gt;half centuries through sustained territorial expansion northward&lt;br /&gt;and then both westward and southeastward, as well as through&lt;br /&gt;the assertion of effective maritime control over the entire shoreline&lt;br /&gt;of the Mediterranean Sea. In geographic scope, it reached its&lt;br /&gt;high point around the year A.D. 211 (see map on page 11). Rome's&lt;br /&gt;was a centralized polity and a single self-sufficient economy. Its&lt;br /&gt;imperial power was exercised deliberately and purposefully&lt;br /&gt;through a complex system of political and economic organization.&lt;br /&gt;A strategically designed system of roads and naval routes,&lt;br /&gt;originating from the capital city, permitted the rapid redeployment&lt;br /&gt;and concentration—in the event of a major security&lt;br /&gt;threat—of the Roman legions stationed in the various vassal&lt;br /&gt;states and tributary provinces.&lt;br /&gt;At the empire's apex, the Roman legions deployed abroad numbered&lt;br /&gt;nu less than three hundred thousand men—a remarkable&lt;br /&gt;force, made all the more lethal by the Roman superiority in tactics&lt;br /&gt;and armaments as well as by the center's ability to direct relatively&lt;br /&gt;rapid redeployment. Qt is striking to note that in 1996, the vastly&lt;br /&gt;more populous supreme power, America, was protecting the outer&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 11&lt;br /&gt;MR- Km nan Empire a\ Its Height&lt;br /&gt;reaches of its dominion by stationing 296,000 professional soldiers&lt;br /&gt;overseas.)&lt;br /&gt;Rome's imperial power, however, was also derived from an important&lt;br /&gt;psychological reality. Civis Romanus sum—"I am a Roman&lt;br /&gt;citizen"—was the highest possible self-definition, a source of&lt;br /&gt;pride, and an aspiration for many. Eventually granted even to&lt;br /&gt;those not of Roman birth, the exalted status of the Roman citizen&lt;br /&gt;was an expression of cultural superiority that justified the imperial&lt;br /&gt;power's sense of mission. It not only legitimated Rome's rule, but it&lt;br /&gt;also inclined those subject to it to desire assimilation and inclusion&lt;br /&gt;in the imperial structure. Cultural superiority, taken for&lt;br /&gt;granted by the rulers and conceded by the subjugated, thus reinforced&lt;br /&gt;imperial power.&lt;br /&gt;That supreme, and largely uncontested, imperial power lasted&lt;br /&gt;about three hundred years. With the exception of the challenge&lt;br /&gt;12 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;posed at one stage by nearby Carthage and on the eastern fringes&lt;br /&gt;by the Parthian Empire, the outside world was largely barbaric,&lt;br /&gt;not well organized, capable for most of the time only of sporadic&lt;br /&gt;attacks, and culturally patently inferior. As long as the empire was&lt;br /&gt;able to maintain internal vitality and unity, the outside world was&lt;br /&gt;noncompetitive.&lt;br /&gt;Three major causes led to the eventual collapse of the Roman&lt;br /&gt;Empire. First, the empire became too large to be governed from&lt;br /&gt;a single center, but splitting it into western and eastern halves&lt;br /&gt;automatically destroyed the monopolistic character of its power.&lt;br /&gt;Second, at the same time, the prolonged period of imperial&lt;br /&gt;hubris generated a cultural hedonism that gradually sapped the&lt;br /&gt;political elite's will to greatness. Third, sustained inflation also&lt;br /&gt;undermined the capacity of the system to sustain itself without&lt;br /&gt;social sacrifice, which the citizens were no longer prepared to&lt;br /&gt;make. Cultural decay, political division, and financial inflation&lt;br /&gt;conspired to make Rome vulnerable even to the barbarians in its&lt;br /&gt;near abroad.&lt;br /&gt;By contemporary standards, Rome was not truly a global&lt;br /&gt;power but a regional one. However, given the sense of isolation&lt;br /&gt;prevailing at the time between the various continents of the globe,&lt;br /&gt;its regional power was self-contained and isolated, with no immediate&lt;br /&gt;or even distant rival. The Roman Empire was thus a world&lt;br /&gt;unto itself, with its superior political organization and cultural superiority&lt;br /&gt;making it a precursor of later imperial systems of even&lt;br /&gt;greater geographic scope.&lt;br /&gt;Even so, the Roman Empire was not unique. The Roman and&lt;br /&gt;the Chinese empires emerged almost contemporaneously, though&lt;br /&gt;neither was aware of the other. By the year 221 B.C. (the time of the&lt;br /&gt;Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage), the unification by Chin'&lt;br /&gt;of the existing seven states Into the first Chinese empire had&lt;br /&gt;prompted the construction of the Great Wall in northern China, to&lt;br /&gt;seal off the inner kingdom from the barbarian world beyond. The&lt;br /&gt;subsequent Han Empire, which had started to emerge by 140 B.C.,&lt;br /&gt;was even more impressive in scope and organization. By the onset&lt;br /&gt;of the Christian era, no fewer than 57 million people were subject&lt;br /&gt;to its authority. That huge number, itself unprecedented, testified&lt;br /&gt;to extraordinarily effective central control, exercised through a&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 13&lt;br /&gt;centralized and punitive bureaucracy. Imperial sway extended to&lt;br /&gt;today's Korea, parts of Mongolia, and most of today's coastal&lt;br /&gt;China. However, rather like Rome, the Han Empire also became afflicted&lt;br /&gt;by internal ills, and its eventual collapse was accelerated by&lt;br /&gt;its division in A.D. 220 into three independent realms.&lt;br /&gt;China's further history involved cycles of reunification and expansion,&lt;br /&gt;followed by decay and fragmentation. More than once,&lt;br /&gt;China succeeded in establishing imperial systems that were selfcontained,&lt;br /&gt;isolated, and unchallenged externally by any organized&lt;br /&gt;rivals. The tripartite division of the Han realm was reversed in A.D.&lt;br /&gt;589, with something akin to an imperial system reemerging. But&lt;br /&gt;the period of China's greatest imperial self-assertion came under&lt;br /&gt;the Manchus, specifically during the early Ch'ing dynasty. By the&lt;br /&gt;eighteenth century, China was once again a full-fledged empire,&lt;br /&gt;with the imperial center surrounded by vassal and tributary&lt;br /&gt;states, including today's Korea, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and&lt;br /&gt;Nepal. China's sway thus extended from today's Russian Far East&lt;br /&gt;all the way across southern Siberia to Lake Baikal and into contemporary&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan, then southward toward the Indian Ocean, and&lt;br /&gt;then back east across Laos and northern Vietnam (see map on&lt;br /&gt;page 14).&lt;br /&gt;As in the Roman case, the empire was a complex financial,&lt;br /&gt;economic, educational, and security organization. Control over&lt;br /&gt;the large territory and the more than 300 million people living&lt;br /&gt;within it was exercised through all these means, with a strong emphasis&lt;br /&gt;on centralized political authority, supported by a remarkably&lt;br /&gt;effective courier service. The entire empire was demarcated&lt;br /&gt;into four zones, radiating from Peking and delimiting areas that&lt;br /&gt;could be reached by courier within one week, two weeks, three&lt;br /&gt;weeks, and four weeks, respectively. A centralized bureaucracy,&lt;br /&gt;professionally trained and competitively selected, provided the&lt;br /&gt;sinews of unity.&lt;br /&gt;That unity was reinforced, legitimated, and sustained—again,&lt;br /&gt;as in the case of Rome—by a strongly felt and deeply ingrained&lt;br /&gt;sense of cultural superiority that was augmented by Confucianism,&lt;br /&gt;an imperially expedient philosophy, with its stress on harmony, hierarchy,&lt;br /&gt;and discipline. China—the Celestial Empire—was seen as&lt;br /&gt;the center of the universe, with only barbarians on its peripheries&lt;br /&gt;14 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;and beyond. To be Chinese meant to be cultured, and for that reason,&lt;br /&gt;the rest of the world owed China its due deference. That special&lt;br /&gt;sense of superiority permeated the response given by the&lt;br /&gt;Chinese emperor—even in the phase of China's growing decline, in&lt;br /&gt;the late eighteenth century—to King George III of Great Britain,&lt;br /&gt;whose emissaries had attempted to inveigle China into a trading&lt;br /&gt;relationship by offering some British industrial products as goodwill&lt;br /&gt;gifts:&lt;br /&gt;We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor, instruct the King of England&lt;br /&gt;to take note of our charge:&lt;br /&gt;The Celestial Empire, ruling all within the four seas . ..&lt;br /&gt;does not value rare and precious things . . . nor do we have the&lt;br /&gt;slightest need of your country's manufactures&lt;br /&gt;Hence we . . . have commanded your tribute envoys to return&lt;br /&gt;safely home. You, 0 King, should simply act in conformity&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 15&lt;br /&gt;with our wishes by strengthening your loyalty and swearing&lt;br /&gt;perpetual obedience.&lt;br /&gt;The decline and fall of the several Chinese empires was also&lt;br /&gt;primarily due to internal factors. Mongol and later occidental "barbarians"&lt;br /&gt;prevailed because internal fatigue, decay, hedonism, and&lt;br /&gt;loss of economic as well as military creativity sapped and then accelerated&lt;br /&gt;the collapse of Chinese will. Outside powers exploited&lt;br /&gt;China's internal malaise—Britain in the Opium War of 1839-1842,&lt;br /&gt;Japan a century later—which, in turn, generated the profound&lt;br /&gt;sense of cultural humiliation that has motivated the Chinese&lt;br /&gt;throughout the twentieth century, a humiliation all the more intense&lt;br /&gt;because of the collision between their ingrained sense of cultural&lt;br /&gt;superiority and the demeaning political realities of&lt;br /&gt;postimperial China.&lt;br /&gt;Much as in the case of Rome, imperial China would be classified&lt;br /&gt;today as a regional power. But in its heyday, China had no&lt;br /&gt;global peer, in the sense that no other power was capable of challenging&lt;br /&gt;its imperial status or even of resisting its further expansion&lt;br /&gt;if that had been the Chinese inclination. The Chinese system was&lt;br /&gt;self-contained and self-sustaining, based primarily on a shared ethnic&lt;br /&gt;identity, with relatively limited projection of central power&lt;br /&gt;over ethnically alien and geographically peripheral tributaries.&lt;br /&gt;The large and dominant ethnic core made it possible for China&lt;br /&gt;to achieve periodic imperial restoration. In that respect, China was&lt;br /&gt;quite unlike other empires, in which numerically small but hegemonically&lt;br /&gt;motivated peoples were able for a time to impose and&lt;br /&gt;maintain domination over much larger ethnically alien populations.&lt;br /&gt;However, once the domination of such small-core empires&lt;br /&gt;was undermined, imperial restoration was out of the question.&lt;br /&gt;To find a somewhat closer analogy to today's definition of a&lt;br /&gt;global power, we must turn to the remarkable phenomenon of the&lt;br /&gt;Mongol Empire. Its emergence was achieved through an intense&lt;br /&gt;struggle with major and well-organized opponents. Among those&lt;br /&gt;defeated were the kingdoms of Poland and Hungary, the forces of&lt;br /&gt;the Holy Roman Empire, several Russian and Rus' principalities,&lt;br /&gt;the Caliphate of Baghdad, and later, even the Sung dynasty of&lt;br /&gt;China.&lt;br /&gt;16 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Genghis Khan and his successors, by defeating their regional rivals,&lt;br /&gt;established centralized control over the territory that latterday&lt;br /&gt;scholars of geopolitics have identified as the global heartland,&lt;br /&gt;or the pivot for world power. Their Eurasian continental empire&lt;br /&gt;ranged from the shores of the China Sea to Anatolia in Asia Minor&lt;br /&gt;and to Centra] Europe (see map). It was not until the heyday of the&lt;br /&gt;Stalinist Sino-Soviet bloc that the Mongol Empire on the Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;continent was finally matched, insofar as the scope of centralized&lt;br /&gt;control over contiguous territory is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;The Roman, Chinese, and Mongol empires were regional precursors&lt;br /&gt;of subsequent aspirants to global power. In the case of&lt;br /&gt;Rome and China, as already noted, their imperial structures were&lt;br /&gt;highly developed, both politically and economically, while the&lt;br /&gt;widespread acceptance of the cultural superiority of the center exercised&lt;br /&gt;an important cementing role. In contrast, the Mongol Empire&lt;br /&gt;sustained political control by relying more directly on military&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 17&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;conquest followed by adaptation (and even assimilation) to local&lt;br /&gt;conditions.&lt;br /&gt;Mongol imperial power was largely based on military domination.&lt;br /&gt;Achieved through the brilliant and ruthless application of&lt;br /&gt;superior military tactics that combined a remarkable capacity for&lt;br /&gt;rapid movement of forces with their timely concentration, Mongol&lt;br /&gt;rule entailed no organized economic or financial system, nor&lt;br /&gt;was Mongol authority derived from any assertive sense of cultural&lt;br /&gt;superiority. The Mongol rulers were too thin numerically to&lt;br /&gt;represent a self-regenerating ruling class, and in any case, the absence&lt;br /&gt;of a defined and self-conscious sense of cultural or even&lt;br /&gt;ethnic superiority deprived the imperial elite of the needed subjective&lt;br /&gt;confidence.&lt;br /&gt;In fact, the Mongol rulers proved quite susceptible to gradual&lt;br /&gt;assimilation by the often culturally more advanced peoples they&lt;br /&gt;had conquered. Thus, one of the grandsons of Genghis Khan, who&lt;br /&gt;had become the emperor of the Chinese part of the great Khan's&lt;br /&gt;realm, became a fervent propagator of Confucianism; another became&lt;br /&gt;a devout Muslim in his capacity as the sultan of Persia; and a&lt;br /&gt;third became the culturally Persian ruler of Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;It was that factor—assimilation of the rulers by the ruled because&lt;br /&gt;of the absence of a dominant political culture—as well as unresolved&lt;br /&gt;problems of succession to the great Khan who had&lt;br /&gt;founded the empire, that caused the empire's eventual demise. The&lt;br /&gt;Mongol realm had become too big to be governed from a single center,&lt;br /&gt;but the solution attempted—dividing the empire into several&lt;br /&gt;self-contained parts—prompted still more rapid local assimilation&lt;br /&gt;and accelerated the imperial disintegration. After lasting two centuries,&lt;br /&gt;from 1206 to 1405, the world's largest land-based empire disappeared&lt;br /&gt;without a trace.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thereafter, Europe became both the locus of global power and&lt;br /&gt;the focus of the main struggles for global power. Indeed, in the&lt;br /&gt;course of approximately three centuries, the small northwestern&lt;br /&gt;periphery of the Eurasian continent attained—through the projection&lt;br /&gt;of maritime power and for the first time ever—genuine global&lt;br /&gt;domination as European power reached, and asserted itself on,&lt;br /&gt;every continent of the globe. It is noteworthy that the Western European&lt;br /&gt;imperial hegemons were demographically not very numerous,&lt;br /&gt;especially when compared to the numbers effectively&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 19&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;subjugated. Yet by the beginning of the twentieth century, outside&lt;br /&gt;of the Western Hemisphere (which two centuries earlier had also&lt;br /&gt;been subject to Western European control and which was inhabited&lt;br /&gt;predominantly by European emigrants and their descendants),&lt;br /&gt;only China, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Ethiopia were&lt;br /&gt;free of Western Europe's domination (see map on page 18).&lt;br /&gt;However, Western European domination was not tantamount to&lt;br /&gt;the attainment of global power by Western Europe. The essential&lt;br /&gt;reality was that of Europe's civilizational global supremacy and of&lt;br /&gt;fragmented European continental power. Unlike the land conquest&lt;br /&gt;of the Eurasian heartland by the Mongols or by the subsequent&lt;br /&gt;Russian Empire, European overseas imperialism was attained&lt;br /&gt;through ceaseless transoceanic exploration and the expansion of&lt;br /&gt;maritime trade. This process, however, also involved a continuous&lt;br /&gt;struggle among the leading European states not only for the overseas&lt;br /&gt;dominions but for hegemony within Europe itself. The geopolitically&lt;br /&gt;consequential fact was that Europe's global hegemony did&lt;br /&gt;not derive from hegemony in Europe by any single European&lt;br /&gt;power.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Broadly speaking, until the middle of the seventeenth century,&lt;br /&gt;Spain was the paramount European power. By the late fifteenth&lt;br /&gt;century, it had also emerged as a major overseas imperial power,&lt;br /&gt;entertaining global ambitions. Religion served as a unifying doctrine&lt;br /&gt;and as a source of imperial missionary zeal. Indeed, it took&lt;br /&gt;papal arbitration between Spain and its maritime rival, Portugal, to&lt;br /&gt;codify a formal division of the world into Spanish and Portuguese&lt;br /&gt;colonial spheres in the Treaties of Tordesilla (1494) and Saragossa&lt;br /&gt;(1529). Nonetheless, faced by English, French, and Dutch challenges,&lt;br /&gt;Spain was never able to assert genuine supremacy, either&lt;br /&gt;in Western Europe itself or across the oceans.&lt;br /&gt;Spain's preeminence gradually gave way to that of France. Until&lt;br /&gt;1815, France was the dominant European power, though continuously&lt;br /&gt;checked by its European rivals, both on the continent and&lt;br /&gt;overseas. Under Napoleon, France came close to establishing true&lt;br /&gt;hegemony over Europe. Had it succeeded, it might have also&lt;br /&gt;gained the status of the dominant global power. However, its defeat&lt;br /&gt;by a European coalition reestablished the continental balance&lt;br /&gt;of power.&lt;br /&gt;For the next century, until World War I, Great Britain exercised&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 21&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;global maritime domination as London became the world's principal&lt;br /&gt;financial and trading center and the British navy "ruled the&lt;br /&gt;waves." Great Britain was clearly paramount overseas, but like the&lt;br /&gt;earlier European aspirants to global hegemony, the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;could not single-handedly dominate Europe. Instead, Britain relied&lt;br /&gt;on an intricate balance-of-power diplomacy and eventually on an&lt;br /&gt;Anglo-French entente to prevent continental domination by either&lt;br /&gt;Russia or Germany.&lt;br /&gt;The overseas British Empire was initially acquired through a&lt;br /&gt;combination of exploration, trade, and conquest. But much like its&lt;br /&gt;Roman and Chinese predecessors or its French and Spanish rivals,&lt;br /&gt;it also derived a great deal of its staying power from the perception&lt;br /&gt;of British cultural superiority. That superiority was not only a&lt;br /&gt;matter of subjective arrogance on the part of the imperial ruling&lt;br /&gt;class but was a perspective shared by many of the non-British subjects.&lt;br /&gt;In the words of South Africa's first black president, Nelson&lt;br /&gt;Mandela: "I was brought up in a British school, and at the time&lt;br /&gt;Britain was the home of everything that was best in the world. I&lt;br /&gt;have not discarded the influence which Britain and British history&lt;br /&gt;and culture exercised on us." Cultural superiority, successfully asserted&lt;br /&gt;and quietly conceded, had the effect of reducing the need&lt;br /&gt;to rely on large military forces to maintain the power of the imperial&lt;br /&gt;center. By 1914, only a few thousand British military personnel&lt;br /&gt;and civil servants controlled about 11 million square miles and almost&lt;br /&gt;400 million non-British peoples (see map on page 20).&lt;br /&gt;In brief, Rome exercised its sway largely through superior military&lt;br /&gt;organization and cultural appeal. China relied heavily on an&lt;br /&gt;efficient bureaucracy to rule an empire based on shared ethnic&lt;br /&gt;identity, reinforcing its control through a highly developed sense&lt;br /&gt;of cultural superiority. The Mongol Empire combined advanced&lt;br /&gt;military tactics for conquest with an inclination toward assimilation&lt;br /&gt;as the basis for rule. The British (as well as the Spanish,&lt;br /&gt;Dutch, and French) gained preeminence as their flag followed their&lt;br /&gt;trade, their control likewise reinforced by superior military organization&lt;br /&gt;and cultural assertiveness. But none of these empires were&lt;br /&gt;truly global. Even Great Britain was not a truly global power. It did&lt;br /&gt;not control Europe but only balanced it. A stable Europe was crucial&lt;br /&gt;to British international preeminence, and Europe's self-destruction&lt;br /&gt;Inevitably marked the end of British primacy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 23&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, the scope and pervasiveness of American global&lt;br /&gt;power today are unique. Not only does the United States control&lt;br /&gt;all of the world's oceans and seas, but it has developed an assertive&lt;br /&gt;military capability for amphibious shore control that enables&lt;br /&gt;it to project its power inland in politically significant ways.&lt;br /&gt;Its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern&lt;br /&gt;extremities of Eurasia, and they also control the Persian Gulf.&lt;br /&gt;American vassals and tributaries, some yearning to be embraced&lt;br /&gt;by even more formal ties to Washington, dot the entire Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;continent, as the map on page 22 shows-&lt;br /&gt;America's economic dynamism provides the necessary precondition&lt;br /&gt;tor the exercise of global primacy. Initially, immediately after&lt;br /&gt;World War II, America's economy stood apart from all others, accounting&lt;br /&gt;alone for more than 50 percent of the world's GNP. The&lt;br /&gt;economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, followed by the&lt;br /&gt;wider phenomenon of Asia's economic dynamism, meant that the&lt;br /&gt;American share of global GNP eventually had to shrink from the&lt;br /&gt;disproportionately high levels of the immediate postwar era.&lt;br /&gt;Nonetheless, by the time the subsequent Cold War had ended,&lt;br /&gt;America's share of global GNP, and more specifically its share of&lt;br /&gt;the world's manufacturing output, had stabilized at about 30 percent,&lt;br /&gt;a level that had been the norm for most of this century, apart&lt;br /&gt;from those exceptional years immediately after World War II.&lt;br /&gt;More important, America has maintained and has even widened&lt;br /&gt;its lead in exploiting the latest scientific breakthroughs for military&lt;br /&gt;purposes, thereby creating a technologically peerless military&lt;br /&gt;establishment, the only one with effective global reach. All&lt;br /&gt;the while, it has maintained its strong competitive advantage in the&lt;br /&gt;economically decisive information technologies. American mastery&lt;br /&gt;in the cutting-edge sectors of tomorrow's economy suggests that&lt;br /&gt;American technological domination is not likely to be undone&lt;br /&gt;soon, especially given that in the economically decisive fields,&lt;br /&gt;Americans are maintaining or even widening their advantage in&lt;br /&gt;productivity over their Western European and Japanese rivals.&lt;br /&gt;To be sure, Russia and China are powers that resent this American&lt;br /&gt;hegemony. In early 1996, they jointly stated as much in the&lt;br /&gt;course of a visit to Beijing by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, they possess nuclear arsenals that could threaten vital&lt;br /&gt;U.S. interests. But the brutal fact is that for the time being, and for&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;24 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;some time to come, although they can initiate a suicidal nuclear&lt;br /&gt;war, neither one of them can win it. Lacking the ability to project&lt;br /&gt;forces over long distances in order to impose their political will&lt;br /&gt;and being technologically much more backward than America,&lt;br /&gt;they do not have the means to exercise—nor soon attain—sustained&lt;br /&gt;political clout worldwide.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of&lt;br /&gt;global power, militarily, it has an unmatched global reach; economically,&lt;br /&gt;it remains the main locomotive of global growth, even if&lt;br /&gt;challenged in some aspects by Japan" and Germany (neither of&lt;br /&gt;which enjoys the other attributes of global might); technologically,&lt;br /&gt;it retains the overall lead in the cutting-edge areas of innovation;&lt;br /&gt;and culturally, despite some crassness, it enjoys an appeal that is&lt;br /&gt;unrivaled, especially among the world's youth—all of which gives&lt;br /&gt;the United States a political clout that no other state comes close&lt;br /&gt;to matching. It is the combination of all four that makes America the&lt;br /&gt;only comprehensive global superpower.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE AMERICAN GLOBAL SYSTEM&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Although America's international preeminence unavoidably evokes&lt;br /&gt;similarities to earlier imperial systems, the differences are more essential.&lt;br /&gt;They go beyond the question of territorial scope. American&lt;br /&gt;global power is exercised through a global system of distinctively&lt;br /&gt;American design that mirrors the domestic American experience.&lt;br /&gt;Central to that domestic experience is the pluralistic character of&lt;br /&gt;both the American society and its political system.&lt;br /&gt;The earlier empires were built by aristocratic political elites&lt;br /&gt;and were in most cases ruled by essentially authoritarian or absolutist&lt;br /&gt;regimes. The bulk of the populations of the imperial states&lt;br /&gt;were either politically indifferent or, in more recent times, infected&lt;br /&gt;by imperialist emotions and symbols. The quest for national glory,&lt;br /&gt;"the white man's burden," "la mission civilisatrlce," not to speak of&lt;br /&gt;the opportunities for personal profit—all served to mobilize support&lt;br /&gt;for imperial adventures and to sustain essentially hierarchical&lt;br /&gt;imperial power pyramids.&lt;br /&gt;The attitude of the American public toward the external projection&lt;br /&gt;of American power has been much more ambivalent. The pub&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY&lt;br /&gt;OF A NEW TYPE 25&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;lie supported America's engagement in World War II largely because&lt;br /&gt;of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.&lt;br /&gt;The engagement of the United States in the Cold War was initially&lt;br /&gt;endorsed more reluctantly, until the Berlin blockade and the subsequent&lt;br /&gt;Korean War. After the Cold War had ended, the emergence&lt;br /&gt;of the United States as the single global power did not evoke much&lt;br /&gt;public gloating but rather elicited an inclination toward a more&lt;br /&gt;limited definition of American responsibilities abroad. Public opinion&lt;br /&gt;polls conducted in 1995 and 1996 indicated a general public&lt;br /&gt;preference for "sharing" global power with others, rather than for&lt;br /&gt;its monopolistic exercise.&lt;br /&gt;Because of these domestic factors, the American global system&lt;br /&gt;emphasizes the technique of co-optation (as in the case of defeated&lt;br /&gt;rivals—Germany, Japan, and lately even Russia) to a much&lt;br /&gt;greater extent than the earlier imperial systems did. It likewise relies&lt;br /&gt;heavily on the indirect exercise of influence on dependent foreign&lt;br /&gt;elites, while drawing much benefit from the appeal of its&lt;br /&gt;democratic principles and institutions. All of the foregoing are reinforced&lt;br /&gt;by the massive but intangible impact of the American&lt;br /&gt;domination of global communications, popular entertainment, and&lt;br /&gt;mass culture and by the potentially very tangible clout of America's&lt;br /&gt;technological edge and global military reach.&lt;br /&gt;Cultural domination has been an underappreciated facet of&lt;br /&gt;American global power. Whatever one may think of its aesthetic&lt;br /&gt;values, America's mass culture exercises a magnetic appeal, especially&lt;br /&gt;on the world's youth. Its attraction may be derived from the&lt;br /&gt;hedonistic quality of the lifestyle it projects, but its global appeal&lt;br /&gt;is undeniable. American television programs and films account for&lt;br /&gt;about three-fourths of the global market. American popular music&lt;br /&gt;is equally dominant, while American fads, eating habits, and even&lt;br /&gt;clothing are increasingly imitated worldwide. The language of the&lt;br /&gt;Internet is English, and an overwhelming proportion of the global&lt;br /&gt;computer chatter also originates from America, influencing the&lt;br /&gt;content of global conversation. Lastly, America has become a&lt;br /&gt;Mecca for those seeking advanced education, with approximately&lt;br /&gt;half a million foreign students flocking to the United States, with&lt;br /&gt;many of the ablest never returning home. Graduates from American&lt;br /&gt;universities are to be found in almost every Cabinet on every&lt;br /&gt;continent.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;26 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The style of many foreign democratic politicians also increasingly&lt;br /&gt;emulates the American. Not only did John F. Kennedy find eager&lt;br /&gt;imitators abroad, but even more recent (and less glorified)&lt;br /&gt;American political leaders have become the object of careful study&lt;br /&gt;and political imitation. Politicians from cultures as disparate as the&lt;br /&gt;Japanese and the British (for example, the Japanese prime minister&lt;br /&gt;of the mid-1990s, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and the British prime minister,&lt;br /&gt;Tony Blair—and note the "Tony," imitative of "Jimmy" Carter,&lt;br /&gt;"Bill" Clinton, or "Bob" Dole) find it perfectly appropriate to copy&lt;br /&gt;Bill Clinton's homey mannerisms, populist common touch, and&lt;br /&gt;public relations techniques.&lt;br /&gt;Democratic ideals, associated with the American political tradition,&lt;br /&gt;further reinforce what some perceive as America's "cultural&lt;br /&gt;imperialism." In the age of the most massive spread of the&lt;br /&gt;democratic form of government, the American political experience&lt;br /&gt;tends to serve as a standard for emulation. The spreading&lt;br /&gt;emphasis worldwide on the centrality of a written constitution&lt;br /&gt;and on the supremacy of law over political expediency, no matter&lt;br /&gt;how short-changed in practice, has drawn upon the strength of&lt;br /&gt;American constitutionalism. In recent times, the adoption by the&lt;br /&gt;former Communist countries of civilian supremacy over the military&lt;br /&gt;(especially as a precondition for NATO membership) has&lt;br /&gt;also been very heavily influenced by the U.S. system of civilmilitary&lt;br /&gt;relations.&lt;br /&gt;The appeal and impact of the democratic American political&lt;br /&gt;system has also been accompanied by the growing attraction of&lt;br /&gt;the American entrepreneurial economic model, which stresses&lt;br /&gt;global free trade and uninhibited competition. As the Western welfare&lt;br /&gt;state, including its German emphasis on "codetermination"&lt;br /&gt;between entrepreneurs and trade unions, begins to lose its economic&lt;br /&gt;momentum, more Europeans are voicing the opinion that&lt;br /&gt;the more competitive and even ruthless American economic culture&lt;br /&gt;has to be emulated if Europe is not to fall further behind. Even&lt;br /&gt;in Japan, greater individualism in economic behavior is becoming&lt;br /&gt;recognized as a necessary concomitant of economic success.&lt;br /&gt;The American emphasis on political democracy and economic&lt;br /&gt;development thus combines to convey a simple ideological message&lt;br /&gt;that appeals to many: the quest for individual success enhances&lt;br /&gt;freedom while generating wealth. The resulting blend of&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 27&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;idealism and egoism is a potent combination. Individual self-fulfillment&lt;br /&gt;is said to be a God-given right that at the same time can benefit&lt;br /&gt;others by setting an example and by generating wealth. It is a&lt;br /&gt;doctrine that attracts the energetic, the ambitious, and the highly&lt;br /&gt;competitive.&lt;br /&gt;As the imitation of American ways gradually pervades the&lt;br /&gt;world, it creates a more congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect&lt;br /&gt;and seemingly consensual American hegemony. And as in&lt;br /&gt;the case of the domestic American system, that hegemony involves&lt;br /&gt;a complex structure of interlocking institutions and procedures,&lt;br /&gt;designed to generate consensus and obscure asymmetries&lt;br /&gt;in power and influence. American global supremacy is thus buttressed&lt;br /&gt;by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally&lt;br /&gt;span the globe.&lt;br /&gt;The Atlantic alliance, epitomized institutionally by NATO, links&lt;br /&gt;the most productive and influential states of Europe to America,&lt;br /&gt;making the United States a key participant even in intra-European&lt;br /&gt;affairs. The bilateral political and military ties with Japan bind the&lt;br /&gt;most powerful Asian economy to the United States, with Japan remaining&lt;br /&gt;(at least for the time being) essentially an American protectorate.&lt;br /&gt;America also participates in such nascent trans-Pacific&lt;br /&gt;multilateral organizations as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation&lt;br /&gt;Forum (APEC), making itself a key participant in that region's&lt;br /&gt;affairs. The Western Hemisphere is generally shielded from outside&lt;br /&gt;influences, enabling America to play the central role in existing&lt;br /&gt;hemispheric multilateral organizations. Special security arrangements&lt;br /&gt;in the Persian Gulf, especially after the brief punitive mission&lt;br /&gt;in 1991 against Iraq, have made that economically vital region&lt;br /&gt;into an American military preserve. Even the former Soviet space&lt;br /&gt;is permeated by various American-sponsored arrangements for&lt;br /&gt;closer cooperation with NATO, such as the Partnership for Peace.&lt;br /&gt;In addition, one must consider as part of the American system&lt;br /&gt;the global web of specialized organizations, especially the "international"&lt;br /&gt;financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund&lt;br /&gt;(IMF) and the World Bank can be said to represent "global" interests,&lt;br /&gt;and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality,&lt;br /&gt;however, they are heavily American dominated and their&lt;br /&gt;origins are traceable to American initiative, particularly the Bretton&lt;br /&gt;Woods Conference of 1944.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;28 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Unlike earlier empires, this vast and complex global system is&lt;br /&gt;not a hierarchical pyramid. Rather, America stands at the center of&lt;br /&gt;an interlocking universe, one in which power is exercised through&lt;br /&gt;continuous bargaining, dialogue, diffusion, and quest for formal&lt;br /&gt;consensus, even though that power originates ultimately from a&lt;br /&gt;single source, namely, Washington, D.C. And that is where the&lt;br /&gt;power game has to be played, and played according to America's&lt;br /&gt;domestic rules. Perhaps the highest compliment that the world&lt;br /&gt;pays to the centrality of the democratic process in American&lt;br /&gt;global hegemony is the degree to which foreign countries are&lt;br /&gt;themselves drawn into the domestic American political bargaining.&lt;br /&gt;To the extent that they can, foreign governments strive to mobilize&lt;br /&gt;those Americans with whom they share a special ethnic or&lt;br /&gt;religious identity. Most foreign governments also employ American&lt;br /&gt;lobbyists to advance their case, especially in Congress, in addition&lt;br /&gt;to approximately one thousand special foreign interest&lt;br /&gt;groups registered as active in America's capital. American ethnic&lt;br /&gt;communities also strive to influence U.S. foreign policy, with the&lt;br /&gt;Jewish, Greek, and Armenian lobbies standing out as the most effectively&lt;br /&gt;organized.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;American supremacy has thus produced a new international&lt;br /&gt;order that not only replicates but institutionalizes abroad many&lt;br /&gt;of the features of the American system itself. Its basic features&lt;br /&gt;include&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;• a collective security system, including integrated command&lt;br /&gt;and forces (NATO, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and so&lt;br /&gt;forth);&lt;br /&gt;• regional economic cooperation (APEC, NAFTA [North American&lt;br /&gt;Free Trade Agreement]) and specialized global cooperative&lt;br /&gt;institutions (the World Bank, IMF, WTO [World Trade&lt;br /&gt;Organization]);&lt;br /&gt;" procedures that emphasize consensual decision making,&lt;br /&gt;even if dominated by the United States;&lt;br /&gt;• a preference for democratic membership within key&lt;br /&gt;alliances;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HEGEMONY OF A NEW TYPE 29&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;• a rudimentary global constitutional and judicial structure&lt;br /&gt;(ranging from the World Court to a special tribunal to try&lt;br /&gt;Bosnian war crimes).&lt;br /&gt;Most of that system emerged during the Cold War, as part of&lt;br /&gt;America's effort to contain its global rival, the Soviet Union. It was&lt;br /&gt;thus ready-made for global application, once that rival faltered and&lt;br /&gt;America emerged as the first and only global power. Its essence has&lt;br /&gt;been well encapsulated by the political scientist G. John Ikenberry:&lt;br /&gt;It was hegemonic in the sense that it was centered around the&lt;br /&gt;United States and reflected American-styled political mechanisms&lt;br /&gt;and organizing principles. It was a liberal order in that it&lt;br /&gt;was legitimate and marked by reciprocal interactions. Europeans&lt;br /&gt;[one may also add, the Japanese] were able to reconstruct&lt;br /&gt;and integrate their societies and economies in ways that&lt;br /&gt;were congenial with American hegemony but also with room to&lt;br /&gt;experiment with their own autonomous and semi-independent&lt;br /&gt;political systems . . . The evolution of this complex system&lt;br /&gt;served to "domesticate" relations among the major Western&lt;br /&gt;states. There have been tense conflicts between these states&lt;br /&gt;from time to time, but the important point is that conflict has&lt;br /&gt;been contained within a deeply embedded, stable, and increasingly&lt;br /&gt;articulated political order.... The threat of war is off the&lt;br /&gt;table.2&lt;br /&gt;Currently, this unprecedented American global hegemony has&lt;br /&gt;no rival. But will it remain unchallenged in the years to come?&lt;br /&gt;2From his paper "Creating Liberal Order: The Origins and Persistence of&lt;br /&gt;the Postwar Western Settlement," University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,&lt;br /&gt;November 1995.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 2&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Chessboard&lt;br /&gt;FOR AMERICA, THE CHIEF geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a&lt;br /&gt;millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers&lt;br /&gt;and peoples who fought with one another for regional&lt;br /&gt;domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;power is preeminent in Eurasia—and America's global primacy is&lt;br /&gt;directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance&lt;br /&gt;on the Eurasian continent is sustained.&lt;br /&gt;Obviously, that condition is temporary. But its duration, and&lt;br /&gt;what follows it, is of critical importance not only to America's wellbeing&lt;br /&gt;but more generally to international peace. The sudden emergence&lt;br /&gt;of the first and only global power has created a situation in&lt;br /&gt;which an equally quick end to its supremacy—either because of&lt;br /&gt;America's withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden&lt;br /&gt;emergence of a successful rival—would produce massive international&lt;br /&gt;instability. In effect, it would prompt global anarchy. The&lt;br /&gt;Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington is right in boldly&lt;br /&gt;asserting:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;30&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 31&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence&lt;br /&gt;and disorder and less democracy and economic growth&lt;br /&gt;than a world where the United States continues to have more&lt;br /&gt;influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The&lt;br /&gt;sustained international primacy of the United States is central&lt;br /&gt;to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of&lt;br /&gt;freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order&lt;br /&gt;in the world.1&lt;br /&gt;In that context, how America "manages" Eurasia is critical.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia is the globe's largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A&lt;br /&gt;power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's&lt;br /&gt;three most advanced and economically productive regions. A&lt;br /&gt;mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia&lt;br /&gt;would almost automatically entail Africa's subordination, rendering&lt;br /&gt;the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral&lt;br /&gt;to the world's central continent (see map on page 32). About 75&lt;br /&gt;percent of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the&lt;br /&gt;world's physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and&lt;br /&gt;underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the&lt;br /&gt;world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known energy&lt;br /&gt;resources (see tables on page 33).&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia is also the location of most of the world's politically assertive&lt;br /&gt;and dynamic states. After the United States, the next six&lt;br /&gt;largest economies and the next six biggest spenders on military&lt;br /&gt;weaponry are located in Eurasia. All but one of the world's overt&lt;br /&gt;nuclear powers and all but one of the covert ones are located in&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia. The world's two most populous aspirants to regional&lt;br /&gt;hegemony and global influence are Eurasian. All of the potential&lt;br /&gt;political and/or economic challengers to American primacy are&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian. Cumulatively, Eurasia's power vastly overshadows&lt;br /&gt;America's. Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically&lt;br /&gt;one.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global&lt;br /&gt;primacy continues to be played. Although geostrategy—the strategic&lt;br /&gt;management of geopolitical interests—may be compared to&lt;br /&gt;'Samuel P. Huntington. "Why International Primacy Matters," International&lt;br /&gt;Security (Spring 1993):83.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tlie Continents: Area&lt;br /&gt;23.496,900&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia Alrica/MlrJtIle East South Ainerka North America&lt;br /&gt;The Continents: Population&lt;br /&gt;MU lions&lt;br /&gt;4.5O0&lt;br /&gt;4.000&lt;br /&gt;3,500&lt;br /&gt;1,000&lt;br /&gt;2,500&lt;br /&gt;2.000&lt;br /&gt;1.500&lt;br /&gt;1.000&lt;br /&gt;500&lt;br /&gt;4.053.455.374&lt;br /&gt;334.916.662 3S6' 2 9 2 0 3 6&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia Atrita/Mlddle Rait South America NorthAmeric&lt;br /&gt;The Continents: GNP&lt;br /&gt;JU.UUU -&lt;br /&gt;20,000&lt;br /&gt;10.000-&lt;br /&gt;0-&lt;br /&gt;34.000&lt;br /&gt;I 1 1&lt;br /&gt;[ - I&lt;br /&gt;1.5O0&lt;br /&gt;1 1&lt;br /&gt;1,750&lt;br /&gt;8.100&lt;br /&gt;[ 1&lt;br /&gt;1 1 i&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia Airtca/Middle Eitt South America North America&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;34 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;chess, the somewhat oval-shaped Eurasian chessboard engages&lt;br /&gt;not just two but several players, each possessing differing amounts&lt;br /&gt;of power. The key players are located on the chessboard's west,&lt;br /&gt;east, center, and south. Both the western and the eastern extremities&lt;br /&gt;of the chessboard contain densely populated regions, organized&lt;br /&gt;on relatively congested space into several powerful states. In&lt;br /&gt;the case of Eurasia's small western periphery, American power is&lt;br /&gt;deployed directly on it. The far eastern mainland is the seat of an&lt;br /&gt;increasingly powerful and independent player, controlling an enormous&lt;br /&gt;population, while the territory of its energetic rival—confined&lt;br /&gt;on several nearby islands—and half of a small far-eastern&lt;br /&gt;peninsula provide a perch for American power.&lt;br /&gt;Stretching between the western and eastern extremities is a&lt;br /&gt;sparsely populated and currently politically fluid and organizationally&lt;br /&gt;fragmented vast middle space that was formerly occupied&lt;br /&gt;by a powerful rival to U.S. preeminence—a rival that was&lt;br /&gt;once committed to the goal of pushing America out of Eurasia. To&lt;br /&gt;the south of that large central Eurasian plateau lies a politically&lt;br /&gt;anarchic but energy-rich region of potentially great importance&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 35&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;to both the western and the eastern Eurasian states, including in&lt;br /&gt;the southernmost area a highly populated aspirant to regional&lt;br /&gt;hegemony.&lt;br /&gt;This huge, oddly shaped Eurasian chessboard—extending from&lt;br /&gt;Lisbon to Vladivostok—provides the setting for "the game." If&lt;br /&gt;the middle space can be drawn increasingly into the expanding&lt;br /&gt;orbit of the West (where America preponderates), if the southern&lt;br /&gt;region is not subjected to domination by a single player, and if the&lt;br /&gt;East is not unified in a manner that prompts the expulsion of&lt;br /&gt;America from its offshore bases, America can then be said to prevail.&lt;br /&gt;But if the middle space rebuffs the West, becomes an&lt;br /&gt;assertive single entity, and either gains control over the South or&lt;br /&gt;forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor, then America's primacy&lt;br /&gt;in Eurasia shrinks dramatically. The same would be the case&lt;br /&gt;if the two major Eastern players were somehow to unite. Finally,&lt;br /&gt;any ejection of America by its Western partners from its perch on&lt;br /&gt;the western periphery would automatically spell the end of America's&lt;br /&gt;participation in the game on the Eurasian chessboard, even&lt;br /&gt;though that would probably also mean the eventual subordination&lt;br /&gt;of the western extremity to a revived player occupying the&lt;br /&gt;middle space.&lt;br /&gt;The scope of America's global hegemony is admittedly great,&lt;br /&gt;but its depth is shallow, limited by both domestic and external restraints.&lt;br /&gt;American hegemony involves the exercise of decisive influence&lt;br /&gt;but, unlike the empires of the past, not of direct control.&lt;br /&gt;The very scale and diversity of Eurasia, as well as the power of&lt;br /&gt;some of its states, limits the depth of American influence and the&lt;br /&gt;scope of control over the course of events. That megacontinent is&lt;br /&gt;just too large, too populous, culturally too varied, and composed&lt;br /&gt;of too many historically ambitious and politically energetic states&lt;br /&gt;to be compliant toward even the most economically successful&lt;br /&gt;and politically preeminent global power. This condition places a&lt;br /&gt;premium on geostrategic skill, on the careful, selective, and very&lt;br /&gt;deliberate deployment of America's resources on the huge&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian chessboard.&lt;br /&gt;It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be&lt;br /&gt;autocratic abroad. This limits the use of America's power, especially&lt;br /&gt;its capacity for military intimidation. Never before has a pop36&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ulist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit&lt;br /&gt;of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in&lt;br /&gt;conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's sense of&lt;br /&gt;domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense&lt;br /&gt;spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties even among professional&lt;br /&gt;soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic&lt;br /&gt;instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, most Americans by and large do not derive any special&lt;br /&gt;gratification from their country's new status as the sole global&lt;br /&gt;superpower. Political "triumphalism" connected with America's&lt;br /&gt;victory in the Cold War has generally tended to receive a cold reception&lt;br /&gt;and has been the object of some derision on the part of&lt;br /&gt;the more liberal-minded commentators. If anything, two rather&lt;br /&gt;varying views of the implications for America of its historic success&lt;br /&gt;in the competition with the former Soviet Union have been&lt;br /&gt;politically more appealing: on the one hand, there is the view that&lt;br /&gt;the end of the Cold War justifies a significant reduction in America's&lt;br /&gt;global engagement, irrespective of the consequences for&lt;br /&gt;America's global standing; and on the other hand, there is the perspective&lt;br /&gt;that the time has come for genuine international multilateralism,&lt;br /&gt;to which America should even yield some of its&lt;br /&gt;sovereignty. Both schools of thought have commanded the loyalty&lt;br /&gt;of committed constituencies.&lt;br /&gt;Compounding the dilemmas facing the American leadership&lt;br /&gt;are the changes in the character of the global situation itself: the&lt;br /&gt;direct use of power now tends to be more constrained than was&lt;br /&gt;the case in the past. Nuclear weapons have dramatically reduced&lt;br /&gt;the utility of war as a tool of policy or even as a threat. The growing&lt;br /&gt;economic interdependence among nations is making the political&lt;br /&gt;exploitation of economic blackmail less compelling. Thus&lt;br /&gt;maneuver, diplomacy, coalition building, co-optation, and the very&lt;br /&gt;deliberate deployment of one's political assets have become the&lt;br /&gt;key ingredients of the successful exercise of geostrategic power on&lt;br /&gt;the Eurasian chessboard.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 37&lt;br /&gt;GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGY&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The exercise of American global primacy must be sensitive to the&lt;br /&gt;fact that political geography remains a critical consideration in international&lt;br /&gt;affairs. Napoleon reportedly once said that to know a&lt;br /&gt;nation's geography was to know its foreign policy. Our understanding&lt;br /&gt;of the importance of political geography, however, must adapt&lt;br /&gt;to the new realities of power.&lt;br /&gt;For most of the history of international affairs, territorial control&lt;br /&gt;was the focus of political conflict. Either national self-gratification&lt;br /&gt;over the acquisition of larger territory or the sense of national&lt;br /&gt;deprivation over the loss of "sacred" land has been the cause of&lt;br /&gt;most of the bloody wars fought since the rise of nationalism. It is&lt;br /&gt;no exaggeration to say that the territorial imperative has been the&lt;br /&gt;main impulse driving the aggressive behavior of nation-states. Empires&lt;br /&gt;were also built through the careful seizure and retention of&lt;br /&gt;vital geographic assets, such as Gibraltar or the Suez Canal or Singapore,&lt;br /&gt;which served as key choke points or linchpins in a system&lt;br /&gt;of imperial control.&lt;br /&gt;The most extreme manifestation of the linkage between nationalism&lt;br /&gt;and territorial possession was provided by Nazi Germany and&lt;br /&gt;imperial Japan. The effort to build the "one-thousand-year Reich"&lt;br /&gt;went far beyond the goal of reuniting all German-speaking peoples&lt;br /&gt;under one political roof and focused also on the desire to control&lt;br /&gt;"the granaries" of Ukraine as well as other Slavic lands, whose populations&lt;br /&gt;were to provide cheap slave labor for the imperial domain.&lt;br /&gt;The Japanese were similarly fixated on the notion that direct territorial&lt;br /&gt;possession of Manchuria, and later of the important oil-producing&lt;br /&gt;Dutch East Indies, was essential to the fulfillment of the&lt;br /&gt;Japanese quest for national power and global status. In a similar&lt;br /&gt;vein, for centuries the definition of Russian national greatness was&lt;br /&gt;equated with the acquisition of territory, and even at the end of the&lt;br /&gt;twentieth century, the Russian insistence on retaining control over&lt;br /&gt;such non-Russian people as the Chechens, who live around a vital&lt;br /&gt;oil pipeline, has been justified by the claim that such control is essential&lt;br /&gt;to Russia's status as a great power.&lt;br /&gt;Nation-states continue to be the basic units of the world system.&lt;br /&gt;Although the decline in big-power nationalism and the fading&lt;br /&gt;of ideology has reduced the emotional content of global politics—&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;38 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;while nuclear weapons have introduced major restraints on the&lt;br /&gt;use of force—competition based on territory still dominates world&lt;br /&gt;affairs, even if its forms currently tend to be more civil. In that&lt;br /&gt;competition, geographic location is still the point of departure for&lt;br /&gt;the definition of a nation-state's external priorities, and the size of&lt;br /&gt;national territory also remains one of the major criteria of status&lt;br /&gt;and power.&lt;br /&gt;However, for most nation-states, the issue of territorial possession&lt;br /&gt;has lately been waning in salience. To the extent that territorial&lt;br /&gt;disputes are still important in shaping the foreign policy of&lt;br /&gt;some states, they are more a matter of resentment over the denial&lt;br /&gt;of self-determination to ethnic brethren said to be deprived of the&lt;br /&gt;right to join the "motherland" or a grievance over alleged mistreatment&lt;br /&gt;by a neighbor of ethnic minorities than they are a quest for&lt;br /&gt;enhanced national status through territorial enlargement.&lt;br /&gt;Increasingly, the ruling national elites have come to recognize&lt;br /&gt;that factors other than territory are more crucial in determining&lt;br /&gt;the international status of a state or the degree of its international&lt;br /&gt;influence. Economic prowess, and its translation into technological&lt;br /&gt;innovation, can also be a key criterion of power. Japan provides&lt;br /&gt;the supreme example. Nonetheless, geographic location still tends&lt;br /&gt;to determine the immediate priorities of a state—and the greater&lt;br /&gt;its military, economic, and political power, the greater the radius,&lt;br /&gt;beyond its immediate neighbors, of that state's vital geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;interests, influence, and involvement.&lt;br /&gt;Until recently, the leading analysts of geopolitics have debated&lt;br /&gt;whether land power was more significant than sea power and what&lt;br /&gt;specific region of Eurasia is vital to gain control over the entire&lt;br /&gt;continent. One of the most prominent, Harold Mackinder, pioneered&lt;br /&gt;the discussion early in this century with his successive&lt;br /&gt;concepts of the Eurasian "pivot area" (which was said to include&lt;br /&gt;all of Siberia and much of Central Asia) and, later, of the&lt;br /&gt;Central-East European "heartland" as the vital springboards for&lt;br /&gt;the attainment of continental domination. He popularized his&lt;br /&gt;heartland concept by the famous dictum:&lt;br /&gt;Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;&lt;br /&gt;Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;&lt;br /&gt;Who rules the World-Island commands the world.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 39&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Geopolitics was also invoked by some leading German political&lt;br /&gt;geographers to justify their country's "Drang nach Osten," notabiy&lt;br /&gt;with Karl Haushofer adapting Mackinder's concept to Germany's&lt;br /&gt;strategic needs. Its much-vulgarized echo could also be heard in&lt;br /&gt;Adolf Hitler's emphasis on the German people's need for "Lebensraum."&lt;br /&gt;Other European thinkers of the first half of this century anticipated&lt;br /&gt;an eastward shift in the geopolitical center of gravity,&lt;br /&gt;with the Pacific region—and specifically America and Japan—becoming&lt;br /&gt;the likely inheritors of Europe's fading domination. To forestall&lt;br /&gt;such a shift, the French political geographer Paul Demangeon,&lt;br /&gt;as well as other French geopoliticians, advocated greater unity&lt;br /&gt;among the European states even before World War II.&lt;br /&gt;Today, the geopolitical issue is no longer what geographic part&lt;br /&gt;of Eurasia Is the point of departure for continental domination, nor&lt;br /&gt;whether land power is more significant than sea power. Geopolitics&lt;br /&gt;has moved from the regional to the global dimension, with preponderance&lt;br /&gt;over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the&lt;br /&gt;central basis for global primacy. The United States, a non-Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;power, now enjoys international primacy, with its power directly&lt;br /&gt;deployed on three peripheries of the Eurasian continent, from&lt;br /&gt;which it exercises a powerful influence on the states occupying the&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian hinterland. But it is on the globe's most important playing&lt;br /&gt;field—Eurasia—that a potential rival to America might at some&lt;br /&gt;point arise. Thus, focusing on the key players and properly assessing&lt;br /&gt;the terrain has to be the point of departure for the formulation&lt;br /&gt;of American geostrategy for the long-term management of America's&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian geopolitical interests.&lt;br /&gt;Two basic steps are thus required:&lt;br /&gt;• first, to identify the geostrategically dynamic Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;states that have the power to cause a potentially important&lt;br /&gt;shift in the international distribution of power and to decipher&lt;br /&gt;the central external goals of their respective political&lt;br /&gt;elites and the likely consequences of their seeking to attain&lt;br /&gt;them; and to pinpoint the geopolitically critical Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;states whose location and/or existence have catalytic effects&lt;br /&gt;either on the more active geostrategic players or on&lt;br /&gt;regional conditions;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;40 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;• second, to formulate specific U.S. policies to offset, co-opt,&lt;br /&gt;and/or control the above, so as to preserve and promote vital&lt;br /&gt;U.S. interests, and to conceptualize a more comprehensive&lt;br /&gt;geostrategy that establishes on a global scale the&lt;br /&gt;interconnection between the more specific U.S. policies.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, for the United States, Eurasian geostrategy involves&lt;br /&gt;the purposeful management of geostrategically dynamic states&lt;br /&gt;and the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states, in keeping&lt;br /&gt;with the twin interests of America in the short-term preservation&lt;br /&gt;of its unique global power and in the long-run transformation&lt;br /&gt;of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation. To put it&lt;br /&gt;in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient&lt;br /&gt;empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy&lt;br /&gt;are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among&lt;br /&gt;the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep&lt;br /&gt;the barbarians from coming together.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;GEOSTRATEGIC PLAYERS AND&lt;br /&gt;GEOPOLITICAL PIVOTS&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Active geostrategic players are the states that have the capacity&lt;br /&gt;and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their&lt;br /&gt;borders in order to alter—to a degree that affects America's interests—&lt;br /&gt;the existing geopolitical state of affairs. They have the potential&lt;br /&gt;and/or the predisposition to be geopolitically volatile. For&lt;br /&gt;whatever reason—the quest for national grandeur, ideological fulfillment,&lt;br /&gt;religious messianism, or economic aggrandizement—some&lt;br /&gt;states do seek to attain regional domination or global standing.&lt;br /&gt;They are driven by deeply rooted and complex motivations, best&lt;br /&gt;explained by Robert Browning's phrase:"... a man's reach should&lt;br /&gt;exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?" They thus take careful&lt;br /&gt;stock of America's power, determine the extent to which their interests&lt;br /&gt;overlap or collide with America, and shape their own more limited&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian objectives, sometimes in collusion but sometimes in&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 41&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;conflict with America's policies. To the Eurasian states so driven,&lt;br /&gt;the United States must pay special attention.&lt;br /&gt;Geopolitical pivots are the states whose importance is derived&lt;br /&gt;not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive&lt;br /&gt;location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;condition for the behavior of geostrategic players. Most&lt;br /&gt;often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography,&lt;br /&gt;which in some cases gives them a special role either in denning access&lt;br /&gt;to important areas or in denying resources to a significant&lt;br /&gt;player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive&lt;br /&gt;shield for a vital state or even a region. Sometimes, the very existence&lt;br /&gt;of a geopolitical pivot can be said to have very significant&lt;br /&gt;political and cultural consequences for a more active neighboring&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic player. The identification of the post-Cold War key&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian geopolitical pivots, and protecting them, is thus also a&lt;br /&gt;crucial aspect of America's global geostrategy.&lt;br /&gt;It should also be noted at the outset that although all&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic players tend to be important and powerful countries,&lt;br /&gt;not all important and powerful countries are automatically&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic players. Thus, while the identification of the geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;players is thus relatively easy, the omission from the list&lt;br /&gt;that follows of some obviously important countries may require&lt;br /&gt;more justification.&lt;br /&gt;In the current global circumstances, at least five key geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;players and five geopolitical pivots (with two of the latter perhaps&lt;br /&gt;also partially qualifying as players) can be identified on&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia's new political map. France, Germany, Russia, China, and&lt;br /&gt;India are major and active players, whereas Great Britain, Japan,&lt;br /&gt;and Indonesia, while admittedly very important countries, do not&lt;br /&gt;so qualify. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran play&lt;br /&gt;the role of critically important geopolitical pivots, though both&lt;br /&gt;Turkey and Iran are to some extent—within their more limited capabilities—&lt;br /&gt;also geostrategically active. More will be said about&lt;br /&gt;each in subsequent chapters.&lt;br /&gt;At this stage, suffice it to say that in the western extremity of&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia the key and dynamic geostrategic players are France and&lt;br /&gt;Germany. Both of them are motivated by a vision of a united Eu42&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;rope, though they differ on how much and in what fashion such a&lt;br /&gt;Europe should remain linked to America. But both want to shape&lt;br /&gt;something ambitiously new in Europe, thus altering the status&lt;br /&gt;quo. France in particular has its own geostrategic concept of Europe,&lt;br /&gt;one that differs in some significant respects from that of the&lt;br /&gt;United States, and is inclined to engage in tactical maneuvers designed&lt;br /&gt;to play off Russia against America and Great Britain against&lt;br /&gt;Germany, even while relying on the Franco-German alliance to offset&lt;br /&gt;its own relative weakness.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, both France and Germany are powerful enough and&lt;br /&gt;assertive enough to exercise influence within a wider regional radius.&lt;br /&gt;France not only seeks a central political role in a unifying Europe&lt;br /&gt;but also sees itself as the nucleus of a Mediterranean-North&lt;br /&gt;African cluster of states that share common concerns. Germany is&lt;br /&gt;increasingly conscious of its special status as Europe's most important&lt;br /&gt;states—as the area's economic locomotive and the emerging&lt;br /&gt;leader of the European Union (EU). Germany feels it has a&lt;br /&gt;special responsibility for the newly emancipated Central Europe,&lt;br /&gt;in a manner vaguely reminiscent of earlier notions of a German-led&lt;br /&gt;Mitteleuropa. Moreover, both France and Germany consider themselves&lt;br /&gt;entitled to represent European interests in dealings with&lt;br /&gt;Russia, and Germany even retains, because of its geographic location,&lt;br /&gt;at least theoretically, the grand option of a special bilateral&lt;br /&gt;accommodation with Russia.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, Great Britain is not a geostrategic player. It has&lt;br /&gt;fewer major options, it entertains no ambitious vision of Europe's&lt;br /&gt;future, and its relative decline has also reduced its capacity to play&lt;br /&gt;the traditional role of the European balancer. Its ambivalence regarding&lt;br /&gt;European unification and its attachment to a waning special&lt;br /&gt;relationship with America have made Great Britain&lt;br /&gt;increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting&lt;br /&gt;Europe's future are concerned. London has largely dealt itself out&lt;br /&gt;of the European game.&lt;br /&gt;Sir Roy Denman, a former British senior official in the European&lt;br /&gt;Commission, recalls in his memoirs that as early as the 1955 conference&lt;br /&gt;in Messina, which previewed the formation of a European&lt;br /&gt;Union, the official spokesman for Britain flatly asserted to the assembled&lt;br /&gt;would-be architects of Europe:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 43&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The future treaty which you are discussing has no chance of&lt;br /&gt;being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being&lt;br /&gt;applied. And if it was applied, it would be totally unacceptable&lt;br /&gt;to Britain.... au revoir et bonne chance.2&lt;br /&gt;More than forty years later, the above dictum remains essentially&lt;br /&gt;the definition of the basic British attitude toward the construction&lt;br /&gt;of a genuinely united Europe. Britain's reluctance to&lt;br /&gt;participate in the Economic and Monetary Union, targeted for January&lt;br /&gt;1999, reflects the country's unwillingness to identify British&lt;br /&gt;destiny with that of Europe. The substance of that attitude was&lt;br /&gt;well summarized in the early 1990s as follows:&lt;br /&gt;• Britain rejects the goal of political unification.&lt;br /&gt;• Britain favors a model of economic integration based on&lt;br /&gt;free trade.&lt;br /&gt;• Britain prefers foreign policy, security, and defense coordination&lt;br /&gt;outside the EC [European Community] framework.&lt;br /&gt;• Britain has rarely maximized its influence with the EC.3&lt;br /&gt;Great Britain, to be sure, still remains important to America. It&lt;br /&gt;continues to wield some degree of global influence through the&lt;br /&gt;Commonwealth, but it is neither a restless major power nor is it&lt;br /&gt;motivated by an ambitious vision. It is America's key supporter, a&lt;br /&gt;very loyal ally, a vital military base, and a close partner in critically&lt;br /&gt;important intelligence activities. Its friendship needs to be nourished,&lt;br /&gt;but its policies do not call for sustained attention. It is a retired&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic player, resting on its splendid laurels, largely&lt;br /&gt;disengaged from the great European adventure in which France&lt;br /&gt;and Germany are the principal actors.&lt;br /&gt;The other medium-sized European states, with most being&lt;br /&gt;2Roy Den man, Missed Chances (London: Cassell, 1996).&lt;br /&gt;'In Robert Skidelsky's contribution on "Great Britain and the New Europe,"&lt;br /&gt;in From the Atlantic to the Urals, ed. David P. Calleo and Philip H. Gordon&lt;br /&gt;(Arlington, Va.: 1992), p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;44 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;members of NATO and/or the European Union, either follow America's&lt;br /&gt;lead or quietly line up behind Germany or France, Their policies&lt;br /&gt;do not have a wider regional impact, and they are not in a&lt;br /&gt;position to alter their basic alignments. At this stage, they are neither&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic players nor geopolitical pivots. The same is true&lt;br /&gt;of the most important potential Central European member of&lt;br /&gt;NATO and the EU, namely, Poland. Poland is too weak to be a&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic player, and it has only one option: to become integrated&lt;br /&gt;into the West. Moreover, the disappearance of the old Russian&lt;br /&gt;Empire and Poland's deepening ties with both the Atlantic&lt;br /&gt;alliance and the emerging Europe increasingly give Poland historically&lt;br /&gt;unprecedented security, while confining its strategic choices.&lt;br /&gt;Russia, it hardly needs saying, remains a major geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;player, in spite of its weakened state and probably prolonged&lt;br /&gt;malaise. Its very presence impacts massively on the newly independent&lt;br /&gt;states within the vast Eurasian space of the former Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union. It entertains ambitious geopolitical objectives, which it increasingly&lt;br /&gt;proclaims openly. Once it has recovered its strength, it&lt;br /&gt;will also impact significantly on its western and eastern neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, Russia has still to make its fundamental geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;choice regarding its relationship with America: is it a friend or foe?&lt;br /&gt;It may well feel that it has major options on the Eurasian continent&lt;br /&gt;in that regard. Much depends on how its internal politics evolve&lt;br /&gt;and especially on whether Russia becomes a European democracy&lt;br /&gt;or a Eurasian empire again. In any case, it clearly remains a player,&lt;br /&gt;even though it has lost some of its "pieces," as well as some key&lt;br /&gt;spaces on the Eurasian chessboard.&lt;br /&gt;Similarly, it hardly needs arguing that China is a major player.&lt;br /&gt;China is already a significant regional power and is likely to entertain&lt;br /&gt;wider aspirations, given its history as a major power and its&lt;br /&gt;view of the Chinese state as the global center. The choices China&lt;br /&gt;makes are already beginning to affect the geopolitical distribution&lt;br /&gt;of power in Asia, while its economic momentum is bound to give it&lt;br /&gt;both greater physical power and increasing ambitions. The rise of&lt;br /&gt;a "Greater China" will not leave the Taiwan issue dormant, and that&lt;br /&gt;will inevitably impact on the American position in the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;The dismantling of the Soviet Union has also created on the western&lt;br /&gt;edge of China a series of states, regarding which the Chinese&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 45&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;leaders cannot be indifferent. Thus, Russia will also be much affected&lt;br /&gt;by China's more active emergence on the world scene.&lt;br /&gt;The eastern periphery of Eurasia poses a paradox. Japan is&lt;br /&gt;clearly a major power in world affairs, and the American-Japanese&lt;br /&gt;alliance has often—and correctly—been defined as America's&lt;br /&gt;most important bilateral relationship. As one of the very top economic&lt;br /&gt;powers in the world, Japan clearly possesses the potential&lt;br /&gt;for the exercise of first-class political power. Yet it does not act on&lt;br /&gt;this, eschewing any aspirations for regional domination and preferring&lt;br /&gt;instead to operate under American protection. Like Great&lt;br /&gt;Britain in the case of Europe, Japan prefers not to become engaged&lt;br /&gt;in the politics of the Asian mainland, though at least a partial reason&lt;br /&gt;for this is the continued hostility of many fellow Asians to any&lt;br /&gt;Japanese quest for a regionally preeminent political role.&lt;br /&gt;This self-restrained Japanese political profile in turn permits&lt;br /&gt;the United States to play a central security role in the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;Japan is thus not a geostrategic player, though its obvious potential&lt;br /&gt;for quickly becoming one—especially if either China or America&lt;br /&gt;were suddenly to alter its current policies—imposes on the&lt;br /&gt;United States a special obligation to carefully nurture the American-&lt;br /&gt;Japanese relationship. It is not Japanese foreign policy that&lt;br /&gt;America must watch, but it is Japan's self-restraint that America&lt;br /&gt;must very subtly cultivate. Any significant reduction in American-&lt;br /&gt;Japanese political ties would impact directly on the region's&lt;br /&gt;stability.&lt;br /&gt;The case for not listing Indonesia as a dynamic geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;player is easier to make. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the most&lt;br /&gt;important country, but even in the region itself, its capacity for&lt;br /&gt;projecting significant influence is limited by the relatively underdeveloped&lt;br /&gt;state of the Indonesian economy, its continued internal&lt;br /&gt;political uncertainties, its dispersed archipelago, and its susceptibility&lt;br /&gt;to ethnic conflicts that are exacerbated by the central role&lt;br /&gt;exercised in its internal financial affairs by the Chinese minority. At&lt;br /&gt;some point, Indonesia could become an important obstacle to Chinese&lt;br /&gt;southward aspirations. That eventuality has already been&lt;br /&gt;recognized by Australia, which once feared Indonesian expansionism&lt;br /&gt;but lately has begun to favor closer Australian-Indonesian security&lt;br /&gt;cooperation. But a period of political consolidation and&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;46 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;continued economic success is needed before Indonesia can be&lt;br /&gt;viewed as the regionally dominant actor.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, India is in the process of establishing itself as a regional&lt;br /&gt;power and views itself as potentially a major global player&lt;br /&gt;as well. It also sees itself as a rival to China. That may be a matter&lt;br /&gt;of overestimating its own long-term capabilities, but India is unquestionably&lt;br /&gt;the most powerful South Asian state, a regional hegemon&lt;br /&gt;of sorts. It is also a semisecret nuclear power, and it became&lt;br /&gt;one not only in order to intimidate Pakistan but especially to balance&lt;br /&gt;China's possession of a nuclear arsenal. India has a geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;vision of its regional role, both vis-a-vis its neighbors and in the&lt;br /&gt;Indian Ocean. However, its ambitions at this stage only peripherally&lt;br /&gt;intrude on America's Eurasian interests, and thus, as a&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic player, India is not—at least, not to the same degree&lt;br /&gt;as either Russia or China—a source of geopolitical concern.&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard,&lt;br /&gt;is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent&lt;br /&gt;country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine,&lt;br /&gt;Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can&lt;br /&gt;still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly&lt;br /&gt;Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating&lt;br /&gt;conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be&lt;br /&gt;resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be&lt;br /&gt;supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south. China would&lt;br /&gt;also be likely to oppose any restoration of Russian domination&lt;br /&gt;over Central Asia, given its increasing interest in the newly independent&lt;br /&gt;states there. However, if Moscow regains control over&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as&lt;br /&gt;its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the&lt;br /&gt;wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe&lt;br /&gt;and Asia. Ukraine's loss of independence would have immediate&lt;br /&gt;consequences for Central Europe, transforming Poland into the&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united Europe.&lt;br /&gt;Despite its limited size and small population, Azerbaijan, with&lt;br /&gt;its vast energy resources, is also geopolitically critical. It is the&lt;br /&gt;cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin&lt;br /&gt;and Central Asia. The independence of the Central Asian states&lt;br /&gt;can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 47&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;subordinated to Moscow's control. Azerbaijan's own and very significant&lt;br /&gt;oil resources can also be subjected to Russian control,&lt;br /&gt;once Azerbaijan's independence has been nullified. An independent&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipelines that do&lt;br /&gt;not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major&lt;br /&gt;avenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming&lt;br /&gt;economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics. Almost as&lt;br /&gt;much as in the case of Ukraine, the future of Azerbaijan and Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia is also crucial in defining what Russia might or might not&lt;br /&gt;become.&lt;br /&gt;Turkey and Iran are engaged in establishing some degree of influence&lt;br /&gt;in the Caspian Sea-Central Asia region, exploiting the retraction&lt;br /&gt;of Russian power. For that reason, they might be considered as&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic players. However, both states confront serious domestic&lt;br /&gt;problems, and their capacity for effecting major regional shifts in&lt;br /&gt;the distribution of power is limited. They are also rivals and thus&lt;br /&gt;tend to negate each other's influence. For example, in Azerbaijan,&lt;br /&gt;where Turkey has gained an influential role, the Iranian posture&lt;br /&gt;(arising out of concern over possible Azeri national stirrings within&lt;br /&gt;Iran itself) has been more helpful to the Russians.&lt;br /&gt;Both Turkey and Iran, however, are primarily important geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;pivots. Turkey stabilizes the Black Sea region, controls access&lt;br /&gt;from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the&lt;br /&gt;Caucasus, still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and&lt;br /&gt;serves as the southern anchor for NATO. A destabilized Turkey&lt;br /&gt;would be likely to unleash more violence in the southern Balkans,&lt;br /&gt;while facilitating the reimposition of Russian control over the&lt;br /&gt;newly independent states of the Caucasus. Iran, despite the ambiguity&lt;br /&gt;of its attitude toward Azerbaijan, similarly provides stabilizing&lt;br /&gt;support for the new political diversity of Central Asia. It&lt;br /&gt;dominates the eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf, while its independence,&lt;br /&gt;irrespective of current Iranian hostility toward the&lt;br /&gt;United States, acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian threat to&lt;br /&gt;American interests in the Persian Gulf region.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, South Korea is a Far Eastern geopolitical pivot. Its close&lt;br /&gt;links to the United States enable America to shield Japan and&lt;br /&gt;thereby to keep Japan from becoming an independent and major&lt;br /&gt;military power, without an overbearing American presence within&lt;br /&gt;48 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Japan itself. Any significant change in South Korea's status, either&lt;br /&gt;through unification and/or through a shift into an expanding Chinese&lt;br /&gt;sphere of influence, would necessarily alter dramatically&lt;br /&gt;America's role in the Far East, thus altering Japan's as well. In addition,&lt;br /&gt;South Korea's growing economic power also makes it a more&lt;br /&gt;important "space" in its own right, control over which becomes increasingly&lt;br /&gt;valuable.&lt;br /&gt;The above list of geostrategic players and geopolitical pivots is&lt;br /&gt;neither permanent nor fixed. At times, some states might have to&lt;br /&gt;be added or subtracted. Certainly, in some respects, the case&lt;br /&gt;could be made that Taiwan, or Thailand, or Pakistan, or perhaps&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan or Uzbekistan should also be included in the latter category.&lt;br /&gt;However, at this stage, the case for none of the above seems&lt;br /&gt;compelling. Changes in the status of any of them would represent&lt;br /&gt;major events and involve some shifts in the distribution of power,&lt;br /&gt;but it is doubtful that the catalytic consequences would be farreaching.&lt;br /&gt;The only exception might involve the issue of Taiwan, if&lt;br /&gt;one chooses to view it apart from China. Even then, that issue&lt;br /&gt;would only arise if China were to use major force to conquer the island,&lt;br /&gt;in successful defiance of the United States, thereby threatening&lt;br /&gt;more generally America's political credibility in the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;The probability of such a course of events seems low, but that consideration&lt;br /&gt;still has to be kept in mind when framing U.S. policy toward&lt;br /&gt;China.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;CRITICAL CHOICES AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Identification of the central players and key pivots helps to define&lt;br /&gt;America's grand policy dilemmas and to anticipate the potential&lt;br /&gt;major challenges on the Eurasian supercontinent. These can&lt;br /&gt;be summarized, before more comprehensive discussion in subsequent&lt;br /&gt;chapters, as involving five broad issues:&lt;br /&gt;• What kind of Europe should America prefer and hence promote?&lt;br /&gt;• What kind of Russia is in America's interest, and what and&lt;br /&gt;how much can America do about it?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 49&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;• What are the prospects for the emergence in Central Eurasia&lt;br /&gt;of a new "Balkans," and what should America do to minimize&lt;br /&gt;the resulting risks?&lt;br /&gt;• What role should China be encouraged to assume in the Far&lt;br /&gt;East, and what are the implications of the foregoing not&lt;br /&gt;only for the United States but also for Japan?&lt;br /&gt;• What new Eurasian coalitions are possible, which might be&lt;br /&gt;most dangerous to U.S. interests, and what needs to be&lt;br /&gt;done to preclude them?&lt;br /&gt;The United States has always professed its fidelity to the&lt;br /&gt;cause of a united Europe. Ever since the days of the Kennedy administration,&lt;br /&gt;the standard invocation has been that of "equal&lt;br /&gt;partnership." Official Washington has consistently proclaimed its&lt;br /&gt;desire to see Europe emerge as a single entity, powerful enough&lt;br /&gt;to share with America both the responsibilities and the burdens&lt;br /&gt;of global leadership.&lt;br /&gt;That has been the established rhetoric on the subject. But in&lt;br /&gt;practice, the United States has been less clear and less consistent.&lt;br /&gt;Does Washington truly desire a Europe that is a genuinely&lt;br /&gt;equal partner in world affairs, or does it prefer an unequal alliance?&lt;br /&gt;For example, is the United States prepared to share leadership&lt;br /&gt;with Europe in the Middle East, a region not only much&lt;br /&gt;closer geographically to Europe than to America but also one in&lt;br /&gt;which several European states have long-standing interests? The&lt;br /&gt;issue of Israel instantly comes to mind. U.S.-European differences&lt;br /&gt;over Iran and Iraq have also been treated by the United&lt;br /&gt;States not as an issue between equals but as a matter of insubordination.&lt;br /&gt;Ambiguity regarding the degree of American support for European&lt;br /&gt;unity also extends to the issue of how European unity is to be&lt;br /&gt;defined, especially concerning which country, if any, should lead a&lt;br /&gt;united Europe. Washington has not discouraged London's divisive&lt;br /&gt;posture regarding Europe's integration, though Washington has&lt;br /&gt;also shown a clear preference for German—rather than French—&lt;br /&gt;leadership in Europe. That is understandable, given the traditional&lt;br /&gt;thrust of French policy, but the preference has also had the effect&lt;br /&gt;50 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;of encouraging the occasional appearance of a tactical Franco-&lt;br /&gt;British entente in order to thwart Germany, as well as periodic&lt;br /&gt;French flirtation with Moscow in order to offset the American-German&lt;br /&gt;coalition.&lt;br /&gt;The emergence of a truly united Europe—especially if that&lt;br /&gt;should occur with constructive American support—will require&lt;br /&gt;significant changes in the structure and processes of the NATO alliance,&lt;br /&gt;the principal link between America and Europe. NATO provides&lt;br /&gt;not only the main mechanism for the exercise of U.S.&lt;br /&gt;influence regarding European matters but the basis for the politically&lt;br /&gt;critical American military presence in Western Europe. However,&lt;br /&gt;European unity will require that structure to adjust to the&lt;br /&gt;new reality of an alliance based on two more or less equal partners,&lt;br /&gt;instead of an alliance that, to use traditional terminology, involves&lt;br /&gt;essentially a hegemon and its vassals. That issue has so far&lt;br /&gt;been largely skirted, despite the modest steps taken in 1996 to enhance&lt;br /&gt;within NATO the role of the Western European Union (WEU), •&lt;br /&gt;the military coalition of the Western European states. A real choice&lt;br /&gt;in favor of a united Europe will thus compel a far-reaching reordering&lt;br /&gt;of NATO, inevitably reducing the American primacy within the "&lt;br /&gt;alliance.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, a long-range American geostrategy for Europe will have&lt;br /&gt;to address explicitly the issues of European unity and real partnership&lt;br /&gt;with Europe. An America that truly desires a united and hence&lt;br /&gt;also a more independent Europe will have to throw its weight behind&lt;br /&gt;those European forces that are genuinely committed to Europe's&lt;br /&gt;political and economic integration. Such a strategy will also&lt;br /&gt;mean junking the last vestiges of the once-hallowed U.S.-U.K. special&lt;br /&gt;relationship.&lt;br /&gt;A policy for a united Europe will also have to address—though&lt;br /&gt;jointly with the Europeans—the highly sensitive issue of Europe's&lt;br /&gt;geographic scope. How far eastward should the European Union&lt;br /&gt;extend? And should the eastern limits of the EU be synonymous&lt;br /&gt;with the eastern front line of NATO? The former is more a matter&lt;br /&gt;for a European decision, but a European decision on that issue will&lt;br /&gt;have direct implications for a NATO decision. The latter, however,&lt;br /&gt;engages the United States, and the U.S. voice in NATO is still decisive.&lt;br /&gt;Given the growing consensus regarding the desirability of admitting&lt;br /&gt;the nations of Central Europe into both the EU and NATO,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 51&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;the practical meaning of this question focuses attention on the future&lt;br /&gt;status of the Baltic republics and perhaps also that of Ukraine.&lt;br /&gt;There is thus an important overlap between the European&lt;br /&gt;dilemma discussed above and the second one pertaining to Russia.&lt;br /&gt;It is easy to respond to the question regarding Russia's future&lt;br /&gt;by professing a preference for a democratic Russia, closely linked&lt;br /&gt;to Europe. Presumably, a democratic Russia would be more sympathetic&lt;br /&gt;to the values shared by America and Europe and hence&lt;br /&gt;also more likely to become a junior partner in shaping a more stable&lt;br /&gt;and cooperative Eurasia. But Russia's ambitions may go beyond&lt;br /&gt;the attainment of recognition and respect as a democracy.&lt;br /&gt;Within the Russian foreign policy establishment (composed&lt;br /&gt;largely of former Soviet officials), there still thrives a deeply ingrained&lt;br /&gt;desire for a special Eurasian role, one that would consequently&lt;br /&gt;entail the subordination to Moscow of the newly&lt;br /&gt;independent post-Soviet states.&lt;br /&gt;In that context, even friendly western policy is seen by some influential&lt;br /&gt;members of the Russian policy-making community as designed&lt;br /&gt;to deny Russia its rightful claim to a global status. As two&lt;br /&gt;Russian geopoliticians put it:&lt;br /&gt;[T]he United States and the NATO countries—while sparing&lt;br /&gt;Russia's self-esteem to the extent possible, but nevertheless&lt;br /&gt;firmly and consistently—are destroying the geopolitical foundations&lt;br /&gt;which could, at least in theory, allow Russia to hope to&lt;br /&gt;acquire the status as the number two power in world politics&lt;br /&gt;that belonged to the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, America is seen as pursuing a policy in which&lt;br /&gt;the new organization of the European space that is being engineered&lt;br /&gt;by the West is, in essence, built on the idea of supporting,&lt;br /&gt;in this part of the world, new, relatively small and weak&lt;br /&gt;national states through their more or less close rapprochement&lt;br /&gt;with NATO, the EC, and so forth.4&lt;br /&gt;HA. Bogaturov and V. Kremenyuk (both senior scholars in the Institute of&lt;br /&gt;the United States and Canada), in "Current Relations and Prospects for Interaction&lt;br /&gt;Between Russia and the United States," Nezauisimaya Gazeta, June&lt;br /&gt;28,1996.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;52 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The above quotations define well—even though with some animus—&lt;br /&gt;the dilemma that the United States faces. To what extent&lt;br /&gt;should Russia be helped economically—which inevitably strengthens&lt;br /&gt;Russia politically and militarily—and to what extent should&lt;br /&gt;the newly independent states be simultaneously assisted in the defense&lt;br /&gt;and consolidation of their independence? Can Russia be&lt;br /&gt;both powerful and a democracy at the same time? If it becomes&lt;br /&gt;powerful again, will it not seek to regain its lost imperial domain,&lt;br /&gt;and can it then be both an empire and a democracy?&lt;br /&gt;U.S. policy toward the vital geopolitical pivots of Ukraine and&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan cannot skirt that issue, and America thus faces a difficult&lt;br /&gt;dilemma regarding tactical balance and strategic purpose. Internal&lt;br /&gt;Russian recovery is essential to Russia's democratization&lt;br /&gt;and eventual Europeanization. But any recovery of its imperial potential&lt;br /&gt;would be inimical to both of these objectives. Moreover, it&lt;br /&gt;is over this issue that differences could develop between America&lt;br /&gt;and some European states, especially as the EU and NATO expand.&lt;br /&gt;Should Russia be considered a candidate for eventual membership&lt;br /&gt;in either structure? And what then about Ukraine? The costs of the&lt;br /&gt;exclusion of Russia could be high—creating a self-fulfilling&lt;br /&gt;prophecy in the Russian mindset—but the results of dilution of either&lt;br /&gt;the EU or NATO could also be quite destabilizing.&lt;br /&gt;Another major uncertainty looms in the large and geopolitically&lt;br /&gt;fluid space of Central Eurasia, maximized by the potential&lt;br /&gt;vulnerability of the Turkish-Iranian pivots. In the area demarcated&lt;br /&gt;on the following map from Crimea in the Black Sea directly eastward&lt;br /&gt;along the new southern frontiers of Russia, all the way to the&lt;br /&gt;Chinese province of Xinjiang, then down to the Indian Ocean and&lt;br /&gt;thence westward to the Red Sea, then northward to the eastern&lt;br /&gt;Mediterranean Sea and back to Crimea, live about 400 million people,&lt;br /&gt;located in some twenty-five states, almost all of them ethnically&lt;br /&gt;as well as religiously heterogeneous and practically none of&lt;br /&gt;them politically stable. Some of these states may be in the process&lt;br /&gt;of acquiring nuclear weapons.&lt;br /&gt;This huge region, torn by volatile hatreds and surrounded by&lt;br /&gt;competing powerful neighbors, is likely to be a major battlefield,&lt;br /&gt;both for wars among nation-states and, more likely, for protracted&lt;br /&gt;ethnic and religious violence. Whether India acts as a restraint or&lt;br /&gt;whether it takes advantage of some opportunity to impose its will&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 53&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;on Pakistan will greatly affect the regional scope of the likely conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;The internal strains within Turkey and Iran are likely not&lt;br /&gt;only to get worse but to greatly reduce the stabilizing role these&lt;br /&gt;states are capable of playing within this volcanic region. Such developments&lt;br /&gt;will in turn make it more difficult to assimilate the new&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian states into the international community, while also&lt;br /&gt;adversely affecting the American-dominated security of the Persian&lt;br /&gt;Gulf region. In any case, both America and the international&lt;br /&gt;community may be faced here with a challenge that will dwarf the&lt;br /&gt;recent crisis in the former Yugoslavia.&lt;br /&gt;A possible challenge to American primacy from Islamic fundamentalism&lt;br /&gt;could be part of the problem in this unstable region.&lt;br /&gt;By exploiting religious hostility to the American way of life and&lt;br /&gt;taking advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Islamic fundamentalism&lt;br /&gt;could undermine several pro-Western Middle Eastern governments&lt;br /&gt;and eventually jeopardize American regional interests,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;54 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;especially in the Persian Gulf. However, without political cohesion&lt;br /&gt;and in the absence of a single genuinely powerful Islamic state, a&lt;br /&gt;challenge from Islamic fundamentalism would lack a geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;core and would thus be more likely to express itself through diffuse&lt;br /&gt;violence.&lt;br /&gt;A geostrategic issue of crucial importance is posed by China's&lt;br /&gt;emergence as a major power. The most appealing outcome would&lt;br /&gt;be to co-opt a democratizing and free-marketing China into a larger&lt;br /&gt;Asian regional framework of cooperation. But suppose China does&lt;br /&gt;not democratize but continues to grow in economic and military&lt;br /&gt;power? A "Greater China" may be emerging, whatever the desires&lt;br /&gt;and calculations of its neighbors, and any effort to prevent that&lt;br /&gt;from happening could entail an intensifying conflict with China.&lt;br /&gt;Such a conflict could strain American-Japanese relations—for it is&lt;br /&gt;far from certain that Japan would want to follow America's lead in&lt;br /&gt;containing China—and could therefore have potentially revolutionary&lt;br /&gt;consequences for Tokyo's definition of Japan's regional&lt;br /&gt;role, perhaps even resulting in the termination of the American&lt;br /&gt;presence in the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;However, accommodation with China will also exact its own&lt;br /&gt;price. To accept China as a regional power is not a matter of simply&lt;br /&gt;endorsing a mere slogan. There will have to be substance to&lt;br /&gt;any such regional preeminence. To put it very directly, how large a&lt;br /&gt;Chinese sphere of influence, and where, should America be prepared&lt;br /&gt;to accept as part of a policy of successfully co-opting China&lt;br /&gt;into world affairs? What areas now outside of China's political radius&lt;br /&gt;might have to be conceded to the realm of the reemerging Celestial&lt;br /&gt;Empire?&lt;br /&gt;In that context, the retention of the American presence in&lt;br /&gt;South Korea becomes especially important. Without it, it is difficult&lt;br /&gt;to envisage the American-Japanese defense arrangement continuing&lt;br /&gt;in its present form, for Japan would have to become&lt;br /&gt;militarily more self-sufficient. But any movement toward Korean&lt;br /&gt;reunification is likely to disturb the basis for the continued U.S.&lt;br /&gt;military presence in South Korea. A reunified Korea may choose&lt;br /&gt;not to perpetuate American military protection; that, indeed,&lt;br /&gt;could be the price exacted by China for throwing its decisive&lt;br /&gt;weight behind the reunification of the peninsula. In brief, U.S. management&lt;br /&gt;of its relationship with China will inevitably have direct&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN CHESSBOARD 55&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;consequences for the stability of the American-Japanese-Korean&lt;br /&gt;triangular security relationship.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, some possible contingencies involving future political&lt;br /&gt;alignments should also be briefly noted, subject to fuller discussion&lt;br /&gt;in pertinent chapters. In the past, international affairs were&lt;br /&gt;largely dominated by contests among individual states for regional&lt;br /&gt;domination. Henceforth, the United States may have to determine&lt;br /&gt;how to cope with regional coalitions that seek to push America out&lt;br /&gt;of Eurasia, thereby threatening America's status as a global power.&lt;br /&gt;However, whether any such coalitions do or do not arise to challenge&lt;br /&gt;American primacy will in fact depend to a very large degree&lt;br /&gt;on how effectively the United States responds to the major dilemmas&lt;br /&gt;identified here.&lt;br /&gt;Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand&lt;br /&gt;coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an "antihegemonic"&lt;br /&gt;coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.&lt;br /&gt;It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge&lt;br /&gt;once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would&lt;br /&gt;likely be the leader and Russia the follower. Averting this contingency,&lt;br /&gt;however remote it may be, will require a display of U.S.&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic skill on the western, eastern, and southern perimeters&lt;br /&gt;of Eurasia simultaneously.&lt;br /&gt;A geographically more limited but potentially even more consequential&lt;br /&gt;challenge could involve a Sino-Japanese axis, in the&lt;br /&gt;wake of a collapse of the American position in the Far East and a&lt;br /&gt;revolutionary change in Japan's world outlook. It would combine&lt;br /&gt;the power of two extraordinarily productive peoples, and it could&lt;br /&gt;exploit some form of "Asianism" as a unifying anti-American doctrine.&lt;br /&gt;However, it does not appear likely that in the foreseeable future&lt;br /&gt;China and Japan will form an alliance, given their recent&lt;br /&gt;historical experience; and a farsighted American policy in the Far&lt;br /&gt;East should certainly be able to prevent this eventuality from&lt;br /&gt;occurring.&lt;br /&gt;Also quite remote, but not to be entirely excluded, is the possibility&lt;br /&gt;of a grand European realignment, involving either a German-&lt;br /&gt;Russian collusion or a Franco-Russian entente. There are obvious&lt;br /&gt;historical precedents for both, and either could emerge if European&lt;br /&gt;unification were to grind to a halt and if relations between Europe&lt;br /&gt;and America were to deteriorate gravely. Indeed, in the latter&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;56 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;eventuality, one could imagine a European-Russian accommodation&lt;br /&gt;to exclude America from the continent. At this stage, all of&lt;br /&gt;these variants seem improbable. They would require not only a&lt;br /&gt;massive mishandling by America of its European policy but also a&lt;br /&gt;dramatic reorientation on the part of the key European states.&lt;br /&gt;Whatever the future, it is reasonable to conclude that American&lt;br /&gt;primacy on the Eurasian continent will be buffeted by turbulence&lt;br /&gt;and perhaps at least by sporadic violence. America's&lt;br /&gt;primacy is potentially vulnerable to new challenges, either from regional&lt;br /&gt;contenders or novel constellations. The currently dominant&lt;br /&gt;American global system, within which "the threat of war is off the&lt;br /&gt;table," is likely to be stable only in those parts of the world in&lt;br /&gt;which American primacy, guided by a long-term geostrategy, rests&lt;br /&gt;on compatible and congenial sociopolitical systems, linked together&lt;br /&gt;by American-dominated multilateral frameworks.&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 3&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The&lt;br /&gt;Democratic&lt;br /&gt;Bridgehead&lt;br /&gt;EUROPE is AMERICA'S NATURAL ALLY. It shares the same values; partakes,&lt;br /&gt;in the main, of the same religious heritage; practices the&lt;br /&gt;same democratic politics; and is the original homeland of a&lt;br /&gt;large majority of Americans. By pioneering in the integration of nation-&lt;br /&gt;states into a shared supranational economic and eventually political&lt;br /&gt;union, Europe is also pointing the way toward larger forms of&lt;br /&gt;postnational organization, beyond the narrow visions and the destructive&lt;br /&gt;passions of the age of nationalism. It is already the most&lt;br /&gt;multilateral^ organized region of the world (see chart on page 58).&lt;br /&gt;Success in its political unification would create a single entity of&lt;br /&gt;about 400 million people, living under a democratic roof and enjoying&lt;br /&gt;a standard of living comparable to that of the United States. Such&lt;br /&gt;a Europe would inevitably be a global power.&lt;br /&gt;Europe also serves as the springboard for the progressive expansion&lt;br /&gt;of democracy deeper into Eurasia. Europe's expansion&lt;br /&gt;eastward would consolidate the democratic victory of the 1990s. It&lt;br /&gt;would match on the political and economic plane the essential civilizational&lt;br /&gt;scope of Europe—what has been called the Petrine Europe—&lt;br /&gt;as denned by Europe's ancient and common religious&lt;br /&gt;57&lt;br /&gt;OSCE&lt;br /&gt;Poland&lt;br /&gt;Czech Republic&lt;br /&gt;Slovakia&lt;br /&gt;Hungary&lt;br /&gt;Bulgaria&lt;br /&gt;Romania&lt;br /&gt;Estonia&lt;br /&gt;Latvia&lt;br /&gt;Lithuania&lt;br /&gt;Albania&lt;br /&gt;Slovenia&lt;br /&gt;Croatia&lt;br /&gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina&lt;br /&gt;Yugoslavia&lt;br /&gt;NATO&lt;br /&gt;USA&lt;br /&gt;Canada&lt;br /&gt;Turkey&lt;br /&gt;Iceland&lt;br /&gt;Norway&lt;br /&gt;EU&lt;br /&gt;Greece&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;\&lt;br /&gt;\&lt;br /&gt;\&lt;br /&gt;Malta&lt;br /&gt;Holy See&lt;br /&gt;San Marino&lt;br /&gt;Ireland&lt;br /&gt;Austria&lt;br /&gt;WEU&lt;br /&gt;Belgium&lt;br /&gt;Germany&lt;br /&gt;France&lt;br /&gt;Italy&lt;br /&gt;Luxembourg&lt;br /&gt;Netherlands&lt;br /&gt;Portugal&lt;br /&gt;Spain&lt;br /&gt;Sweden&lt;br /&gt;Finland&lt;br /&gt;^\ Denmark&lt;br /&gt;A&lt;br /&gt;\\&lt;br /&gt;\&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;/&lt;br /&gt;\ United Kingdom //&lt;br /&gt;\&lt;br /&gt;i&lt;br /&gt;y&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;Liechtenstein&lt;br /&gt;Cyprus&lt;br /&gt;Monaco&lt;br /&gt;Russia&lt;br /&gt;Belarus&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine&lt;br /&gt;Moldova&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;Kyrgyzstan&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan&lt;br /&gt;Tajikistan&lt;br /&gt;Armenia&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;Georgia&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 59&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;heritage, derived from Western-rite Christianity. Such a Europe&lt;br /&gt;once existed, long before the age of nationalism and even longer&lt;br /&gt;before the recent division of Europe into its American- and Sovietdominated&lt;br /&gt;halves. Such a larger Europe would be able to exercise&lt;br /&gt;a magnetic attraction on the states located even farther east,&lt;br /&gt;building a network of ties with Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, drawing&lt;br /&gt;them into increasingly binding cooperation while proselytizing&lt;br /&gt;common democratic principles. Eventually, such a Europe could&lt;br /&gt;become one of the vital pillars of an American-sponsored larger&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian structure of security and cooperation.&lt;br /&gt;But first of all, Europe is America's essential geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;bridgehead on the Eurasian continent. America's geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;stake in Europe is enormous. Unlike America's links with Japan,&lt;br /&gt;the Atlantic alliance entrenches American political influence and&lt;br /&gt;military power directly on the Eurasian mainland. At this stage of&lt;br /&gt;American-European relations, with the allied European nations still&lt;br /&gt;highly dependent on U.S. security protection, any expansion in the&lt;br /&gt;scope of Europe becomes automatically an expansion in the scope&lt;br /&gt;of direct U.S. influence as well. Conversely, without close transatlantic&lt;br /&gt;ties, America's primacy in Eurasia promptly fades away. U.S.&lt;br /&gt;control over the Atlantic Ocean and the ability to project influence&lt;br /&gt;and power deeper into Eurasia would be severely circumscribed.&lt;br /&gt;The problem, however, is that a truly European "Europe" as&lt;br /&gt;such does not exist. It is a vision, a concept, and a goal, but it is&lt;br /&gt;not yet reality. Western Europe is already a common market, but it&lt;br /&gt;is still far from being a single political entity. A political Europe has&lt;br /&gt;yet to emerge. The crisis in Bosnia offered painful proof of Europe's&lt;br /&gt;continued absence, if proof were still needed. The brutal&lt;br /&gt;fact is that Western Europe, and increasingly also Central Europe,&lt;br /&gt;remains largely an American protectorate, with its allied states&lt;br /&gt;reminiscent of ancient vassals and tributaries. This is not a&lt;br /&gt;healthy condition, either for America or for the European nations.&lt;br /&gt;Matters are made worse by a more pervasive decline in Europe's&lt;br /&gt;internal vitality. Both the legitimacy of the existing socioeconomic&lt;br /&gt;system and even the surfacing sense of European&lt;br /&gt;identity appear to be vulnerable. In a number of European states,&lt;br /&gt;one can detect a crisis of confidence and a loss of creative momentum,&lt;br /&gt;as well as an inward perspective that is both isolationist and&lt;br /&gt;escapist from the larger dilemmas of the world. It is not clear&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;60 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;whether most Europeans even want Europe to be a major power&lt;br /&gt;and whether they are prepared to do what is needed for it to become&lt;br /&gt;one. Even residual European anti-Americanism, currently&lt;br /&gt;quite weak, is curiously cynical: the Europeans deplore American&lt;br /&gt;"hegemony" but take comfort in being sheltered by it.&lt;br /&gt;The political momentum for Europe's unification was once driven&lt;br /&gt;by three main impulses: the memories of the destructive two&lt;br /&gt;world wars, the desire for economic recovery, and the insecurity&lt;br /&gt;generated by the Soviet threat. By the mid-nineties, however, these&lt;br /&gt;impulses had faded. Economic recovery by and large has been&lt;br /&gt;achieved; if anything, the problem Europe increasingly faces is&lt;br /&gt;that of an excessively burdensome welfare system that is sapping&lt;br /&gt;its economic vitality, while the passionate resistance to any reform&lt;br /&gt;by special interests is diverting European political attention inward.&lt;br /&gt;The Soviet threat has disappeared, while the desire of some&lt;br /&gt;Europeans to gain independence from American tutelage has not&lt;br /&gt;translated into a compelling impulse for continental unification.&lt;br /&gt;The European cause has been increasingly sustained by the bureaucratic&lt;br /&gt;momentum generated by the large institutional machinery&lt;br /&gt;created by the European Community and its successor, the&lt;br /&gt;European Union. The idea of unity still enjoys significant popular&lt;br /&gt;support, but it tends to be lukewarm, lacking in passion and a&lt;br /&gt;sense of mission. In general, the Western Europe of today conveys&lt;br /&gt;the impression of a troubled, unfocused, comfortable yet socially&lt;br /&gt;uneasy set of societies, not partaking of any larger vision. European&lt;br /&gt;unification is increasingly a process and not a cause.&lt;br /&gt;Still, the political elites of two leading European nations—&lt;br /&gt;France and Germany—remain largely committed to the goal of&lt;br /&gt;shaping and defining a Europe that would truly be Europe. They&lt;br /&gt;are thus Europe's principal architects. Working together, they&lt;br /&gt;could construct a Europe worthy of its past and of its potential.&lt;br /&gt;But each is committed to a somewhat different vision and design,&lt;br /&gt;and neither is strong enough to prevail by itself.&lt;br /&gt;This condition creates for the United States a special opportunity&lt;br /&gt;for decisive intervention. It necessitates American engagement&lt;br /&gt;on behalf of Europe's unity, for otherwise unification could&lt;br /&gt;grind to a halt and then gradually even be undone. But any effective&lt;br /&gt;American involvement in Europe's construction has to be&lt;br /&gt;guided by clarity in American thinking regarding what kind of EuTHE&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 61&lt;br /&gt;rope America prefers and is ready to promote—an equal partner&lt;br /&gt;or a junior ally—and regarding the eventual scope of both the European&lt;br /&gt;Union and NATO. It also requires careful management of&lt;br /&gt;Europe's two principal architects.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;GRANDEUR AND REDEMPTION&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;France seeks reincarnation as Europe; Germany hopes for redemption&lt;br /&gt;through Europe. These varying motivations go a long way toward&lt;br /&gt;explaining and defining the substance of the alternative&lt;br /&gt;French and German designs for Europe.&lt;br /&gt;For France, Europe is the means for regaining France's past&lt;br /&gt;greatness. Even before World War H, serious French thinkers on international&lt;br /&gt;affairs already worried about the progressive decline&lt;br /&gt;of Europe's centrality in world affairs. During the several decades&lt;br /&gt;of the Cold War, that worry turned into resentment over the "Anglo-&lt;br /&gt;Saxon" domination of the West, not to speak of contempt for&lt;br /&gt;the related "Americanization" of Western culture. The creation of a&lt;br /&gt;genuine Europe—in Charles De Gaulle's words, "from the Atlantic&lt;br /&gt;to the Urals"—was to remedy that deplorable state of affairs. And&lt;br /&gt;such a Europe, since it would be led by Paris, would simultaneously&lt;br /&gt;regain for France the grandeur that the French still feel remains&lt;br /&gt;their nation's special destiny.&lt;br /&gt;For Germany, a commitment to Europe is the basis for national&lt;br /&gt;redemption, while an intimate connection to America is central to&lt;br /&gt;its security. Accordingly, a Europe more assertively independent of&lt;br /&gt;America is not a viable option. For Germany, redemption + security&lt;br /&gt;= Europe + America. That formula defines Germany's posture and&lt;br /&gt;policy, making Germany simultaneously Europe's truly good citizen&lt;br /&gt;and America's strongest European supporter.&lt;br /&gt;Germany sees in its fervent commitment to Europe a historical&lt;br /&gt;cleansing, a restoration of its moral and political credentials. By redeeming&lt;br /&gt;itself through Europe, Germany is restoring its own greatness&lt;br /&gt;while gaining a mission that would not automatically mobilize&lt;br /&gt;European resentments and fears against Germany. If Germans seek&lt;br /&gt;the German national interest, that runs the risk of alienating other&lt;br /&gt;Europeans; if Germans promote Europe's common interest, that&lt;br /&gt;garners European support and respect.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;62 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On the central issues of the Cold War, France was a loyal, dedicated,&lt;br /&gt;and determined ally. It stood shoulder to shoulder with&lt;br /&gt;America when the chips were down. Whether during the two&lt;br /&gt;Berlin blockades or during the Cuban missile crisis, there was no&lt;br /&gt;doubt about French steadfastness. But France's support for NATO&lt;br /&gt;was tempered by a simultaneous French desire to assert a separate&lt;br /&gt;French political identity and to preserve for France its essential&lt;br /&gt;freedom of action, especially on matters that pertained to&lt;br /&gt;France's global status or to the future of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;There is an element of delusional obsession in the French political&lt;br /&gt;elite's preoccupation with the notion that France is still a&lt;br /&gt;global power. When Prime Minister Alain Juppe", echoing his predecessors,&lt;br /&gt;declared to the National Assembly in May 1995 that&lt;br /&gt;"France can and must assert its vocation as a world power," the&lt;br /&gt;gathering broke out into spontaneous applause. The French insistence&lt;br /&gt;on the development of its own nuclear deterrent was motivated&lt;br /&gt;largely by the view that France would thereby enhance its&lt;br /&gt;own freedom of action and at the same time gain the capacity to influence&lt;br /&gt;American life-and-death decisions regarding the security of&lt;br /&gt;the Western alliance as a whole. It was not vis-a-vis the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union that France sought to upgrade its status, for the French nuclear&lt;br /&gt;deterrent had, at the very best, only a marginal impact on Soviet&lt;br /&gt;war-making capabilities. Paris felt instead that its own nuclear&lt;br /&gt;weapons would give France a role in the Cold War's top-level and&lt;br /&gt;most dangerous decision-making processes.&lt;br /&gt;In French thinking, the possession of nuclear weapons fortified&lt;br /&gt;France's claim to being a global power, of having a voice that had&lt;br /&gt;to be respected worldwide. It tangibly reinforced France's position&lt;br /&gt;as one of the five veto-wielding UN Security Council members, all&lt;br /&gt;five also nuclear powers. In the French perspective, the British nuclear&lt;br /&gt;deterrent was simply an extension of the American, especially&lt;br /&gt;given the British commitment to the special relationship and&lt;br /&gt;the British abstention from the effort to construct an independent&lt;br /&gt;Europe. (That the French nuclear program significantly benefited&lt;br /&gt;from covert U.S. assistance was, to the French, of no consequence&lt;br /&gt;for France's strategic calculus.) The French nuclear deterrent also&lt;br /&gt;consolidated, in the French mindset, France's commanding position&lt;br /&gt;as the leading continental power, the only truly European&lt;br /&gt;state so endowed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 63&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;France's global ambitions were also expressed through its determined&lt;br /&gt;efforts to sustain a special security role in most of the&lt;br /&gt;Francophone African countries. Despite the loss, after prolonged&lt;br /&gt;combat, of Vietnam and Algeria and the abandonment of a wider&lt;br /&gt;empire, that security mission, as well as continued French control&lt;br /&gt;over scattered Pacific islands (which have provided the venue for&lt;br /&gt;controversial French atomic tests), has reinforced the conviction&lt;br /&gt;of the French elite that France, indeed, still has a global role to&lt;br /&gt;play, despite the reality of being essentially a middle-rank postimperial&lt;br /&gt;European power.&lt;br /&gt;All of the foregoing has sustained as well as motivated France's&lt;br /&gt;claim to the mantle of European leadership. With Britain self-marginalized&lt;br /&gt;and essentially an appendage to U.S. power and with Germany&lt;br /&gt;divided for much of the Cold War and still handicapped by&lt;br /&gt;its twentieth-century history, France could seize the idea of Europe,&lt;br /&gt;identify itself with it, and usurp it as identical with France's&lt;br /&gt;conception of itself. The country that first invented the idea of the&lt;br /&gt;sovereign nation-state and made nationalism into a civic religion&lt;br /&gt;thus found it quite natural to see itself—with the same emotional&lt;br /&gt;commitment that was once invested in "la patrie"—as the embodiment&lt;br /&gt;of an independent but united Europe. The grandeur of a&lt;br /&gt;French-led Europe would then be France's as well.&lt;br /&gt;This special vocation, generated by a deeply felt sense of historical&lt;br /&gt;destiny and fortified by a unique cultural pride, has major&lt;br /&gt;policy implications. The key geopolitical space that France had to&lt;br /&gt;keep within its orbit of influence—or, at least, prevent from being&lt;br /&gt;dominated by a more powerful state than itself—can be drawn on&lt;br /&gt;the map in the form of a semicircle. It includes the Iberian Peninsula,&lt;br /&gt;the northern shore of the western Mediterranean, and Germany&lt;br /&gt;up to East-Central Europe (see map on page 64). That is not&lt;br /&gt;only the minimal radius of French security; it is also the essential&lt;br /&gt;zone of French political interest. Only with the support of the&lt;br /&gt;southern states assured, and with Germany's backing guaranteed,&lt;br /&gt;can the goal of constructing a unified and independent Europe, led&lt;br /&gt;by France, be effectively pursued. And obviously, within that&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical orbit, the increasingly powerful Germany is bound to&lt;br /&gt;be the most difficult to manage.&lt;br /&gt;In the French vision, the central goal of a united and independent&lt;br /&gt;Europe can be achieved by combining the unification of Europe&lt;br /&gt;64 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Prance's and (iermaiiy's Geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;Orbits a! Special Interest&lt;br /&gt;French ortnt (J Jpsoal IMMMI&lt;br /&gt;Gsmm oiOfl of spues! inlsiesl&lt;br /&gt;under French leadership with the simultaneous but gradual diminution&lt;br /&gt;of the American primacy on the continent. But if France is to&lt;br /&gt;shape Europe's future, it must both engage and shackle Germany,&lt;br /&gt;while also seeking step-by-step to strip Washington of its political&lt;br /&gt;leadership in European affairs. The resulting key policy dilemmas&lt;br /&gt;for France are essentially twofold: how to preserve the American&lt;br /&gt;security commitment to Europe—which France recognizes is still&lt;br /&gt;essential—while steadily reducing the American presence; and how&lt;br /&gt;to sustain Franco-German partnership as the combined politicaleconomic&lt;br /&gt;engine of European unification while precluding German&lt;br /&gt;leadership in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;If France were truly a global power, the resolution of these dilemmas&lt;br /&gt;in the pursuit of France's central goal might not be difficult.&lt;br /&gt;None of the other European states, save Germany, are endowed with&lt;br /&gt;the same ambition or driven by the same sense of mission. Even&lt;br /&gt;Germany could perhaps be seduced into acceptance of French leadTHE&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 65&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ership in a united but independent (of America) Europe, but only if&lt;br /&gt;it felt that France was in fact a global power and could thus provide&lt;br /&gt;Europe with the security that Germany cannot but America does.&lt;br /&gt;Germany, however, knows the real limits of French power.&lt;br /&gt;France is much weaker than Germany economically, while its military&lt;br /&gt;establishment (as the Gulf War of 1991 showed) is not very&lt;br /&gt;competent. It is good enough to squash internal coups in satellite&lt;br /&gt;African states, but it can neither protect Europe nor project significant&lt;br /&gt;power far from Europe. France is no more and no less than a&lt;br /&gt;middle-rank European power. Accordingly, in order to construct&lt;br /&gt;Europe, Germany has been willing to propitiate French pride, but&lt;br /&gt;in order to keep Europe truly secure, it has not been willing to follow&lt;br /&gt;French leadership blindly. It has continued to insist on a central&lt;br /&gt;role in European security for America.&lt;br /&gt;That reality, painful for French self-esteem, emerged more&lt;br /&gt;clearly after Germany's reunification. Until then, the Franco-German&lt;br /&gt;reconciliation did have the appearance of French political&lt;br /&gt;leadership riding comfortably on German economic dynamism.&lt;br /&gt;That perception actually suited both parties. It mitigated the traditional&lt;br /&gt;European fears of Germany, and it had the effect of fortifying&lt;br /&gt;and gratifying French illusions by generating the impression that&lt;br /&gt;the construction of Europe was led by France, backed by an economically&lt;br /&gt;dynamic West Germany.&lt;br /&gt;Franco-German reconciliation, even with its misconceptions,&lt;br /&gt;was nonetheless a positive development for Europe, and its importance&lt;br /&gt;cannot be overstated. It has provided the crucial foundation&lt;br /&gt;for all of the progress so far achieved in Europe's difficult process&lt;br /&gt;of unification. Thus, it was also fully compatible with American interests&lt;br /&gt;and in keeping with the long-standing American commitment&lt;br /&gt;to the promotion of transnational cooperation in Europe. A&lt;br /&gt;breakdown of Franco-German cooperation would be a fatal setback&lt;br /&gt;for Europe and a disaster for America's position in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;Tacit American support made it possible for France and Germany&lt;br /&gt;to push the process of Europe's unification forward. Germany's&lt;br /&gt;reunification, moreover, increased the incentive for the&lt;br /&gt;French to lock Germany into a binding European framework. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;on December 6, 1990, the French president and the German chancellor&lt;br /&gt;committed themselves to the goal of a federal Europe, and&lt;br /&gt;ten days later, the Rome intergovernmental conference on political&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;66 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;union issued—British reservations notwithstanding—a clear mandate&lt;br /&gt;to the twelve foreign ministers of the European Community to&lt;br /&gt;prepare a Draft Treaty on Political Union.&lt;br /&gt;However, Germany's reunification also dramatically changed&lt;br /&gt;the real parameters of European politics. It was simultaneously a&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical defeat for Russia and for France. United Germany not&lt;br /&gt;only ceased to be a political junior partner of France, but it automatically&lt;br /&gt;became the undisputed prime power in Western Europe&lt;br /&gt;and even a partial global power, especially through its major financial&lt;br /&gt;contributions to the support of the key international institutions.'&lt;br /&gt;The new reality bred some mutual disenchantment in the&lt;br /&gt;Franco-German relationship, for Germany was now able and willing&lt;br /&gt;to articulate and openly promote its own vision of a future Europe,&lt;br /&gt;still as France's partner but no longer as its protege.&lt;br /&gt;For France, the resulting diminished political leverage dictated&lt;br /&gt;several policy consequences. France somehow had to regain&lt;br /&gt;greater influence within NATO—from which it had largely abstained&lt;br /&gt;as a protest against U.S. domination—while also compensating&lt;br /&gt;for its relative weakness through greater diplomatic&lt;br /&gt;maneuver. Returning to NATO might enable France to influence&lt;br /&gt;America more; occasional flirtation with Moscow or London might&lt;br /&gt;generate pressure from the outside on America as well as on Germany.&lt;br /&gt;Consequently, as part of its policy of maneuver rather than&lt;br /&gt;contestation, France returned to NATO's command structure. By&lt;br /&gt;1994, France was again a de facto active participant in NATO's political&lt;br /&gt;and military decision making; by late 1995, the French foreign&lt;br /&gt;and defense ministers were again regular attendees at alliance&lt;br /&gt;sessions. But at a price: once fully inside, they reaffirmed their determination&lt;br /&gt;to reform the alliance's structure in order to make for&lt;br /&gt;greater balance between its American leadership and its European&lt;br /&gt;participation. They wanted a higher profile and a bigger role for a&lt;br /&gt;collective European component. As the French foreign minister,&lt;br /&gt;Herv6 de Charette, stated in a speech on April 8,1996, "For France,&lt;br /&gt;'For example, as a percentage of overall budget, Germany accounts for&lt;br /&gt;EU: 28.5 percent; NATO: 22.8 percent; UN 8.93 percent, in addition to being&lt;br /&gt;the largest shareholder in the World Bank and the EBRD (European Bank for&lt;br /&gt;Reconstruction and Development).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 67&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;the basic goal [of the rapprochement] is to assert a European identity&lt;br /&gt;within the alliance that is operationally credible and politically&lt;br /&gt;visible."&lt;br /&gt;At the same time, Paris was quite prepared to exploit tactically&lt;br /&gt;its traditional links with Russia to constrain America's European&lt;br /&gt;policy and to resuscitate whenever expedient the old Franco-&lt;br /&gt;British entente to offset Germany's growing European primacy.&lt;br /&gt;The French foreign minister came close to saying so explicitly in&lt;br /&gt;August 1996, when he declared that "if France wants to play an international&lt;br /&gt;role, it stands to benefit from the existence of a strong&lt;br /&gt;Russia, from helping it to reaffirm itself as a major power," prompting&lt;br /&gt;the Russian foreign minister to reciprocate by stating that "of&lt;br /&gt;all the world leaders, the French are the closest to having constructive&lt;br /&gt;attitudes in their relations with Russia."2&lt;br /&gt;France's initially lukewarm support for NATO's eastward expansion—&lt;br /&gt;indeed, a barely suppressed skepticism regarding its desirability—&lt;br /&gt;was thus partially a tactic designed to gain leverage in&lt;br /&gt;dealing with the United States. Precisely because America and Germany&lt;br /&gt;were the chief proponents of NATO expansion, it suited&lt;br /&gt;France to play cool, to go along reticently, to voice concern regarding&lt;br /&gt;the potential impact of that initiative on Russia, and to act as&lt;br /&gt;Europe's most sensitive interlocutor with Moscow. To some Central&lt;br /&gt;Europeans, it appeared that the French even conveyed the impression&lt;br /&gt;that they were not averse to a Russian sphere of influence&lt;br /&gt;in Eastern Europe. The Russian card thus not only balanced America&lt;br /&gt;and conveyed a none-too-subtle message to Germany, but it&lt;br /&gt;also increased the pressure on the United States to consider favorably&lt;br /&gt;French proposals for NATO reform.&lt;br /&gt;Ultimately, NATO expansion will require unanimity among the&lt;br /&gt;alliance's sixteen members. Paris knew that its acquiescence was&lt;br /&gt;not only vital for that unanimity but that France's actual support&lt;br /&gt;was needed to avoid obstruction from other alliance members.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, it made no secret of the French intention to make support&lt;br /&gt;for NATO expansion a hostage to America's eventually satisfying&lt;br /&gt;the French determination to alter both the balance of power within&lt;br /&gt;the alliance and its fundamental organization.&lt;br /&gt;France was at first similarly tepid in its support for the east-&lt;br /&gt;!As quoted by Le Nouvel Observateur, August 12,1996.&lt;br /&gt;68 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;ward expansion of the European Union. Here the lead was taken&lt;br /&gt;largely by Germany, with American support but without the same&lt;br /&gt;degree of U.S. engagement as in the case of NATO expansion. Even&lt;br /&gt;though in NATO France tended to argue that the EU's expansion&lt;br /&gt;would provide a more suitable umbrella for the former Communist&lt;br /&gt;states, as soon as Germany started pressing for the more rapid enlargement&lt;br /&gt;of the EU to include Central Europe, France began to&lt;br /&gt;raise technical concerns and also to demand that the EU pay equal&lt;br /&gt;attention to Europe's exposed Mediterranean southern flank.&lt;br /&gt;(These differences emerged as early as fhe November 1994 Franco-&lt;br /&gt;German summit.) French emphasis on the latter issue also had the&lt;br /&gt;effect of gaining for France the support of NATO's southern members,&lt;br /&gt;thereby maximizing France's overall bargaining power. But&lt;br /&gt;the cost was a widening gap in the respective geopolitical visions&lt;br /&gt;of Europe held by France and Germany, a gap only partially narrowed&lt;br /&gt;by France's belated endorsement in the second half of 1996&lt;br /&gt;of Poland's accession to both NATO and the EU.&lt;br /&gt;That gap was inevitable, given the changing historical context.&lt;br /&gt;Ever since the end of World War II, democratic Germany had recognized&lt;br /&gt;that Franco-German reconciliation was required to build a&lt;br /&gt;European community within the western half of divided Europe.&lt;br /&gt;That reconciliation was also central to Germany's historical rehabilitation.&lt;br /&gt;Hence, the acceptance of French leadership was a fair&lt;br /&gt;price to pay. At the same time, the continued Soviet threat to a vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;West Germany made loyalty to America the essential precondition&lt;br /&gt;for survival—and even the French recognized that. But&lt;br /&gt;after the Soviet collapse, to build a larger and more united Europe,&lt;br /&gt;subordination to France was neither necessary nor propitious. An&lt;br /&gt;equal Franco-German partnership, with the reunified Germany in&lt;br /&gt;fact now being the stronger partner, was more than a fair deal for&lt;br /&gt;Paris; hence, the French would simply have to accept Germany's&lt;br /&gt;preference for a primary security link with its transatlantic ally&lt;br /&gt;and protector.&lt;br /&gt;With the end of the Cold War, that link assumed new importance&lt;br /&gt;for Germany. In the past, it had sheltered Germany from an&lt;br /&gt;external but very proximate threat and was the necessary precondition&lt;br /&gt;for the eventual reunification of the country. With the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union gone and Germany reunified, the link to America now provided&lt;br /&gt;the umbrella under which Germany could more openly asTHE&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 69&lt;br /&gt;sume a leadership role in Central Europe without simultaneously&lt;br /&gt;threatening its neighbors. The American connection provided&lt;br /&gt;more than the certificate of good behavior: it reassured Germany's&lt;br /&gt;neighbors that a close relationship with Germany also meant a&lt;br /&gt;closer relationship with America. All of that made it easier for Germany&lt;br /&gt;to define more openly its own geopolitical priorities.&lt;br /&gt;Germany—safely anchored in Europe and rendered harmless&lt;br /&gt;but secure by the visible American military presence—could now&lt;br /&gt;promote the assimilation of the newly freed Central Europe into&lt;br /&gt;the European structures. It would not be the old Mitteleuropa of&lt;br /&gt;German imperialism but a more benign community of economic renewal&lt;br /&gt;stimulated by German investments and trade, with Germany&lt;br /&gt;also acting as the sponsor of the eventually formal inclusion of the&lt;br /&gt;new Mitteleuropa in both the European Union and NATO. With the&lt;br /&gt;Franco-German alliance providing the vital platform for the assertion&lt;br /&gt;of a more decisive regional role, Germany no longer needed to&lt;br /&gt;be shy in asserting itself within an orbit of its special interest.&lt;br /&gt;On the map of Europe, the zone of German special interest&lt;br /&gt;could be sketched in the shape of an oblong, in the West including&lt;br /&gt;of course France and in the East spanning the newly emancipated&lt;br /&gt;post-Communist states of Central Europe, including the Baltic republics,&lt;br /&gt;embracing Ukraine and Belarus, and reaching even into&lt;br /&gt;Russia (see map on page 64). In many respects, that zone corresponds&lt;br /&gt;to the historical radius of constructive German cultural influence,&lt;br /&gt;carved out in the prenationalist era by German urban and&lt;br /&gt;agricultural colonists in East-Central Europe and in the Baltic republics,&lt;br /&gt;all of whom were wiped out in the course of World War II.&lt;br /&gt;More important, the areas of special concern to the French (discussed&lt;br /&gt;earlier) and the Germans, when viewed together as in the&lt;br /&gt;map below, in effect define the western and eastern limits of Europe,&lt;br /&gt;while the overlap between them underlines the decisive&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical importance of the Franco-German connection as the&lt;br /&gt;vital core of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;The critical breakthrough for the more openly assertive German&lt;br /&gt;role in Central Europe was provided by the German-Polish&lt;br /&gt;reconciliation that occurred during the mid-nineties. Despite some&lt;br /&gt;initial reluctance, the reunited Germany (with American prodding)&lt;br /&gt;did formally recognize as permanent the Oder-Neisse border with&lt;br /&gt;Poland, and that step in turn removed the single most important&lt;br /&gt;70 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Polish reservation regarding a closer relationship with Germany.&lt;br /&gt;Following some further mutual gestures of goodwill and forgiveness,&lt;br /&gt;the relationship underwent a dramatic change. Not only did&lt;br /&gt;German-Polish trade literally explode (in 1995 Poland superseded&lt;br /&gt;Russia as Germany's largest trading partner in the East), but Germany&lt;br /&gt;became Poland's principal sponsor for membership in the&lt;br /&gt;EU and (together with the United States) in NATO. It is no exaggeration&lt;br /&gt;to say that by the middle of the decade, Polish-German reconciliation&lt;br /&gt;was assuming a geopolitical importance in Central&lt;br /&gt;Europe matching the earlier impact on Western Europe of the&lt;br /&gt;Franco-German reconciliation.&lt;br /&gt;Through Poland, German influence could radiate northward—&lt;br /&gt;into the Baltic states—and eastward—into Ukraine and Belarus.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, the scope of the German-Polish reconciliation was&lt;br /&gt;somewhat widened by Poland's occasional inclusion in important&lt;br /&gt;Franco-German discussions regarding Europe's future. The socalled&lt;br /&gt;Weimar Triangle (named after the German city in which&lt;br /&gt;the first high-level trilateral Franco-German-Polish consultations,&lt;br /&gt;which subsequently became periodic, had taken place) created a&lt;br /&gt;potentially significant geopolitical axis on the European continent,&lt;br /&gt;embracing some 180 million people from three nations with&lt;br /&gt;a highly denned sense of national identity. On the one hand, this&lt;br /&gt;further enhanced Germany's dominant role in Central Europe, but&lt;br /&gt;on the other hand, that role was somewhat balanced by the&lt;br /&gt;Franco-Polish participation in the three-way dialogue.&lt;br /&gt;Central European acceptance of German leadership—and such&lt;br /&gt;was even more the case with the smaller Central European&lt;br /&gt;states—was eased by the very evident German commitment to the&lt;br /&gt;eastward expansion of Europe's key institutions. In so committing&lt;br /&gt;itself, Germany undertook a historical mission much at variance&lt;br /&gt;with some rather deeply rooted Western European outlooks. In&lt;br /&gt;that latter perspective, events occurring east of Germany and Austria&lt;br /&gt;were perceived as somehow beyond the limits of concern to&lt;br /&gt;the real Europe. That attitude—articulated in the early eighteenth&lt;br /&gt;century by Lord Bolingbroke,3 who argued that political violence in&lt;br /&gt;'Cf. his History of Europe, from the Pyrenean Peace to the Death of Louis&lt;br /&gt;XIV.&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 71&lt;br /&gt;the East was of no consequence to the Western Europeans—resurfaced&lt;br /&gt;during the Munich crisis of 1938; and it made a tragic reappearance&lt;br /&gt;in the British and French attitudes during the conflict of&lt;br /&gt;the mid-1990s in Bosnia. It still lurks beneath the surface in the ongoing&lt;br /&gt;debates regarding the future of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, the only real debate in Germany was whether&lt;br /&gt;NATO or the EU should be expanded first—the defense minister favored&lt;br /&gt;the former, the foreign minister advocated the latter—with&lt;br /&gt;the net result that Germany became the undisputed apostle of a&lt;br /&gt;larger and more united Europe. The German chancellor spoke of&lt;br /&gt;the year 2000 as the goal for the EU's first eastward enlargement,&lt;br /&gt;and the German defense minister was among the first to suggest&lt;br /&gt;that the fiftieth anniversary of NATO's founding was an appropriately&lt;br /&gt;symbolic date for the alliance's eastern expansion. Germany's&lt;br /&gt;conception of Europe's future thus differed from its&lt;br /&gt;principal European allies: the British proclaimed their preference&lt;br /&gt;for a larger Europe because they saw in enlargement the means for&lt;br /&gt;diluting Europe's unity; the French feared that enlargement would&lt;br /&gt;enhance Germany's role and hence favored more narrowly based&lt;br /&gt;integration. Germany stood for both and thus gained a standing in&lt;br /&gt;Central Europe all its own.&lt;br /&gt;AMERICA'S CENTRAL OBJECTIVE&lt;br /&gt;The central issue for America is how to construct a Europe that is&lt;br /&gt;based on the Franco-German connection, a Europe that is viable,&lt;br /&gt;that remains linked to the United States, and that widens the&lt;br /&gt;scope of the cooperative democratic international system on&lt;br /&gt;which the effective exercise of American global primacy so much&lt;br /&gt;depends. Hence, it is not a matter of making a choice between&lt;br /&gt;France and Germany. Without either France or Germany, there will&lt;br /&gt;be no Europe.&lt;br /&gt;Three broad conclusions emerge from the foregoing discussion:&lt;br /&gt;1. American engagement in the cause of European unification is&lt;br /&gt;needed to compensate for the internal crisis of morale and purpose&lt;br /&gt;that has been sapping European vitality, to overcome the&lt;br /&gt;72 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;widespread European suspicion that ultimately America does not&lt;br /&gt;favor genuine European unity, and to infuse into the European undertaking&lt;br /&gt;the needed dose of democratic fervor. That requires a&lt;br /&gt;clear-cut American commitment to the eventual acceptance of Europe&lt;br /&gt;as America's global partner.&lt;br /&gt;2. In the short run, tactical opposition to French policy and support&lt;br /&gt;for German leadership is justified; in the longer run, European&lt;br /&gt;unity will have to involve a more distinctive European political and&lt;br /&gt;military identity if a genuine Europe is actually to become reality.&lt;br /&gt;That requires some progressive accommodation to the French view&lt;br /&gt;regarding the distribution of power within transatlantic institutions.&lt;br /&gt;3. Neither France nor Germany is sufficiently strong to construct&lt;br /&gt;Europe on its own or to resolve with Russia the ambiguities&lt;br /&gt;inherent in the definition of Europe's geographic scope. That requires&lt;br /&gt;energetic, focused, and determined American involvement,&lt;br /&gt;particularly with the Germans, in defining Europe's scope and hence&lt;br /&gt;also in coping with such sensitive—especially to Russia—issues as&lt;br /&gt;the eventual status within the European system of the Baltic republics&lt;br /&gt;and Ukraine.&lt;br /&gt;Just one glance at the map of the vast Eurasian landmass underlines&lt;br /&gt;the geopolitical significance to America of the European&lt;br /&gt;bridgehead—as well as its geographic modesty. The preservation&lt;br /&gt;of that bridgehead and its expansion as the springboard for&lt;br /&gt;democracy are directly relevant to America's security. The existing&lt;br /&gt;gap between America's global concern for stability and for the related&lt;br /&gt;dissemination of democracy and Europe's seeming indifference&lt;br /&gt;to these issues (despite France's self-proclaimed status as a&lt;br /&gt;global power) needs to be closed, and it can only be narrowed if&lt;br /&gt;Europe increasingly assumes a more confederated character. Europe&lt;br /&gt;cannot become a single nation-state, because of the tenacity&lt;br /&gt;of its diverse national traditions, but it can become an entity that&lt;br /&gt;through common political institutions cumulatively reflects shared&lt;br /&gt;democratic values, identifies its own interests with their universalization,&lt;br /&gt;and exercises a magnetic attraction on its co-inhabitants of&lt;br /&gt;the Eurasian space.&lt;br /&gt;Left to themselves, the Europeans run the risk of becoming abTHE&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 73&lt;br /&gt;sorbed by their internal social concerns. Europe's economic recovery&lt;br /&gt;has obscured the longer-run costs of its seeming success.&lt;br /&gt;These costs are damaging economically as well as politically. The&lt;br /&gt;crisis of political legitimacy and economic vitality that Western Europe&lt;br /&gt;increasingly confronts—but is unable to overcome—is&lt;br /&gt;deeply rooted in the pervasive expansion of the state-sponsored&lt;br /&gt;social structure that favors paternalism, protectionism, and&lt;br /&gt;parochialism. The result is a cultural condition that combines escapist&lt;br /&gt;hedonism with spiritual emptiness—a condition that can be&lt;br /&gt;exploited by nationalist extremists or dogmatic ideologues.&lt;br /&gt;This condition, if it becomes rampant, could prove deadly to&lt;br /&gt;democracy and the idea of Europe. The two, in fact, are linked, for&lt;br /&gt;the new problems of Europe—be they immigration or economictechnological&lt;br /&gt;competitiveness with America or Asia, not to speak&lt;br /&gt;of the need for a politically stable reform of existing socioeconomic&lt;br /&gt;structures—can only be dealt with effectively in an increasingly&lt;br /&gt;continental context. A Europe that is larger than the&lt;br /&gt;sum of its parts—that is, a Europe that sees a global role for itself&lt;br /&gt;in the promotion of democracy and in the wider proselytization&lt;br /&gt;of basic human values—is more likely to be a Europe that is&lt;br /&gt;firmly uncongenial to political extremism, narrow nationalism, or&lt;br /&gt;social hedonism.&lt;br /&gt;One need neither evoke the old fears of a separate German-&lt;br /&gt;Russian accommodation nor exaggerate the consequences of&lt;br /&gt;French tactical flirtation with Moscow to entertain concern for the&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical stability of Europe—and for America's place in it—resulting&lt;br /&gt;from a failure of Europe's still ongoing efforts to unite. Any&lt;br /&gt;such failure would in fact probably entail some renewed and&lt;br /&gt;rather traditional European maneuvers. It would certainly generate&lt;br /&gt;opportunities for either Russian or German geopolitical self-assertion,&lt;br /&gt;though if Europe's modern history contains any lesson,&lt;br /&gt;neither would be likely to gain an enduring success in that regard.&lt;br /&gt;However, at the very least, Germany would probably become more&lt;br /&gt;assertive and explicit in the definition of its national interests.&lt;br /&gt;Currently, Germany's interests are congruent with, and even&lt;br /&gt;sublimated within, those of the EU and of NATO. Even the spokesmen&lt;br /&gt;for the leftist Alliance 90/Greens have advocated the expansion&lt;br /&gt;of both NATO and the EU. But if the unification and&lt;br /&gt;enlargement of Europe should stall, there is some reason to as74&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;sume that a more nationalist definition of Germany's concept of&lt;br /&gt;the European "order" would then surface, to the potential detriment&lt;br /&gt;of European stability. Wolfgang Schauble, the leader of the&lt;br /&gt;Christian Democrats in the Bundestag and a possible successor to&lt;br /&gt;Chancellor Kohl, expressed that mindset when he stated that Germany&lt;br /&gt;is no longer "the western bulwark against the East; we have&lt;br /&gt;become the center of Europe," pointedly adding that in "the long&lt;br /&gt;periods during the Middle Ages . . . Germany was involved in creating&lt;br /&gt;order in Europe. "* In this vision, Mitteleuropa—instead of being&lt;br /&gt;a European region in which Germany economically preponderates—&lt;br /&gt;would become an area of overt German political primacy as&lt;br /&gt;well as the basis tor a more unilateral German policy vis-a-vis the&lt;br /&gt;East and the West.&lt;br /&gt;Europe would then cease to be the Eurasian bridgehead for&lt;br /&gt;American power and the potential springboard for the democratic&lt;br /&gt;global system's expansion into Eurasia. This is why unambiguous&lt;br /&gt;and tangible American support for Europe's unification must be&lt;br /&gt;sustained. Although both during Europe's economic recovery and&lt;br /&gt;within the transatlantic security alliance America has frequently&lt;br /&gt;proclaimed its support for European unification and supported&lt;br /&gt;transnational cooperation in Europe, it has also acted as if it preferred&lt;br /&gt;to deal on troubling economic and political issues with individual&lt;br /&gt;European states and not with the European Union as such.&lt;br /&gt;Occasional American insistence on a voice within the European&lt;br /&gt;decision-making process has tended to reinforce European suspicions&lt;br /&gt;that America favors cooperation among the Europeans when&lt;br /&gt;they follow the American lead but not when they formulate Europe's&lt;br /&gt;policies. This is the wrong message to convey.&lt;br /&gt;American commitment to Europe's unity—reiterated forcefully&lt;br /&gt;in the joint American-European Madrid Declaration of December&lt;br /&gt;1995—will continue to ring hollow until America is ready not only&lt;br /&gt;to declare unambiguously that it is prepared to accept the consequences&lt;br /&gt;of Europe becoming truly Europe but to act accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;For Europe, the ultimate consequence would entail a true partnership&lt;br /&gt;with America rather than the status of a favored but still junior&lt;br /&gt;ally. And a true partnership does mean sharing in decisions as&lt;br /&gt;well as responsibilities. American support for that cause would&lt;br /&gt;'Poiitiken Sondag, August 2,1996, italics added.&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 75&lt;br /&gt;help to invigorate the transatlantic dialogue and would stimulate&lt;br /&gt;among the Europeans a more serious concentration on the role&lt;br /&gt;that a truly significant Europe might play in the world.&lt;br /&gt;It is conceivable that at some point a truly united and powerful&lt;br /&gt;European Union could become a global political rival to the United&lt;br /&gt;States. It could certainly become a difficult economic-technological&lt;br /&gt;competitor, while its geopolitical interests in the Middle East&lt;br /&gt;and elsewhere could significantly diverge from those of America.&lt;br /&gt;But, in fact, such a powerful and politically single-minded Europe&lt;br /&gt;is not likely in the foreseeable future. Unlike the conditions prevailing&lt;br /&gt;in America at the time of the formation of the United States,&lt;br /&gt;there are deep historical roots to the resiliency of the European nation-&lt;br /&gt;states and the passion for a transnational Europe has clearly&lt;br /&gt;waned.&lt;br /&gt;The real alternatives for the next decade or two are either an&lt;br /&gt;expanding and unifying Europe, pursuing—though hesitantly and&lt;br /&gt;spasmodically—the goal of continental unity; a stalemated Europe,&lt;br /&gt;not moving much beyond its current state of integration and geographic&lt;br /&gt;scope, with Central Europe remaining a geopolitical noman's-&lt;br /&gt;land; or, as a likely sequel to the stalemate, a progressively&lt;br /&gt;fragmenting Europe, resuming its old power rivalries. In a stalemated&lt;br /&gt;Europe, it is almost inevitable that Germany's self-identification&lt;br /&gt;with Europe will wane, prompting a more nationalist definition&lt;br /&gt;of the German state interest. For America, the first option is clearly&lt;br /&gt;the best, but it is an option that requires energizing American support&lt;br /&gt;if it is to come to pass.&lt;br /&gt;At this stage of Europe's hesitant construction, America need&lt;br /&gt;not get directly involved in intricate debates regarding such issues&lt;br /&gt;as whether the EU should make its foreign policy decisions by majority&lt;br /&gt;vote (a position favored especially by the Germans);&lt;br /&gt;whether the European Parliament should assume decisive legislative&lt;br /&gt;powers and the European Commission in Brussels should become&lt;br /&gt;in effect the European executive; whether the timetable for&lt;br /&gt;implementing the agreement on European economic and monetary&lt;br /&gt;union should be relaxed; or, finally, whether Europe should be a&lt;br /&gt;broad confederation or a multilayered entity, with a federated inner&lt;br /&gt;core and a somewhat looser outer rim. These are matters for&lt;br /&gt;the Europeans to thrash out among themselves—and it is more&lt;br /&gt;than likely that progress on all of these issues will be uneven,&lt;br /&gt;76 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;punctuated by pauses, and eventually pushed forward only by&lt;br /&gt;complex compromises.&lt;br /&gt;Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Economic and&lt;br /&gt;Monetary Union will come into being by the year 2000, perhaps initially&lt;br /&gt;among six to ten of the EU's current fifteen members. This&lt;br /&gt;will accelerate Europe's economic integration beyond the monetary&lt;br /&gt;dimension, further encouraging its political integration. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;by fits and starts and with an inner more integrated core as well as&lt;br /&gt;a looser outer layer, a single Europe will increasingly become an&lt;br /&gt;important political player on the Eurasian chessboard.&lt;br /&gt;In any case, America should not convey the impression that it&lt;br /&gt;prefers a vaguer, even if broader, European association, but it&lt;br /&gt;should reiterate, through words and deeds, its willingness to deal&lt;br /&gt;eventually with the EU as America's global political and security&lt;br /&gt;partner and not just as a regional common market made up of&lt;br /&gt;states allied with the United States through NATO. To make that&lt;br /&gt;commitment more credible and thus go beyond the rhetoric of&lt;br /&gt;partnership, joint planning with the EU regarding new bilateral&lt;br /&gt;transatlantic decision-making mechanisms could be proposed and&lt;br /&gt;initiated.&lt;br /&gt;The same principle applies to NATO as such. Its preservation is&lt;br /&gt;vital to the transatlantic connection. On this issue, there is overwhelming&lt;br /&gt;American-European consensus. Without NATO, Europe&lt;br /&gt;not only would become vulnerable but almost immediately would&lt;br /&gt;become politically fragmented as well. NATO ensures European security&lt;br /&gt;and provides a stable framework for the pursuit of European&lt;br /&gt;unity. That is what makes NATO historically so vital to Europe.&lt;br /&gt;However, as Europe gradually and hesitantly unifies, the internal&lt;br /&gt;structure and processes of NATO will have to adjust. On this issue,&lt;br /&gt;the French have a point. One cannot someday have a truly&lt;br /&gt;united Europe and yet have an alliance that remains integrated on&lt;br /&gt;the basis of one superpower plus fifteen dependent powers. Once&lt;br /&gt;Europe begins to assume a genuine political identity of its own,&lt;br /&gt;with the EU increasingly taking on some of the functions of a&lt;br /&gt;supranational government, NATO will have to be altered on the basis&lt;br /&gt;of a 1 + 1 (US + EU) formula.&lt;br /&gt;This will not happen overnight and all at once. Progress in that&lt;br /&gt;direction, to repeat, will be hesitant. But such progress will have to&lt;br /&gt;be reflected in the existing alliance arrangements, lest the absence&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 77&lt;br /&gt;of such adjustment itself should become an obstacle to further&lt;br /&gt;progress. A significant step in that direction was the 1996 decision&lt;br /&gt;of the alliance to make room for the Combined Joint Task Forces,&lt;br /&gt;thereby envisaging the possibility of some purely European military&lt;br /&gt;initiatives based on the alliance's logistics as well as on command,&lt;br /&gt;control, communications, and intelligence. Greater U.S.&lt;br /&gt;willingness to accommodate French demands for an increased role&lt;br /&gt;for the Western European Union within NATO, especially in regard&lt;br /&gt;to command and decision making, would also betoken more genuine&lt;br /&gt;American support for European unity and should help to narrow&lt;br /&gt;somewhat the gap between America and France regarding&lt;br /&gt;Europe's eventual self-definition.&lt;br /&gt;In the longer run, it is possible that the WEU will embrace some&lt;br /&gt;EU member states that, for varying geopolitical or historical reasons,&lt;br /&gt;may choose not to seek NATO membership. That could involve&lt;br /&gt;Finland or Sweden, or perhaps even Austria, all of which&lt;br /&gt;have already acquired observer status with the WEU.5 Other states&lt;br /&gt;may also seek a WEU connection as a preliminary to eventual&lt;br /&gt;NATO membership. The WEU might also choose at some point to&lt;br /&gt;emulate NATO's Partnership for Peace program with regard to&lt;br /&gt;would-be members of the EU. All of that would help to spin a wider&lt;br /&gt;web of security cooperation in Europe, beyond the formal scope of&lt;br /&gt;the transatlantic alliance.&lt;br /&gt;In the meantime, until a larger and more united Europe&lt;br /&gt;emerges—and that, even under the best of conditions, will not be&lt;br /&gt;soon—the United States will have to work closely with both France&lt;br /&gt;and Germany in order to help such a more united and larger Europe&lt;br /&gt;emerge. Thus, regarding France, the central policy dilemma&lt;br /&gt;for America will continue to be how to inveigle France into closer&lt;br /&gt;Atlantic political and military integration without compromising&lt;br /&gt;the American-German connection, and regarding Germany, how to&lt;br /&gt;5lt is noteworthy that influential voices both in Finland and in Sweden&lt;br /&gt;have began to discuss the possibility of association with NATO. In May 1996,&lt;br /&gt;the commander of the Finnish Defense Forces was reported by the Swedish&lt;br /&gt;media to have raised the possibility of some NATO deployments on Nordic&lt;br /&gt;soil, and in August 1996, the Swedish Parliament's Defense Committee, in an&lt;br /&gt;action symptomatic of a gradual drift toward closer security cooperation&lt;br /&gt;with NATO, recommended that Sweden join the Western European Armaments&lt;br /&gt;Group (WEAG) to which only NATO members belong.&lt;br /&gt;78 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;exploit U.S. reliance on German leadership in an Atlanticist Europe&lt;br /&gt;without prompting concern in France and Britain as well as in&lt;br /&gt;other European countries.&lt;br /&gt;More demonstrable American flexibility on the future shape of&lt;br /&gt;the alliance would be helpful in eventually mobilizing greater&lt;br /&gt;French support for the alliance's eastward expansion. In the long&lt;br /&gt;run, a NATO zone of integrated military security on both sides of&lt;br /&gt;Germany would more firmly anchor Germany within a multilateral&lt;br /&gt;framework, and that should be a matter of consequence for&lt;br /&gt;France. Moreover, the expansion of the alliance would increase the&lt;br /&gt;probability that the Weimar Triangle (of Germany, France, and&lt;br /&gt;Poland) could become a subtle means for somewhat balancing&lt;br /&gt;German leadership in Europe. Although Poland relies on German&lt;br /&gt;support for gaining entrance into the alliance (and resents current&lt;br /&gt;French hesitations regarding such expansion), once it is inside the&lt;br /&gt;alliance a shared Franco-Polish geopolitical perspective is more&lt;br /&gt;likely to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;In any case, Washington should not lose sight of the fact that&lt;br /&gt;France is only a short-term adversary on matters pertaining to the&lt;br /&gt;identity of Europe or to the inner workings of NATO. More important,&lt;br /&gt;it should bear in mind the fact that France is an essential&lt;br /&gt;partner in the important task of permanently locking a democratic&lt;br /&gt;Germany into Europe. That is the historic role of the Franco-&lt;br /&gt;German relationship, and the expansion of both the EU and NATO&lt;br /&gt;eastward should enhance the importance of that relationship as&lt;br /&gt;Europe's inner core. Finally, France is not strong enough either to&lt;br /&gt;obstruct America on the geostrategic fundamentals of America's&lt;br /&gt;European policy or to become by itself a leader of Europe as such.&lt;br /&gt;Hence, its peculiarities and even its tantrums can be tolerated.&lt;br /&gt;It is also germane to note that France does play a constructive&lt;br /&gt;role in North Africa and in the Francophone African countries. It is&lt;br /&gt;the essential partner for Morocco and Tunisia, while also exercising&lt;br /&gt;a stabilizing role in Algeria. There is a good domestic reason&lt;br /&gt;for such French involvement: some 5 million Muslims now reside&lt;br /&gt;in France. France thus has a vital stake in the stability and orderly&lt;br /&gt;development of North Africa. But that interest is of wider benefit&lt;br /&gt;to Europe's security. Without the French sense of mission, Europe's&lt;br /&gt;southern flank would be much more unstable and threatening.&lt;br /&gt;All of southern Europe is becoming increasingly concerned&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 79&lt;br /&gt;with the social-political threat posed by instability along the&lt;br /&gt;Mediterranean's southern littoral. France's intense concern for&lt;br /&gt;what transpires across the Mediterranean is thus quite pertinent&lt;br /&gt;to NATO's security concerns, and that consideration should be&lt;br /&gt;taken into account when America occasionally has to cope with&lt;br /&gt;France's exaggerated claims of special leadership status.&lt;br /&gt;Germany Is another matter. Germany's dominant role cannot&lt;br /&gt;be denied, but caution must be exercised regarding any public endorsements&lt;br /&gt;of the German leadership role in Europe. That leadership&lt;br /&gt;may be expedient to some European states—like those in&lt;br /&gt;Central Europe that appreciate the German initiative on behalf of&lt;br /&gt;Europe's eastward expansion—and it may be tolerable to the Western&lt;br /&gt;Europeans as long as it is subsumed under America's primacy,&lt;br /&gt;but in the long run, Europe's construction cannot be based on it.&lt;br /&gt;Too many memories still linger; too many fears are likely to surface.&lt;br /&gt;A Europe constructed and led by Berlin is simply not feasible.&lt;br /&gt;That is why Germany needs France, why Europe needs the Franco-&lt;br /&gt;German connection, and why America cannot choose between&lt;br /&gt;Germany and France.&lt;br /&gt;The essential point regarding NATO expansion is that it is a&lt;br /&gt;process integrally connected with Europe's own expansion. If the&lt;br /&gt;European Union is to become a geographically larger community—&lt;br /&gt;with a more-integrated Franco-German leading core and lessintegrated&lt;br /&gt;outer layers—and if such a Europe is to base its&lt;br /&gt;security on a continued alliance with America, then it follows that&lt;br /&gt;its geopolitically most exposed sector, Central Europe, cannot be&lt;br /&gt;demonstratively excluded from partaking in the sense of security&lt;br /&gt;that the rest of Europe enjoys through the transatlantic alliance.&lt;br /&gt;On this, America and Germany agree. For them, the impulse for enlargement&lt;br /&gt;is political, historical, and constructive. It is not driven&lt;br /&gt;by animosity toward Russia, nor by fear of Russia, nor by the desire&lt;br /&gt;to isolate Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Hence, America must work particularly closely with Germany&lt;br /&gt;in promoting the eastward expansion of Europe. American-German&lt;br /&gt;cooperation and joint leadership regarding this issue are essential.&lt;br /&gt;Expansion will happen if the United States and Germany jointly encourage&lt;br /&gt;the other NATO allies to endorse the step and either negotiate&lt;br /&gt;effectively some accommodation with Russia, if it is willing to&lt;br /&gt;compromise (see chapter 4), or act assertively, in the correct con80&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;viction that the task of constructing Europe cannot be subordinated&lt;br /&gt;to Moscow's objections. Combined American-German pressure&lt;br /&gt;will be especially needed to obtain the required unanimous&lt;br /&gt;agreement of all NATO members, but no NATO member wili be able&lt;br /&gt;to deny it if America and Germany jointly press for it.&lt;br /&gt;Ultimately at stake in this effort is America's long-range role in&lt;br /&gt;Europe. A new Europe is still taking shape, and if that new Europe&lt;br /&gt;is to remain geopolitically a part of the "Euro-Atlantic" space, the&lt;br /&gt;expansion of NATO is essential. Indeed, a comprehensive U.S. policy&lt;br /&gt;for Eurasia as a whole will not be possible if the effort to widen&lt;br /&gt;NATO, having been launched by the United States, stalls and falters.&lt;br /&gt;That failure would discredit American leadership; it would&lt;br /&gt;shatter the concept of an expanding Europe; it would demoralize&lt;br /&gt;the Central Europeans; and it could reignite currently dormant or&lt;br /&gt;dying Russian geopolitical aspirations in Central Europe. For the&lt;br /&gt;West, it would be a self-inflicted wound that would mortally damage&lt;br /&gt;the prospects for a truly European pillar in any eventual&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian security architecture; and for America, it would thus be&lt;br /&gt;not only a regional defeat but a global defeat as well.&lt;br /&gt;The bottom line guiding the progressive expansion of Europe&lt;br /&gt;has to be the proposition that no power outside of the existing&lt;br /&gt;transatlantic system has the right to veto the participation of any&lt;br /&gt;qualified European state in the European system—and hence also&lt;br /&gt;in its transatlantic security system—and that no qualified European&lt;br /&gt;state should be excluded a priori from eventual membership in either&lt;br /&gt;the EU or NATO. Especially the highly vulnerable and increasingly&lt;br /&gt;qualified Baltic states are entitled to know that eventually&lt;br /&gt;they also can become full-fledged members in both organizations—&lt;br /&gt;and that in the meantime, their sovereignty cannot be threatened&lt;br /&gt;without engaging the interests of an expanding Europe and its U.S.&lt;br /&gt;partner.&lt;br /&gt;In essence, the West—especially America and its Western European&lt;br /&gt;allies—must provide an answer to the question eloquently&lt;br /&gt;posed by Vaclav Havel in Aachen on May 15, 1996:&lt;br /&gt;1 know that neither the European Union nor the North Atlantic&lt;br /&gt;Alliance can open its doors overnight to all those who aspire&lt;br /&gt;to join them. What both most assuredly can do—and what&lt;br /&gt;they should do before it is too late—is to give the whole of EuTHE&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 81&lt;br /&gt;rope, seen as a sphere ol common values, the clear assurance&lt;br /&gt;that they are not closed clubs. They should formulate a clear&lt;br /&gt;and detailed policy of gradual enlargement that not only contains&lt;br /&gt;a timetable but also explains the logic of that timetable, [italics&lt;br /&gt;added]&lt;br /&gt;EUROPE'S HISTORIC TIMETABLE&lt;br /&gt;Although at this stage the ultimate eastern limits of Europe can neither&lt;br /&gt;be denned firmly nor finally fixed, in the broadest sense Europe&lt;br /&gt;is a common civilization, derived from the shared Christian tradition.&lt;br /&gt;Europe's narrower Western definition has been associated with&lt;br /&gt;Rome and its historical legacy. But Europe's Christian tradition has&lt;br /&gt;involved also Byzantium and its Russian Orthodox emanation. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;culturally, Europe is more than the Petrine Europe, and the Petrine&lt;br /&gt;Europe in turn is much more than Western Europe—even though in&lt;br /&gt;recent years the latter has usurped the identity of "Europe." Even a&lt;br /&gt;mere glance at the map on page 82 confirms that the existing Europe&lt;br /&gt;is simply not a complete Europe. Worse than that, it is a Europe in&lt;br /&gt;which a zone of insecurity between Europe and Russia can have a&lt;br /&gt;suction effect on both, inevitably causing tensions and rivalry.&lt;br /&gt;A Charlemagne Europe (limited to Western Europe) by necessity&lt;br /&gt;made sense during the Cold War, but such a Europe is now an&lt;br /&gt;anomaly. This is so because in addition to being a civilization, the&lt;br /&gt;emerging united Europe is also a way of life, a standard of living,&lt;br /&gt;and a polity of shared democratic procedures, not burdened by&lt;br /&gt;ethnic and territorial conflicts. That Europe in its formally organized&lt;br /&gt;scope is currently much less than its actual potential. Several&lt;br /&gt;of the more advanced and politically stable Central European&lt;br /&gt;states, all part of the Western Petrine tradition, notably the Czech&lt;br /&gt;Republic, Poland, Hungary, and perhaps also Slovenia, are clearly&lt;br /&gt;qualified and eager for membership in "Europe" and its transatlantic&lt;br /&gt;security connection.&lt;br /&gt;In the current circumstances, the expansion of NATO to include&lt;br /&gt;Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—probably by 1999—appears&lt;br /&gt;to be likely. After this initial but significant step, it is likely&lt;br /&gt;that any subsequent expansion of the alliance will either be coinci82&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;dental with or will follow the expansion of the EU. The latter involves&lt;br /&gt;a much more complicated process, both in the number of&lt;br /&gt;qualifying stages and in the meeting of membership requirements&lt;br /&gt;(see chart on page 83). Thus, even the first admissions into the EU&lt;br /&gt;from Central Europe are not likely before the year 2002 or perhaps&lt;br /&gt;somewhat later. Nonetheless, after the first three new NATO members&lt;br /&gt;have also joined the EU, both the EU and NATO will have to&lt;br /&gt;address the question of extending membership to the Baltic republics,&lt;br /&gt;Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, and perhaps&lt;br /&gt;also, eventually, to Ukraine.&lt;br /&gt;It is noteworthy that the prospect of eventual membership is&lt;br /&gt;already exercising a constructive influence on the affairs and conduct&lt;br /&gt;of would-be members. Knowledge that neither the EU nor&lt;br /&gt;NATO wishes to be burdened by additional conflicts pertaining either&lt;br /&gt;to minority rights or to territorial claims among their members&lt;br /&gt;(Turkey versus Greece is more than enough) has already&lt;br /&gt;EU Membership: Application to Accession&lt;br /&gt;A European country submits an application for membership to&lt;br /&gt;the Council of the European Union (the Council).&lt;br /&gt;The Council asks the Commission to deliver an opinion&lt;br /&gt;about the application.&lt;br /&gt;The Commission delivers an opinion about&lt;br /&gt;the application to the Council.&lt;br /&gt;The Council decides unanimously to open&lt;br /&gt;negotiations for accession.&lt;br /&gt;The Commission proposes, and the Council adopts&lt;br /&gt;unanimously, positions to be taken by the Union&lt;br /&gt;vis-a-vis the Applicants in accession negotiations.&lt;br /&gt;The Union, represented by the Council President,&lt;br /&gt;conducts negotiations with the Applicant.&lt;br /&gt;Agreement reached between Union and Applicant&lt;br /&gt;on a Draft Treaty of Accession.&lt;br /&gt;Accession Treaty submitted to the Council&lt;br /&gt;and the European Parliament.&lt;br /&gt;European Parliament delivers its assent to the&lt;br /&gt;Accession Treaty by an absolute majority.&lt;br /&gt;The Council approves the Accession Treaty unanimously.&lt;br /&gt;Member States and Applicants formally sign&lt;br /&gt;the Accession Treaty.&lt;br /&gt;Member States and Applicants ratify the Accession Treaty-&lt;br /&gt;After ratification, the Accession Agreement goes into effect.&lt;br /&gt;Prepared by C.S.I.S. US-EU-Poland Action Commission&lt;br /&gt;84 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;given Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania the needed incentive to&lt;br /&gt;reach accommodations that meet the standards set by the Council&lt;br /&gt;of Europe. Much the same is true for the more general principle&lt;br /&gt;that only democracies can qualify for membership. The desire not&lt;br /&gt;to be left out is having an important reinforcing impact on the new&lt;br /&gt;democracies.&lt;br /&gt;In any case, it ought to be axiomatic that Europe's political&lt;br /&gt;unity and security are indivisible. As a practical matter, in fact it is&lt;br /&gt;difficult to conceive of a truly united Europe without a common security&lt;br /&gt;arrangement with America. It follows, therefore, that states&lt;br /&gt;that are in a position to begin and are invited to undertake accession&lt;br /&gt;talks with the EU should automatically also be viewed henceforth&lt;br /&gt;as subject in effect to NATO's presumptive protection.&lt;br /&gt;Accordingly, the process of widening Europe and enlarging the&lt;br /&gt;transatlantic security system is likely to move forward by deliberate&lt;br /&gt;stages. Assuming sustained American and Western European&lt;br /&gt;commitment, a speculative but cautiously realistic timetable for&lt;br /&gt;these stages might be the following:&lt;br /&gt;1. By 1999, the first new Central European members will have&lt;br /&gt;been admitted into NATO, though their entry into the EU&lt;br /&gt;will probably not happen before 2002 or 2003.&lt;br /&gt;2. In the meantime, the EU will initiate accession talks with the&lt;br /&gt;Baltic republics, and NATO will likewise begin to move forward&lt;br /&gt;on the issue of their membership as well as Romania's,&lt;br /&gt;with their accession likely to be completed by 2005.&lt;br /&gt;At some point in this stage, the other Balkan states may&lt;br /&gt;likewise become eligible.&lt;br /&gt;3. Accession by the Baltic states might prompt Sweden and&lt;br /&gt;Finland also to consider NATO membership.&lt;br /&gt;4. Somewhere between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine, especially if in&lt;br /&gt;the meantime the country has made significant progress in&lt;br /&gt;its domestic reforms and has succeeded in becoming more&lt;br /&gt;evidently identified as a Central European country, should&lt;br /&gt;become ready for serious negotiations with both the EU&lt;br /&gt;and NATO.&lt;br /&gt;THE DEMOCRATIC BRIDGEHEAD 85&lt;br /&gt;In the meantime, it is likely that Franco-German-Polish collaboration&lt;br /&gt;within the EU and NATO will have deepened considerably,&lt;br /&gt;especially in the area of defense. That collaboration could become&lt;br /&gt;the Western core of any wider European security arrangements&lt;br /&gt;that might eventually embrace both Russia and Ukraine. Given the&lt;br /&gt;special geopolitical interest of Germany and Poland in Ukraine's independence,&lt;br /&gt;it is also quite possible that Ukraine will gradually be&lt;br /&gt;drawn into the special Franco-German-Polish relationship. By the&lt;br /&gt;year 2010, Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian political collaboration,&lt;br /&gt;engaging some 230 million people, could evolve into a partnership&lt;br /&gt;enhancing Europe's geostrategic depth (see map above).&lt;br /&gt;Whether the above scenario emerges in a benign fashion or in&lt;br /&gt;the context of intensifying tensions with Russia is of great importance.&lt;br /&gt;Russia should be continuously reassured that the doors to&lt;br /&gt;Europe are open, as are the doors to its eventual participation in&lt;br /&gt;an expanded transatlantic system of security and, perhaps at some&lt;br /&gt;86 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;future point, in a new trans-Eurasian system of security. To give&lt;br /&gt;credence to these assurances, various cooperative links between&lt;br /&gt;Russia and Europe—in all fields—should be very deliberately promoted.&lt;br /&gt;(Russia's relationship to Europe, and the role of Ukraine in&lt;br /&gt;that regard, are discussed more fully in the next chapter.)&lt;br /&gt;If Europe succeeds both in unifying and in expanding and if&lt;br /&gt;Russia in the meantime undertakes successful democratic consolidation&lt;br /&gt;and social modernization, at some point Russia can also become&lt;br /&gt;eligible for a more organic relationship with Europe. That, in&lt;br /&gt;turn, would make possible the eventual merger of the transatlantic&lt;br /&gt;security system with a transcontinental Eurasian one. However, as&lt;br /&gt;a practical reality, the question of Russia's formal membership will&lt;br /&gt;not arise for quite some time to come—and that, if anything, is yet&lt;br /&gt;another reason for not pointlessly shutting the doors to it.&lt;br /&gt;To conclude: with the Europe of Yalta gone, it is essential that&lt;br /&gt;there be no reversion to the Europe of Versailles. The end of the division&lt;br /&gt;of Europe should not precipitate a step back to a Europe of&lt;br /&gt;quarrelsome nation-states but should be the point of departure for&lt;br /&gt;shaping a larger and increasingly integrated Europe, reinforced by&lt;br /&gt;a widened NATO and rendered even more secure by a constructive&lt;br /&gt;security relationship with Russia. Hence, America's central&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic goal in Europe can be summed up quite simply: it is to&lt;br /&gt;consolidate through a more genuine transatlantic partnership the&lt;br /&gt;U.S. bridgehead on the Eurasian continent so that an enlarging Europe&lt;br /&gt;can become a more viable springboard for projecting into&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia the international democratic and cooperative order.&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 4&lt;br /&gt;Black Hole&lt;br /&gt;THE DISINTEGRATION LATE IN 1991 of the world's territorially&lt;br /&gt;largest state created a "black hole" in the very center of&lt;br /&gt;Eurasia. It was as if the geopoliticians' "heartland" had been&lt;br /&gt;suddenly yanked from the global map.&lt;br /&gt;For America, this new and perplexing geopolitical situation&lt;br /&gt;poses a crucial challenge. Understandably, the immediate task has&lt;br /&gt;to be to reduce the probability of political anarchy or a reversion&lt;br /&gt;to a hostile dictatorship in a crumbling state still possessing a&lt;br /&gt;powerful nuclear arsenal. But the long-range task remains: how to&lt;br /&gt;encourage Russia's democratic transformation and economic recovery&lt;br /&gt;while avoiding the reemergence of a Eurasian empire that&lt;br /&gt;could obstruct the American geostrategic goal of shaping a larger&lt;br /&gt;Euro-Atlantic system to which Russia can then be stably and safely&lt;br /&gt;related.&lt;br /&gt;RUSSIA'S NEW GEOPOLITICAL SETTING&lt;br /&gt;The collapse of the Soviet Union was the final stage in the progressive&lt;br /&gt;fragmentation of the vast Sino-Soviet Communist bloc that for&lt;br /&gt;a brief period of time matched, and in some areas even surpassed,&lt;br /&gt;87&lt;br /&gt;88 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;the scope of Genghis Khan's realm. But the more modern transcontinental&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian bloc lasted very briefly, with the defection by&lt;br /&gt;Tito's Yugoslavia and the insubordination of Mao's China signaling&lt;br /&gt;early on the Communist camp's vulnerability to nationalist aspirations&lt;br /&gt;that proved to be stronger than ideological bonds. The Sino-&lt;br /&gt;Soviet bloc lasted roughly ten years; the Soviet Union about&lt;br /&gt;seventy.&lt;br /&gt;However, even more geopolitically significant was the undoing&lt;br /&gt;of the centuries-old Moscow-ruled Great Russian Empire. The disintegration&lt;br /&gt;of that empire was precipitated by the general socioeconomic&lt;br /&gt;and political failure of the Soviet system—though much&lt;br /&gt;of its malaise was obscured almost until the very end by its systemic&lt;br /&gt;secrecy and self-isolation. Hence, the world was stunned by&lt;br /&gt;the seeming rapidity of the Soviet Union's self-destruction. In the&lt;br /&gt;course of two short weeks in December 1991, the Soviet Union was&lt;br /&gt;first defiantly declared as dissolved by the heads of its Russian,&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian, and Belorussian republics, then formally replaced by a&lt;br /&gt;vaguer entity—called the Commonwealth of Independent States&lt;br /&gt;(CIS)—embracing all of the Soviet republics but the Baltic ones;&lt;br /&gt;then the Soviet president reluctantly resigned and the Soviet flag&lt;br /&gt;was lowered for the last time from the tower of the Kremlin; and, finally,&lt;br /&gt;the Russian Federation—now a predominantly Russian national&lt;br /&gt;state of 150 million people—emerged as the de facto&lt;br /&gt;successor to the former Soviet Union, while the other republics—&lt;br /&gt;accounting for another 150 million people—asserted in varying degrees&lt;br /&gt;their independent sovereignty.&lt;br /&gt;The collapse of the Soviet Union produced monumental geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;confusion. In the course of a mere fortnight, the Russian people—&lt;br /&gt;who, generally speaking, were even less forewarned than the&lt;br /&gt;outside world of the Soviet Union's approaching disintegration—&lt;br /&gt;suddenly discovered that they were no longer the masters of a&lt;br /&gt;transcontinental empire but that the frontiers of Russia had been&lt;br /&gt;rolled back to where they had been in the Caucasus in the early&lt;br /&gt;1800s, in Central Asia in the mid-1800s, and—much more dramatically&lt;br /&gt;and painfully—in the West in approximately 1600, soon after&lt;br /&gt;the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The loss of the Caucasus revived&lt;br /&gt;strategic fears of resurgent Turkish influence; the loss of Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia generated a sense of deprivation regarding the enormous enTHE&lt;br /&gt;BLACK HOLE 89&lt;br /&gt;ergy and mineral resources of the region as well as anxiety over a&lt;br /&gt;potential Islamic challenge; and Ukraine's independence challenged&lt;br /&gt;the very essence of Russia's claim to being the divinely endowed&lt;br /&gt;standard-bearer of a common pan-Slavic identity.&lt;br /&gt;The space occupied for centuries by the Tsarist Empire and for&lt;br /&gt;three-quarters of a century by the Russian-dominated Soviet Union&lt;br /&gt;was now to be filled by a dozen states, with most (except for Russia)&lt;br /&gt;hardly prepared for genuine sovereignty and ranging in size&lt;br /&gt;from the relatively large Ukraine with its 52 million people to Armenia&lt;br /&gt;with its 3.5 million. Their viability seemed uncertain, while&lt;br /&gt;Moscow's willingness to accommodate permanently to the new reality&lt;br /&gt;was similarly unpredictable. The historic shock suffered by&lt;br /&gt;the Russians was magnified by the fact that some 20 million Russian-&lt;br /&gt;speaking people were now inhabitants of foreign states dominated&lt;br /&gt;politically by increasingly nationalistic elites determined to&lt;br /&gt;assert their own identities after decades of more or less coercive&lt;br /&gt;Russification.&lt;br /&gt;The collapse of the Russian Empire created a power void in&lt;br /&gt;the very heart of Eurasia. Not only was there weakness and confusion&lt;br /&gt;in the newly independent states, but in Russia itself, the upheaval&lt;br /&gt;produced a massive systemic crisis, especially as the&lt;br /&gt;political upheaval was accompanied by the simultaneous attempt&lt;br /&gt;to undo the old Soviet socioeconomic model. The national trauma&lt;br /&gt;was made worse by Russia's military involvement in Tajikistan,&lt;br /&gt;driven by fears of a Muslim takeover of that newly independent&lt;br /&gt;state, and was especially heightened by the tragic, brutal, and&lt;br /&gt;both economically and politically very costly intervention in&lt;br /&gt;Chechnya. Most painful of all, Russia's international status was&lt;br /&gt;significantly degraded, with one of the world's two superpowers&lt;br /&gt;now viewed by many as little more than a Third World regional&lt;br /&gt;power, though still possessing a significant but increasingly antiquated&lt;br /&gt;nuclear arsenal.&lt;br /&gt;The geopolitical void was magnified by the scale of Russia's social&lt;br /&gt;crisis. Three-quarters of a century of Communist rule had inflicted&lt;br /&gt;unprecedented biological damage on the Russian people. A&lt;br /&gt;very high proportion of its most gifted and enterprising individuals&lt;br /&gt;were killed or perished in the Gulag, in numbers to be counted&lt;br /&gt;in the millions. In addition, during this century the country also&lt;br /&gt;90 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;suffered the ravages of World War I, the killings of a protracted&lt;br /&gt;civil war, and the atrocities and deprivations of World War II. The&lt;br /&gt;ruling Communist regime imposed a stifling doctrinal orthodoxy,&lt;br /&gt;while isolating the country from the rest of the world. Its economic&lt;br /&gt;policies were totally indifferent to ecological concerns, with the result&lt;br /&gt;that both the environment and the health of the people suffered&lt;br /&gt;greatly. According to official Russian statistics, by the&lt;br /&gt;mid-1990s only about 40 percent of newborns came into the world&lt;br /&gt;healthy, whiie roughly one-fifth of Russian first graders suffered&lt;br /&gt;from some form of mental retardation. Male longevity had declined&lt;br /&gt;to 57.3 years, and more Russians were dying than were being born.&lt;br /&gt;Russia's social condition was, in fact, typical of a middle-rank&lt;br /&gt;Third World country.&lt;br /&gt;One cannot overstate the horrors and tribulations that have&lt;br /&gt;befallen the Russian people in the course of this century. Hardly a&lt;br /&gt;single Russian family has had the opportunity to lead a normal civilized&lt;br /&gt;existence. Consider the social implications of the following&lt;br /&gt;sequence of events:&lt;br /&gt;• the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, ending in Russia's humiliating&lt;br /&gt;defeat;&lt;br /&gt;• the first "proletarian" revolution of 1905, igniting large-scale&lt;br /&gt;urban violence;&lt;br /&gt;• World War I of 1914-1917, with its millions of casualties and&lt;br /&gt;massive economic dislocation;&lt;br /&gt;• the civil war of 1918-1921, again consuming several million&lt;br /&gt;lives and devastating the land;&lt;br /&gt;• the Russo-Polish War of 1919-1920, ending in a Russian&lt;br /&gt;defeat;&lt;br /&gt;• the launching of the Gulag in the early 1920s, including the&lt;br /&gt;decimation of the prerevolutionary elite and its large-scale&lt;br /&gt;exodus from Russia;&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 91&lt;br /&gt;• the industrialization and collectivization drives of the early&lt;br /&gt;and mid-1930s, which generated massive famines and millions&lt;br /&gt;of deaths in Ukraine and Kazakstan;&lt;br /&gt;• the Great Purges and Terror of the mid- and late 1930s, with&lt;br /&gt;millions incarcerated in labor camps and upward of 1 million&lt;br /&gt;shot and several million dying from maltreatment;&lt;br /&gt;• World War II of 1941-1945, with its multiple millions of military&lt;br /&gt;and civilian casualties and vast economic devastation;&lt;br /&gt;• the reimposition of Stalinist terror in the late 1940s, again&lt;br /&gt;involving large-scale arrests and frequent executions;&lt;br /&gt;• the forty-year-long arms race with the United States, lasting&lt;br /&gt;from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, with its socially impoverishing&lt;br /&gt;effects;&lt;br /&gt;• the economically exhausting efforts to project Soviet power&lt;br /&gt;into the Caribbean, Middle East, and Africa during the 1970s&lt;br /&gt;and 1980s;&lt;br /&gt;• the debilitating war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989;&lt;br /&gt;• the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union, followed by civil&lt;br /&gt;disorders, a painful economic crisis, and the bloody and humiliating&lt;br /&gt;war against Chechnya.&lt;br /&gt;Not only was the crisis in Russia's internal condition and the&lt;br /&gt;loss of international status distressingly unsettling, especially for&lt;br /&gt;the Russian political elite, but Russia's geopolitical situation was&lt;br /&gt;also adversely affected. In the West, as a consequence of the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union's disintegration, Russia's frontiers had been altered most&lt;br /&gt;painfully, and its sphere of geopolitical influence had dramatically&lt;br /&gt;shrunk (see map on page 94). The Baltic states had been Russiancontrolled&lt;br /&gt;since the 1700s, and the loss of the ports of Riga and&lt;br /&gt;Tallinn made Russia's access to the Baltic Sea more limited and&lt;br /&gt;subject to winter freezes. Although Moscow managed to retain a&lt;br /&gt;poiitically dominant position in the formally newly independent&lt;br /&gt;92 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;but highly Russified Belarus, it was far from certain that the nationalist&lt;br /&gt;contagion would not eventually also gain the upper hand&lt;br /&gt;there as well. And beyond the frontiers of the former Soviet Union,&lt;br /&gt;the collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that the former satellite&lt;br /&gt;states of Central Europe, foremost among them Poland, were&lt;br /&gt;rapidly gravitating toward NATO and the European Union.&lt;br /&gt;Most troubling of all was the loss of Ukraine. The appearance of&lt;br /&gt;an independent Ukrainian state not only challenged all Russians to&lt;br /&gt;rethink the nature of their own political and ethnic identity, but it&lt;br /&gt;represented a vital geopolitical setback for the Russian state. The&lt;br /&gt;repudiation of more than three hundred years of Russian imperial&lt;br /&gt;history meant the loss of a potentially rich industrial and agricultural&lt;br /&gt;economy and of 52 million people ethnically and religiously&lt;br /&gt;sufficiently close to the Russians to make Russia into a truly large&lt;br /&gt;and confident imperial state. Ukraine's independence also deprived&lt;br /&gt;Russia of its dominant position on the Black Sea, where&lt;br /&gt;Odessa had served as Russia's vital gateway to trade with the&lt;br /&gt;Mediterranean and the world beyond.&lt;br /&gt;The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically&lt;br /&gt;limited Russia's geostrategic options. Even without the Baltic&lt;br /&gt;states and Poland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine&lt;br /&gt;could still seek to be the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in&lt;br /&gt;which Moscow could dominate the non-Slavs in the South and&lt;br /&gt;Southeast of the former Soviet Union. But without Ukraine and its&lt;br /&gt;52 million fellow Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild the&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian empire was likely to leave Russia entangled alone in protracted&lt;br /&gt;conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused non-&lt;br /&gt;Slavs, the war with Chechnya perhaps simply being the first&lt;br /&gt;example. Moreover, given Russia's declining birthrate and the explosive&lt;br /&gt;birthrate among the Central Asians, any new Eurasian entity&lt;br /&gt;based purely on Russian power, without Ukraine, would&lt;br /&gt;inevitably become less European and more Asiatic with each passing&lt;br /&gt;year.&lt;br /&gt;The loss of Ukraine was not only geopolitically pivotal but also&lt;br /&gt;geopoiitically catalytic. It was Ukrainian actions—the Ukrainian&lt;br /&gt;declaration of independence in December 1991, its insistence in&lt;br /&gt;the critical negotiations in Bela Vezha that the Soviet Union should&lt;br /&gt;be replaced by a looser Commonwealth of Independent States, and&lt;br /&gt;especially the sudden coup-like imposition of Ukrainian command&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 93&lt;br /&gt;over the Soviet army units stationed on Ukrainian soil—that prevented&lt;br /&gt;the CIS from becoming merely a new name for a more confederal&lt;br /&gt;USSR. Ukraine's political self-determination stunned&lt;br /&gt;Moscow and set an example that the other Soviet republics,&lt;br /&gt;though initially more timidly, then followed.&lt;br /&gt;Russia's loss of its dominant position on the Baltic Sea was&lt;br /&gt;replicated on the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine's independence&lt;br /&gt;but also because the newly independent Caucasian states—&lt;br /&gt;Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—enhanced the opportunities&lt;br /&gt;for Turkey to reestablish its once-lost influence in the region. Prior&lt;br /&gt;to 1991, the Black Sea was the point of departure for the projection&lt;br /&gt;of Russian naval power into the Mediterranean. By the mid-1990s,&lt;br /&gt;Russia was left with a small coastal strip on the Black Sea and with&lt;br /&gt;an unresolved debate with Ukraine over basing rights in Crimea&lt;br /&gt;for the remnants of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, while observing,&lt;br /&gt;with evident irritation, joint NATO-Ukrainian naval and shore-landing&lt;br /&gt;maneuvers and a growing Turkish role in the Black Sea region.&lt;br /&gt;Russia also suspected Turkey of having provided effective aid to&lt;br /&gt;the Chechen resistance.&lt;br /&gt;Farther to the southeast, the geopolitical upheaval produced a&lt;br /&gt;similarly significant change in the status of the Caspian Sea basin&lt;br /&gt;and of Central Asia more generally. Before the Soviet Union's collapse,&lt;br /&gt;the Caspian Sea was in effect a Russian lake, with a small&lt;br /&gt;southern sector falling within Iran's perimeter. With the emergence&lt;br /&gt;of the independent and strongly nationalist Azerbaijan—reinforced&lt;br /&gt;by the influx of eager Western oil investors—and the similarly&lt;br /&gt;independent Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, Russia became&lt;br /&gt;only one of five claimants to the riches of the Caspian Sea basin. It&lt;br /&gt;could no longer confidently assume that it could dispose of these&lt;br /&gt;resources on its own.&lt;br /&gt;The emergence of the independent Central Asian states meant&lt;br /&gt;that in some places Russia's southeastern frontier had been&lt;br /&gt;pushed back northward more than one thousand miles. The new&lt;br /&gt;states now controlled vast mineral and energy deposits that were&lt;br /&gt;bound to attract foreign interests. It was almost inevitable that not&lt;br /&gt;only the elites but, before too long, also the peoples of these states&lt;br /&gt;would become more nationalistic and perhaps increasingly Islamic&lt;br /&gt;in outlook. In Kazakstan, a vast country endowed with enormous&lt;br /&gt;natural resources but with its nearly 20 million people split almost&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 95&lt;br /&gt;evenly between Kazaks and Slavs, linguistic and national frictions&lt;br /&gt;are likely to intensify. Uzbekistan—with its much more ethnically&lt;br /&gt;homogeneous population of approximately 25 million and its leaders&lt;br /&gt;emphasizing the country's historic glories—has become increasingly&lt;br /&gt;assertive in affirming the region's new postcolonial&lt;br /&gt;status. Turkmenistan, geographically shielded by Kazakstan from&lt;br /&gt;any direct contact with Russia, has actively developed new links&lt;br /&gt;with Iran in order to diminish its prior dependence on the Russian&lt;br /&gt;communications system for access to the global markets.&lt;br /&gt;Supported from the outside by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and&lt;br /&gt;Saudi Arabia, the Central Asian states have not been inclined to&lt;br /&gt;trade their new political sovereignty even for the sake of beneficial&lt;br /&gt;economic integration with Russia, as many Russians continued to&lt;br /&gt;hope they would. At the very least, some tension and hostility in&lt;br /&gt;their relationship with Russia is unavoidable, while the painful&lt;br /&gt;precedents of Chechnya and Tajikistan suggest that something&lt;br /&gt;worse cannot be altogether excluded. For the Russians, the&lt;br /&gt;specter of a potential conflict with the Islamic states along Russia's&lt;br /&gt;entire southern flank (which, adding in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan,&lt;br /&gt;account for more than 300 million people) has to be a source of serious&lt;br /&gt;concern.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, at the time its empire dissolved, Russia was also facing&lt;br /&gt;an ominous new geopolitical situation in the Far East, even though&lt;br /&gt;no territorial or political changes had taken place. For several centuries,&lt;br /&gt;China had been weaker and more backward than Russia, at&lt;br /&gt;least in the political-military domains. No Russian concerned with&lt;br /&gt;the country's future and perplexed by the dramatic changes of this&lt;br /&gt;decade can ignore the fact that China is on its way to being a more&lt;br /&gt;advanced, more dynamic, and more successful state than Russia.&lt;br /&gt;China's economic power, wedded to the dynamic energy of its 1.2&lt;br /&gt;billion people, is fundamentally reversing the historical equation&lt;br /&gt;between the two countries, with the empty spaces of Siberia almost&lt;br /&gt;beckoning for Chinese colonization.&lt;br /&gt;This staggering new reality was bound to affect the Russian&lt;br /&gt;sense of security in its Far Eastern region as well as Russian interests&lt;br /&gt;in Central Asia. Before long, this development might even overshadow&lt;br /&gt;the geopolitical importance of Russia's loss of Ukraine. Its&lt;br /&gt;strategic implications were well expressed by Vladimir Lukin, Rus96&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;sia's first post-Communist ambassador to the United States and&lt;br /&gt;later the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee:&lt;br /&gt;In the past, Russia saw itself as being ahead of Asia, though lagging&lt;br /&gt;behind Europe. But since then, Asia has developed much&lt;br /&gt;faster. . . . we find ourselves to be not so much between "modern&lt;br /&gt;Europe" and "backward Asia" but rather occupying some&lt;br /&gt;strange middle space between two "Europes."1&lt;br /&gt;In brief, Russia, until recently the forger of a great territorial&lt;br /&gt;empire and the leader of an ideological bloc of satellite states extending&lt;br /&gt;into the very heart of Europe and at one point to the&lt;br /&gt;South China Sea, had become a troubled national state, without&lt;br /&gt;easy geographic access to the outside world and potentially vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;to debilitating conflicts with its neighbors on its western,&lt;br /&gt;southern, and eastern flanks. Only the uninhabitable and inaccessible&lt;br /&gt;northern spaces, almost permanently frozen, seemed geopolitically&lt;br /&gt;secure.&lt;br /&gt;GEOSTRATEGIC PHANTASMAGORIA&lt;br /&gt;A period of historic and strategic confusion in postimperial Russia&lt;br /&gt;was hence unavoidable. The shocking collapse of the Soviet Union&lt;br /&gt;and especially the stunning and generally unexpected disintegration&lt;br /&gt;of the Great Russian Empire have given rise in Russia to enormous&lt;br /&gt;soul-searching, to a wide-ranging debate over what ought to&lt;br /&gt;be Russia's current historical self-definition, to intense public and&lt;br /&gt;private arguments over questions that in most major nations are&lt;br /&gt;not even raised: What is Russia? Where is Russia? What does it&lt;br /&gt;mean to be a Russian?&lt;br /&gt;These questions are not merely theoretical: any reply contains&lt;br /&gt;significant geopolitical content. Is Russia a national state, based on&lt;br /&gt;purely Russian ethnicity, or is Russia by definition something more&lt;br /&gt;(as Britain is more than England) and hence destined to be an imperial&lt;br /&gt;state? What are—historically, strategically, and ethnically—&lt;br /&gt;the proper frontiers of Russia? Should the independent Ukraine be&lt;br /&gt;'In "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy 88 (Fall 1992):60.&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 97&lt;br /&gt;viewed as a temporary aberration when assessed in such historic,&lt;br /&gt;strategic, and ethnic terms? (Many Russians are inclined to feel&lt;br /&gt;that way.) To be a Russian, does one have to be ethnically a Russian&lt;br /&gt;("Russkyi"), or can one be a Russian politically but not ethnically&lt;br /&gt;(that is, be a "Rossyanin"—the equivalent to "British" but not&lt;br /&gt;to "English")? For example, Yeltsin and some Russians have argued&lt;br /&gt;(with tragic consequences) that the Chechens could—indeed,&lt;br /&gt;should—be considered Russians.&lt;br /&gt;A year before the Soviet Union's demise, a Russian nationalist,&lt;br /&gt;one of the few who saw the end approaching, cried out in a desperate&lt;br /&gt;affirmation:&lt;br /&gt;If the terrible disaster, which is unthinkable to the Russian people,&lt;br /&gt;does occur and the state is torn apart, and the people,&lt;br /&gt;robbed and deceived by their 1,000-year history, suddenly end&lt;br /&gt;up alone, and their recent "brothers" have taken their belongings&lt;br /&gt;and disappeared into their "national lifeboats" and sail&lt;br /&gt;away from the listing ship—well, we have nowhere to go....&lt;br /&gt;Russian statehood, which embodies the "Russian idea" politically,&lt;br /&gt;economically, and spiritually, will be built anew. It will&lt;br /&gt;gather up all the best from its long 1,000-year kingdom and the&lt;br /&gt;70 years of Soviet history that have flown by in a moment.2&lt;br /&gt;But how? The difficulty of defining an answer that would be acceptable&lt;br /&gt;to the Russian people and yet realistic has been compounded&lt;br /&gt;by the historic crisis of the Russian state itself.&lt;br /&gt;Throughout almost its entire history, that state was simultaneously&lt;br /&gt;an instrument of territorial expansion and economic development.&lt;br /&gt;It was also a state that deliberately did not conceive&lt;br /&gt;itself to be a purely national instrument, in the West European tradition,&lt;br /&gt;but defined itself as the executor of a special supranational&lt;br /&gt;mission, with the "Russian idea" variously defined in religious,&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical, or ideological terms. Now, suddenly, that mission&lt;br /&gt;was repudiated as the state shrank territorially to a largely ethnic&lt;br /&gt;dimension.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, the post-Soviet crisis of the Russian state (of its&lt;br /&gt;"essence," so to speak) was compounded by the fact that Russia&lt;br /&gt;2Aleksandr Prokhanov. "Tragedy of Centralism," Literaturnaya Rossiya,&lt;br /&gt;January 1990, pp. 4-5.&lt;br /&gt;98 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;was not only faced with the challenge of having been suddenly deprived&lt;br /&gt;of its imperial missionary vocation but, in order to close&lt;br /&gt;the yawning gap between Russia's social backwardness and the&lt;br /&gt;more advanced parts of Eurasia, was now being pressed by domestic&lt;br /&gt;modernizers (and their Western consultants) to withdraw from&lt;br /&gt;its traditional economic role as the mentor, owner, and disposer of&lt;br /&gt;social wealth. This called for nothing short of a politically revolutionary&lt;br /&gt;limitation of the international and domestic role of the&lt;br /&gt;Russian state. This was profoundly disruptive to the most established&lt;br /&gt;patterns of Russian domestic life and contributed to a divisive&lt;br /&gt;sense of geopolitical disorientation within the Russian&lt;br /&gt;political elite.&lt;br /&gt;In that perplexing setting, as one might have expected,&lt;br /&gt;"Whither Russia and what is Russia?" prompted a variety of responses.&lt;br /&gt;Russia's extensive Eurasian location has long predisposed&lt;br /&gt;that elite to think in geopolitical terms. The first foreign&lt;br /&gt;minister of the postimperlal and post-Communist Russia, Andrei&lt;br /&gt;Kozyrev, reaffirmed that mode of thought in one of his early attempts&lt;br /&gt;to define how the new Russia should conduct itself on the&lt;br /&gt;international scene. Barely a month after the dissolution of the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union, he noted: "In abandoning messianism we set course for&lt;br /&gt;pragmatism. . . . we rapidly came to understand that geopolitics&lt;br /&gt;. . . is replacing ideology."'&lt;br /&gt;Generally speaking, three broad and partially overlapping&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic options, each ultimately related to Russia's preoccupation&lt;br /&gt;with its status vis-a-vis America and each also containing&lt;br /&gt;some internal variants, can be said to have emerged in reaction to&lt;br /&gt;the Soviet Union's collapse. These several schools of thought can&lt;br /&gt;be classified as follows:&lt;br /&gt;1. priority for "the mature strategic partnership" with America,&lt;br /&gt;which for some of its adherents was actually a code&lt;br /&gt;term for a global condominium;&lt;br /&gt;2. emphasis on the "near abroad" as Russia's central concern,&lt;br /&gt;with some advocating a form of Moscow-dominated economic&lt;br /&gt;integration but with others also expecting an eveninterview&lt;br /&gt;In Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 12,1992.&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 99&lt;br /&gt;tual restoration of some measure of imperial control,&lt;br /&gt;thereby creating a power more capable of balancing America&lt;br /&gt;and Europe; and&lt;br /&gt;3. a counteralliance, involving some sort of a Eurasian anti-&lt;br /&gt;U.S. coalition designed to reduce the American preponderance&lt;br /&gt;in Eurasia.&lt;br /&gt;Although the first of the foregoing was initially dominant&lt;br /&gt;among President Yeltsin's new ruling team, the second option surfaced&lt;br /&gt;into political prominence shortly thereafter, in part as a critique&lt;br /&gt;of Yeltsin's geopolitical priorities; the third made itself heard&lt;br /&gt;somewhat later, around the mid-1990s, in reaction to the spreading&lt;br /&gt;sense that Russia's post-Soviet geostrategy was both unclear and&lt;br /&gt;failing. As it happens, all three proved to be historically maladroit&lt;br /&gt;and derived from rather phantasmagoric views of Russia's current&lt;br /&gt;power, international potential, and foreign interests.&lt;br /&gt;In the immediate wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Yeltsin's&lt;br /&gt;initial posture represented the cresting of the old but never entirely&lt;br /&gt;successful "westernizer" conception in Russian political&lt;br /&gt;thought: that Russia belonged in the West, should be part of the&lt;br /&gt;West, and should as much as possible imitate the West in its own&lt;br /&gt;domestic development. That view was espoused by Yeltsin himself&lt;br /&gt;and by his foreign minister, with Yeltsin being quite explicit in denouncing&lt;br /&gt;the Russian imperial legacy. Speaking in Kiev on November&lt;br /&gt;19, 1990, in words that the Ukrainians or Chechens could&lt;br /&gt;subsequently turn against him, Yeltsin eloquently declared;&lt;br /&gt;Russia does not aspire to become the center of some sort of&lt;br /&gt;new empire .. . Russia understands better than others the perniciousness&lt;br /&gt;of that role, inasmuch as it was Russia that performed&lt;br /&gt;that role for a long time. What did it gain from this? Did&lt;br /&gt;Russians become freer as a result? Wealthier? Happier? ... history&lt;br /&gt;has taught us that a people that rules over others cannot&lt;br /&gt;be fortunate.&lt;br /&gt;The deliberately friendly posture adopted by the West, especially&lt;br /&gt;by the United States, toward the new Russian leadership was&lt;br /&gt;a source of encouragement to the post-Soviet "westernizers" in the&lt;br /&gt;100 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Russian foreign policy establishment. It both reinforced its pro-&lt;br /&gt;American inclinations and seduced its membership personally.&lt;br /&gt;The new leaders were flattered to be on a first-name basis with the&lt;br /&gt;top policy makers of the world's only superpower, and they found&lt;br /&gt;it easy to deceive themselves into thinking that they, too, were the&lt;br /&gt;leaders of a superpower. When the Americans launched the slogan&lt;br /&gt;of "the mature strategic partnership" between Washington and&lt;br /&gt;Moscow, to the Russians it seemed as if a new democratic American-&lt;br /&gt;Russian condominium—replacing the former contest—had&lt;br /&gt;thus been sanctified.&lt;br /&gt;That condominium would be global in scope. Russia thereby&lt;br /&gt;would not only be the legal successor to the former Soviet Union&lt;br /&gt;but the de facto partner in a global accommodation, based on genuine&lt;br /&gt;equality. As the new Russian leaders never tired of asserting,&lt;br /&gt;that meant not only that the rest of the world should recognize&lt;br /&gt;Russia as America's equal but that no global problem could be&lt;br /&gt;tackled or resolved without Russia's participation and/or permission.&lt;br /&gt;Although it was not openly stated, implicit in this illusion was&lt;br /&gt;also the notion that Central Europe would somehow remain, or&lt;br /&gt;might even choose to remain, a region of special political proximity&lt;br /&gt;to Russia. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon&lt;br /&gt;would not be followed by the gravitation of their former members&lt;br /&gt;either toward NATO or even only toward the EU.&lt;br /&gt;Western aid, in the meantime, would enable the Russian government&lt;br /&gt;to undertake domestic reforms, withdrawing the state&lt;br /&gt;from economic life and permitting the consolidation of democratic&lt;br /&gt;institutions. Russia's economic recovery, its special status as&lt;br /&gt;America's coequal partner, and its sheer attractiveness would then&lt;br /&gt;encourage the recently independent states of the new CIS—grateful&lt;br /&gt;that the new Russia was not threatening them and increasingly&lt;br /&gt;aware of the benefits of some form of union with Russia—to engage&lt;br /&gt;in ever-closer economic and then political integration with&lt;br /&gt;Russia, thereby also enhancing Russia's scope and power.&lt;br /&gt;The problem with this approach was that it was devoid of either&lt;br /&gt;international or domestic realism. While the concept of "mature&lt;br /&gt;strategic partnership" was flattering, it was also deceptive.&lt;br /&gt;America was neither inclined to share global power with Russia&lt;br /&gt;nor could it, even if it had wanted to do so. The new Russia was&lt;br /&gt;simply too weak, too devastated by three-quarters of a century of&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 101&lt;br /&gt;Communist rule, and too socially backward to be a real global partner.&lt;br /&gt;In Washington's view, Germany, Japan, and China were at least&lt;br /&gt;as important and influential. Moreover, on some of the central&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic issues of national interest to America—in Europe, the&lt;br /&gt;Middle East, and the Far East—it was far from the case that American&lt;br /&gt;and Russian aspirations were the same. Once differences inevitably&lt;br /&gt;started to surface, the disproportion in political power,&lt;br /&gt;financial clout, technological innovation, and cultural appeal made&lt;br /&gt;the "mature strategic partnership" seem hollow—and it struck an&lt;br /&gt;increasing number of Russians as deliberately designed to deceive&lt;br /&gt;Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps that disappointment might have been averted if earlier&lt;br /&gt;on—during the American-Russian honeymoon—America had embraced&lt;br /&gt;the concept of NATO expansion and had at the same time&lt;br /&gt;offered Russia "a deal it could not refuse," namely, a special cooperative&lt;br /&gt;relationship between Russia and NATO. Had America&lt;br /&gt;clearly and decisively embraced the idea of widening the alliance,&lt;br /&gt;with the stipulation that Russia should somehow be included in&lt;br /&gt;the process, perhaps Moscow's subsequent sense of disappointment&lt;br /&gt;with "the mature partnership" as well as the progressive&lt;br /&gt;weakening of the political position of the westernizers in the Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;might have been averted.&lt;br /&gt;The moment to have done so was during the second half of&lt;br /&gt;1993, right after Yeltsin's public endorsement in August of&lt;br /&gt;Poland's interest in joining the transatlantic alliance as being consistent&lt;br /&gt;with "the interests of Russia." Instead, the Clinton administration,&lt;br /&gt;then still pursuing its "Russia first" policy, agonized for&lt;br /&gt;two more years, while the Kremlin changed its tune and became&lt;br /&gt;increasingly hostile to the emerging but indecisive signals of the&lt;br /&gt;American intention to widen NATO. By the time Washington decided,&lt;br /&gt;in 1996, to make NATO enlargement a central goal in America's&lt;br /&gt;policy of shaping a larger and more secure Euro-Atlantic&lt;br /&gt;community, the Russians had locked themselves into rigid opposition.&lt;br /&gt;Hence, the year 1993 might be viewed as the year of a missed&lt;br /&gt;historic opportunity.&lt;br /&gt;Admittedly, not all of the Russian concerns regarding NATO expansion&lt;br /&gt;lacked legitimacy or were motivated by malevolent motives.&lt;br /&gt;Some opponents, to be sure, especially among the Russian&lt;br /&gt;military, partook of a Cold War mentality, viewing NATO expansion&lt;br /&gt;102 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;not as an integral part of Europe's own growth but rather as the&lt;br /&gt;advance toward Russia of an American-led and still hostile alliance.&lt;br /&gt;Some of the Russian foreign policy elite—most of whom&lt;br /&gt;were actually former Soviet officials—persisted in the long-standing&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic view that America had no place in Eurasia and&lt;br /&gt;that NATO expansion was largely driven by the American desire to&lt;br /&gt;increase its sphere of influence. Some of their opposition also derived&lt;br /&gt;from the hope that an unattached Central Europe would&lt;br /&gt;some day again revert to Moscow's sphere of geopolitical influence,&lt;br /&gt;once Russia had regained its health.&lt;br /&gt;But many Russian democrats also feared that the expansion of&lt;br /&gt;NATO would mean that Russia would be left outside of Europe, ostracized&lt;br /&gt;politically, and considered unworthy of membership in&lt;br /&gt;the institutional framework of European civilization. Cultural insecurity&lt;br /&gt;compounded the political fears, making NATO expansion&lt;br /&gt;seem like the culmination of the long-standing Western policy designed&lt;br /&gt;to isolate Russia, leaving it alone in the world and vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;to its various enemies. Moreover, the Russian democrats&lt;br /&gt;simply could not grasp the depth either of the Central Europeans'&lt;br /&gt;resentment over half a century of Moscow's domination or of their&lt;br /&gt;desire to be part of a larger Euro-Atlantic system.&lt;br /&gt;On balance, it is probable that neither the disappointment nor&lt;br /&gt;the weakening of the Russian westernizers could have been&lt;br /&gt;avoided. For one thing, the new Russian elite, quite divided within&lt;br /&gt;itself and with neither its president nor its foreign minister capable&lt;br /&gt;of providing consistent geostrategic leadership, was not able to define&lt;br /&gt;clearly what the new Russia wanted in Europe, nor could it realistically&lt;br /&gt;assess the actual limitations of Russia's weakened&lt;br /&gt;condition. Moscow's politically embattled democrats could not&lt;br /&gt;bring themselves to state boldly that a democratic Russia does not&lt;br /&gt;oppose the enlargement of the transatlantic democratic community&lt;br /&gt;and that it wishes to be associated with it. The delusion of a&lt;br /&gt;shared global status with America made it difficult for the Moscow&lt;br /&gt;political elite to abandon the idea of a privileged geopolitical position&lt;br /&gt;for Russia, not only in the area of the former Soviet Union itself&lt;br /&gt;but even in regard to the former Central European satellite states.&lt;br /&gt;These developments played into the hands of the nationalists,&lt;br /&gt;who by 1994 were beginning to recover their voices, and the militarists,&lt;br /&gt;who by then had become Yeltsin's critically important doTHE&lt;br /&gt;BLACK HOLE 103&lt;br /&gt;mestic supporters. Their increasingly shrill and occasionally&lt;br /&gt;threatening reactions to the aspirations of the Central Europeans&lt;br /&gt;merely intensified the determination of the former satellite&lt;br /&gt;states—mindful of their only recently achieved liberation from&lt;br /&gt;Russian rule—to gain the safe haven of NATO.&lt;br /&gt;The gulf between Washington and Moscow was widened further&lt;br /&gt;by the Kremlin's unwillingness to disavow all of Stalin's conquests.&lt;br /&gt;Western public opinion, especially in Scandinavia but also&lt;br /&gt;in the United States, was especially troubled by the ambiguity of&lt;br /&gt;the Russian attitude toward the Baltic republics. While recognizing&lt;br /&gt;their independence and not pressing for their membership in the&lt;br /&gt;CIS, even the democratic Russian leaders periodically resorted to&lt;br /&gt;threats in order to obtain preferential treatment for the large communities&lt;br /&gt;of Russian colonists who had deliberately been settled in&lt;br /&gt;these countries during the Stalinist years. The atmosphere was&lt;br /&gt;further clouded by the pointed unwillingness of the Kremlin to denounce&lt;br /&gt;the secret Nazi-Soviet agreement of 1939 that had paved&lt;br /&gt;the way for the forcible incorporation of these republics into the&lt;br /&gt;Soviet Union. Even five years after the Soviet Union's collapse,&lt;br /&gt;spokesmen for the Kremlin insisted (in the official statement of&lt;br /&gt;September 10, 1996) that in 1940 the Baltic states had voluntarily&lt;br /&gt;"joined" the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;The post-Soviet Russian elite had apparently also expected&lt;br /&gt;that the West would aid in, or at least not impede, the restoration&lt;br /&gt;of a central Russian role in the post-Soviet space. They thus resented&lt;br /&gt;the West's willingness to help the newly independent post-&lt;br /&gt;Soviet states consolidate their separate political existence. Even&lt;br /&gt;while warning that a "confrontation with the United States . . . is an&lt;br /&gt;option that should be avoided," senior Russian analysts of American&lt;br /&gt;foreign policy argued (not altogether incorrectly) that the&lt;br /&gt;United States was seeking "the reorganization of interstate relations&lt;br /&gt;in the whole of Eurasia .. . whereby there was not one sole&lt;br /&gt;leading power on the continent but many medium, relatively stable,&lt;br /&gt;and moderately strong ones . . . but necessarily inferior to the&lt;br /&gt;United States in their individual or even collective capabilities."'1&lt;br /&gt;'A. Bogaturov and V. Kremenyuk (both senior scholars in the Institute of&lt;br /&gt;the United States and Canada), in "The Americans Themselves Will Never&lt;br /&gt;Stop," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 28, 1996.&lt;br /&gt;104 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;In this regard, Ukraine was critical. The growing American inclination,&lt;br /&gt;especially by 1994, to assign a high priority to American-&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian relations and to help Ukraine sustain its new national&lt;br /&gt;freedom was viewed by many in Moscow—even by its "westernizers"—&lt;br /&gt;as a policy directed at the vital Russian interest in eventually&lt;br /&gt;bringing Ukraine back into the common fold. That Ukraine will&lt;br /&gt;eventually somehow be "reintegrated" remains an article of faith&lt;br /&gt;among many members of the Russian political elite.5 As a result,&lt;br /&gt;Russia's geopolitical and historical questioning of Ukraine's separate&lt;br /&gt;status collided head-on with the American view that an imperial&lt;br /&gt;Russia could not be a democratic Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Additionally, there were purely domestic reasons that a "mature&lt;br /&gt;strategic partnership" between two "democracies" proved to&lt;br /&gt;be illusory. Russia was just too backward and too devastated by&lt;br /&gt;Communist rule to be a viable democratic partner of the United&lt;br /&gt;States. That central reality could not be obscured by high-sounding&lt;br /&gt;rhetoric about partnership. Post-Soviet Russia, moreover, had&lt;br /&gt;made only a partial break with the past. Almost all of its "democratic"&lt;br /&gt;leaders—even if genuinely disillusioned with the Soviet past—&lt;br /&gt;were not only the products of the Soviet system but former senior&lt;br /&gt;members of its ruling elite. They were not former dissidents, as in&lt;br /&gt;Poland or the Czech Republic. The key institutions of Soviet&lt;br /&gt;power—though weakened, demoralized, and corrupted—were still&lt;br /&gt;there. Symbolic of that reality and of the lingering hold of the Communist&lt;br /&gt;past was the historic centerpiece of Moscow: the continued&lt;br /&gt;presence of the Lenin mausoleum. It was as if post-Nazi&lt;br /&gt;Germany were governed by former middle-level Nazi "Gauleiters"&lt;br /&gt;spouting democratic slogans, with a Hitler mausoleum still standing&lt;br /&gt;in the center of Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;Tor example, even Yeltsin's top adviser, Dmitryi Ryurikov, was quoted&lt;br /&gt;by Interfax (November 20, 1996) as considering Ukraine to be "a temporary&lt;br /&gt;phenomenon," while Moscow's Obshchaya Gazeta (December 10, 1996) reported&lt;br /&gt;that "in the foreseeable future events in eastern Ukraine may confront&lt;br /&gt;Russia with a very difficult problem. Mass manifestations of&lt;br /&gt;discontent... will be accompanied by appeals to Russia, or even demands,&lt;br /&gt;to take over the region. Quite a few people in Moscow would be ready to&lt;br /&gt;support such plans." Western concerns regarding Russian intentions were&lt;br /&gt;certainly not eased by Russian demands for Crimea and Sevastopol, nor by&lt;br /&gt;such provocative acts as the deliberate inclusion in late 1996 of Sevastopol&lt;br /&gt;in Russian public television's nightly weather forecasts lor Russian cities.&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 105&lt;br /&gt;The political weakness of the new democratic elite was compounded&lt;br /&gt;by the very scale of the Russian economic crisis. The&lt;br /&gt;need for massive reforms—for the withdrawal of the Russian state&lt;br /&gt;from the economy—generated excessive expectations of Western,&lt;br /&gt;especially American, aid. Although that aid, especially from Germany&lt;br /&gt;and America, gradually did assume large proportions, even&lt;br /&gt;under the best of circumstances it still could not prompt a quick&lt;br /&gt;economic recovery. The resulting social dissatisfaction provided&lt;br /&gt;additional underpinning for a mounting chorus of disappointed&lt;br /&gt;critics who alleged that the partnership with the United States was&lt;br /&gt;a sham, beneficial to America but damaging to Russia.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, neither the objective nor the subjective preconditions&lt;br /&gt;for an effective global partnership existed in the immediate years&lt;br /&gt;following the Soviet Union's collapse. The democratic "westernizers"&lt;br /&gt;simply wanted too much and could deliver too little. They desired&lt;br /&gt;an equal partnership—or, rather, a condominium—with&lt;br /&gt;America, a relatively free hand within the CIS, and a geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;no-man's-land in Central Europe. Yet their ambivalence about Soviet&lt;br /&gt;history, their lack of realism regarding global power, the depth&lt;br /&gt;of the economic crisis, and the absence of widespread social support&lt;br /&gt;meant that they could not deliver the stable and truly democratic&lt;br /&gt;Russia that the concept of equal partnership implied. Russia&lt;br /&gt;first had to go through a prolonged process of political reform, an&lt;br /&gt;equally long process of democratic stabilization, and an even&lt;br /&gt;longer process of socioeconomic modernization and then manage&lt;br /&gt;a deeper shift from an imperial to a national mindset regarding the&lt;br /&gt;new geopolitical realities not only in Central Europe but especially&lt;br /&gt;within the former Russian Empire before a real partnership with&lt;br /&gt;America could become a viable geopolitical option.&lt;br /&gt;Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the "near&lt;br /&gt;abroad" priority became both the major critique of the pro-West&lt;br /&gt;option as well as an early foreign policy alternative. It was based&lt;br /&gt;on the argument that the "partnership" concept slighted what&lt;br /&gt;ought to be most important to Russia: namely, its relations with&lt;br /&gt;the former Soviet republics. The "near abroad" came to be the&lt;br /&gt;shorthand formulation for advocacy of a policy that would place&lt;br /&gt;primary emphasis on the need to reconstruct some sort of a viable&lt;br /&gt;framework, with Moscow as the decision-making center, in the&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical space once occupied by the Soviet Union. On this&lt;br /&gt;106 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;premise, there was widespread agreement that a policy of concentration&lt;br /&gt;on the West, especially on America, was yielding little and&lt;br /&gt;costing too much. It simply made it easier for the West to exploit&lt;br /&gt;the opportunities created by the Soviet Union's collapse.&lt;br /&gt;However, the "near abroad" school of thought was a broad umbrella&lt;br /&gt;under which several varying geopolitical conceptions could&lt;br /&gt;cluster. It embraced not only the economic functionalists and determinists&lt;br /&gt;(including some "westernizers") who believed that the&lt;br /&gt;CIS could evolve into a Moscow-led version of the EU but also others&lt;br /&gt;who saw in economic integration merely one of several tools of&lt;br /&gt;imperial restoration that could operate either under the CIS umbrella&lt;br /&gt;or through special arrangements (formulated in 1996) between&lt;br /&gt;Russia and Belarus or among Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan,&lt;br /&gt;and Kyrgyzstan; it also included Slavophile romantics who advocated&lt;br /&gt;a Slavic Union of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and, finally,&lt;br /&gt;proponents of the somewhat mystical notion of Eurasianism as the&lt;br /&gt;substantive definition of Russia's enduring historical mission.&lt;br /&gt;In its narrowest form, the "near abroad" priority involved the&lt;br /&gt;perfectly reasonable proposition that Russia must first concentrate&lt;br /&gt;on relations with the newly independent states, especially as&lt;br /&gt;all of them remained tied to Russia by the realities of the deliberately&lt;br /&gt;fostered Soviet policy of promoting economic interdependence&lt;br /&gt;among them. That made both economic and geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;sense. The "common economic space," of which the new Russian&lt;br /&gt;leaders spoke often, was a reality that could not be ignored by the&lt;br /&gt;leaders of the newly independent states. Cooperation, and even&lt;br /&gt;some integration, was an economic necessity. Thus, it was not&lt;br /&gt;only normal but desirable to promote joint CIS institutions in order&lt;br /&gt;to reverse the economic disruptions and fragmentation produced&lt;br /&gt;by the political breakup of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;For some Russians, the promotion of economic integration was&lt;br /&gt;thus a functionally effective and politically responsible reaction to&lt;br /&gt;what had transpired. The analogy with the EU was often cited as&lt;br /&gt;pertinent to the post-Soviet situation. A restoration of the empire&lt;br /&gt;was explicitly rejected by the more moderate advocates of economic&lt;br /&gt;integration. For example, an influential report entitled "A&lt;br /&gt;Strategy for Russia," which was issued as early as August 1992 by&lt;br /&gt;the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, a group of prominent&lt;br /&gt;personalities and government officials, very pointedly advocated&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 107&lt;br /&gt;"post-imperial enlightened integration" as the proper program for&lt;br /&gt;the post-Soviet "common economic space."&lt;br /&gt;However, emphasis on the "near abroad" was not merely a politically&lt;br /&gt;benign doctrine of regional economic cooperation. Its&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical content had imperial overtones. Even the relatively&lt;br /&gt;moderate 1992 report spoke of a recovered Russia that would&lt;br /&gt;eventually establish a strategic partnership with the West, in&lt;br /&gt;which Russia would have the role of "regulating the situation in&lt;br /&gt;Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Far East." Other advocates of&lt;br /&gt;this priority were more unabashed, speaking explicitly of Russia's&lt;br /&gt;"exclusive role" in the post-Soviet space and accusing the West of&lt;br /&gt;engaging in an anti-Russian policy by providing aid to Ukraine and&lt;br /&gt;the other newly independent states.&lt;br /&gt;A typical but by no means extreme example was the argument&lt;br /&gt;made by Y. Ambartsumov, the chairman in 1993 of the parliamentary&lt;br /&gt;Foreign Affairs Committee and a former advocate of the "partnership"&lt;br /&gt;priority, who openly asserted that the former Soviet&lt;br /&gt;space was an exclusive Russian sphere of geopolitical influence. In&lt;br /&gt;January 1994, he was echoed by the heretofore energetic advocate&lt;br /&gt;of the pro-Western priority, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who&lt;br /&gt;stated that Russia "must preserve its military presence in regions&lt;br /&gt;that have been in its sphere of interest for centuries." In fact,&lt;br /&gt;Izvestiia reported on April 8,1994, that Russia had succeeded in retaining&lt;br /&gt;no fewer than twenty-eight military bases on the soil of the&lt;br /&gt;newly independent states—and a line drawn on a map linking the&lt;br /&gt;Russian military deployments in Kaliningrad, Moldova, Crimea, Armenia,&lt;br /&gt;Tajikistan, and the Kuril Islands would roughly approximate&lt;br /&gt;the outer limits of the former Soviet Union, as in the map on page&lt;br /&gt;108.&lt;br /&gt;In September 1995, President Yeltsin issued an official document&lt;br /&gt;on Russian policy toward the CIS that codified Russian goals&lt;br /&gt;as follows:&lt;br /&gt;The main objective of Russia's policy toward the CIS is to create&lt;br /&gt;an economically and politically integrated association of&lt;br /&gt;states capable of claiming its proper place in the world community&lt;br /&gt;... to consolidate Russia as the leading force in the formation&lt;br /&gt;of a new system of interstate political and economic&lt;br /&gt;relations on the territory of the post-Union space.&lt;br /&gt;108 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;One should note the emphasis placed on the political dimension&lt;br /&gt;of the effort, on the reference to a single entity claiming "its"&lt;br /&gt;place in the world system, and on Russia's dominant role within&lt;br /&gt;that new entity. In keeping with this emphasis, Moscow insisted&lt;br /&gt;that political and military ties between Russia and the newly constituted&lt;br /&gt;CIS also be reinforced: that a common military command&lt;br /&gt;be created; that the armed forces of the CIS states be linked by a&lt;br /&gt;formal treaty; that the "external" borders of the CIS be subject to&lt;br /&gt;centralized (meaning Moscow's) control; that Russian forces play&lt;br /&gt;the decisive role in any peacekeeping actions within the CIS; and&lt;br /&gt;that a common foreign policy be shaped within the CIS, whose&lt;br /&gt;main institutions have come to be located in Moscow (and not in&lt;br /&gt;Minsk, as originally agreed in 1991), with the Russian president presiding&lt;br /&gt;at the CIS summit meetings.&lt;br /&gt;And that was not all. The September 1995 document also declared&lt;br /&gt;that&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 109&lt;br /&gt;Russian television and radio broadcasting in the near abroad&lt;br /&gt;should be guaranteed, the dissemination of Russian press in&lt;br /&gt;the region should be supported, and Russia should train national&lt;br /&gt;cadres for CIS states.&lt;br /&gt;Special attention should be given to restoring Russia's position&lt;br /&gt;as the main educational center on the territory of the&lt;br /&gt;post-Soviet space, bearing in mind the need to educate the&lt;br /&gt;young generation in CIS states in a spirit of friendly relations&lt;br /&gt;with Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Reflecting this mood, in early 1996 the Russian Duma went so&lt;br /&gt;far as to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union to be invalid.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, during spring of the same year, Russia signed two agreements&lt;br /&gt;providing for closer economic and political integration between&lt;br /&gt;Russia and the more accommodating members of the CIS.&lt;br /&gt;One agreement, signed with great pomp and circumstance, in effect&lt;br /&gt;provided for a union between Russia and Belarus within a new&lt;br /&gt;"Community of Sovereign Republics" (the Russian abbreviation&lt;br /&gt;"SSR" was pointedly reminiscent of the Soviet Union's "SSSR"), and&lt;br /&gt;the other—signed by Russia, Kazakstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan—&lt;br /&gt;postulated the creation in the long term of a "Community of&lt;br /&gt;Integrated States." Both initiatives indicated impatience over the&lt;br /&gt;slow progress of integration within the CIS and Russia's determination&lt;br /&gt;to persist in promoting it.&lt;br /&gt;The "near abroad" emphasis on enhancing the central mechanisms&lt;br /&gt;of the CIS thus combined some elements of reliance on objective&lt;br /&gt;economic determinism with a strong dose of subjective&lt;br /&gt;imperial determination. But neither provided a more philosophical&lt;br /&gt;and also a geopolitical answer to the still gnawing question "What&lt;br /&gt;is Russia, what is its true mission and rightful scope?"&lt;br /&gt;It was this void that the increasingly appealing doctrine of&lt;br /&gt;Eurasianism—with its focus also on the "near abroad"—attempted&lt;br /&gt;to fill. The point of departure for this orientation—defined in&lt;br /&gt;rather cultural and even mystical terminology—was the premise&lt;br /&gt;that geopolitically and culturally, Russia is neither quite European&lt;br /&gt;nor quite Asian and that, therefore, it has a distinctive Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;identity of its own. That identity is the legacy of Russia's unique&lt;br /&gt;spatial control over the enormous landmass between Central Europe&lt;br /&gt;and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the legacy of the imperial&lt;br /&gt;statehood that Moscow forged through four centuries of eastward&lt;br /&gt;110 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;expansion. That expansion assimilated into Russia a large non-&lt;br /&gt;Russian and non-European population, creating thereby also a singular&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian political and cultural personality.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasianism as a doctrine was not a post-Soviet emanation. It&lt;br /&gt;first surfaced in the nineteenth century but became more pervasive&lt;br /&gt;in the twentieth, as an articulate alternative to Soviet communism&lt;br /&gt;and as a reaction to the alleged decadence of the West.&lt;br /&gt;Russian Emigres were especially active in propagating the doctrine&lt;br /&gt;as an alternative to Sovietism, realizing that the national awakening&lt;br /&gt;of the non-Russians within the Soviet Union required an overarching&lt;br /&gt;supranational doctrine, lest the eventual fall of communism&lt;br /&gt;lead also to the disintegration of the old Great Russian Empire.&lt;br /&gt;As early as the mid-1920s, this case was articulated persuasively&lt;br /&gt;by Prince N. S. Trubetzkoy, a leading exponent of Eurasianism,&lt;br /&gt;who wrote that&lt;br /&gt;[c]ommunism was in fact a disguised version of Europeanism in&lt;br /&gt;destroying the spiritual foundations and national uniqueness&lt;br /&gt;of Russian life, in propagating there the materialist frame of reference&lt;br /&gt;that actually governs both Europe and America . . .&lt;br /&gt;Our task is to create a completely new culture, our own culture,&lt;br /&gt;which will not resemble European civilization . . . when&lt;br /&gt;Russia ceases to be a distorted reflection of European civilization&lt;br /&gt;. . . when she becomes once again herself: Russia-Eurasia,&lt;br /&gt;the conscious heir to and bearer of the great legacy of Genghis&lt;br /&gt;Khan.e&lt;br /&gt;That view found an eager audience in the confused post-Soviet&lt;br /&gt;setting. On the one hand, communism was condemned as a betrayal&lt;br /&gt;of Russian orthodoxy and of the special, mystical "Russian&lt;br /&gt;idea"; and on the other, westernism was repudiated because the&lt;br /&gt;West, especially America, was seen as corrupt, anti-Russian culturally,&lt;br /&gt;and inclined to deny to Russia its historically and geographically&lt;br /&gt;rooted claim to exclusive control over the Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;landmass.&lt;br /&gt;Eurasianism was given an academic gloss in the much-quoted&lt;br /&gt;writings of Lev Gumilev, a historian, geographer, and ethnogra-&lt;br /&gt;EN. S. Trubetzkoy. "The Legacy of Genghis Khan," Cross Currents 9&lt;br /&gt;(1990):68.&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 111&lt;br /&gt;pher, whose books Medieval Russia and the Great Steppe, The&lt;br /&gt;Rhythms of Eurasia, and The Geography ofEthnos in Historical Time&lt;br /&gt;make a powerful case for the proposition that Eurasia is the natural&lt;br /&gt;geographic setting for the Russian people's distinctive "ethnos,"&lt;br /&gt;the consequence of a historic symbiosis between them and&lt;br /&gt;the non-Russian inhabitants of the open steppes, creating thereby&lt;br /&gt;a unique Eurasian cultural and spiritual identity. Gumilev warned&lt;br /&gt;that adaptation to the West would mean nothing less for the Russian&lt;br /&gt;people than the loss of their own "ethnos and soul."&lt;br /&gt;These views were echoed, though more primitively, by a variety&lt;br /&gt;of Russian nationalist politicians. Yeltsin's former vice president,&lt;br /&gt;Aleksandr Rutskoi, for example, asserted that "it is apparent&lt;br /&gt;from looking at our country's geopolitical situation that Russia&lt;br /&gt;represents the only bridge between Asia and Europe. Whoever becomes&lt;br /&gt;the master of this space will become the master of the&lt;br /&gt;world."7 Yeltsin's 1996 Communist challenger, Gennadii Zyuganov,&lt;br /&gt;despite his Marxist-Leninist vocation, embraced Eurasianism's&lt;br /&gt;mystical emphasis on the special spiritual and missionary role of&lt;br /&gt;the Russian people in the vast spaces of Eurasia, arguing that Russia&lt;br /&gt;was thereby endowed both with a unique cultural vocation and&lt;br /&gt;with a specially advantageous geographic basis for the exercise of&lt;br /&gt;global leadership.&lt;br /&gt;A more sober and pragmatic version of Eurasianism was also&lt;br /&gt;advanced by the leader of Kazakstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Faced&lt;br /&gt;at home with an almost even demographic split between native&lt;br /&gt;Kazaks and Russian settlers and seeking a formula that would&lt;br /&gt;somewhat dilute Moscow's pressures for political integration,&lt;br /&gt;Nazarbayev propagated the concept of the "Eurasian Union" as an&lt;br /&gt;alternative to the faceless and ineffective CIS. Although his version&lt;br /&gt;lacked the mystical content of the more traditional Eurasianist&lt;br /&gt;thinking and certainly did not posit a special missionary role for&lt;br /&gt;the Russians as leaders of Eurasia, it was derived from the notion&lt;br /&gt;that Eurasia—denned geographically in terms analogous to that of&lt;br /&gt;the Soviet Union—constituted an organic whole, which must also&lt;br /&gt;have a political dimension.&lt;br /&gt;To a degree, the attempt to assign to the "near abroad" the&lt;br /&gt;highest priority in Russian geopolitical thinking was justified in the&lt;br /&gt;Interview with {.'Espresso (Rome), July 15, 1994.&lt;br /&gt;112 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;sense that some measure of order and accommodation between&lt;br /&gt;postimperial Russia and the newly independent states was an absolute&lt;br /&gt;necessity, in terms of security and economics. However,&lt;br /&gt;what gave much of the discussion a surrealistic touch was the lingering&lt;br /&gt;notion that in some fashion, whether it came about either&lt;br /&gt;voluntarily (because of economics) or as a consequence of Russia's&lt;br /&gt;eventual recovery of its lost power—not to speak of Russia's&lt;br /&gt;special Eurasian or Slavic mission—the political "integration" of&lt;br /&gt;the former empire was both desirable and feasible.&lt;br /&gt;In this regard, the frequently invoked comparison with the EU&lt;br /&gt;neglects a crucial distinction: the EU, even allowing for Germany's&lt;br /&gt;special influence, is not dominated by a single power that alone&lt;br /&gt;overshadows all the other members combined, in relative GNP,&lt;br /&gt;population, or territory. Nor is the EU the successor to a national&lt;br /&gt;empire, with the liberated members deeply suspicious that "integration"&lt;br /&gt;is a code word for renewed subordination. Even so, one&lt;br /&gt;can easily imagine what the reaction of the European states would&lt;br /&gt;have been if Germany had declared formally that its goal was to&lt;br /&gt;consolidate and expand its leading role in the EU along the lines of&lt;br /&gt;Russia's pronouncement of September 1995 cited earlier.&lt;br /&gt;The analogy with the EU suffers from yet another deficiency.&lt;br /&gt;The open and relatively developed Western European economies&lt;br /&gt;were ready for democratic integration, and the majority of Western&lt;br /&gt;Europeans perceived tangible economic and political benefits in&lt;br /&gt;such integration. The poorer West European countries were also&lt;br /&gt;able to benefit from substantial subsidies. In contrast, the newly&lt;br /&gt;independent states viewed Russia as politically unstable, as still&lt;br /&gt;entertaining domineering ambitions, and, economically, as an obstacle&lt;br /&gt;to their participation in the global economy and to their access&lt;br /&gt;to much-needed foreign investment.&lt;br /&gt;Opposition to Moscow's notions of "integration" was particularly&lt;br /&gt;strong in Ukraine. Its leaders quickly recognized that such&lt;br /&gt;"integration," especially in light of Russian reservations regarding&lt;br /&gt;the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence, would eventually lead&lt;br /&gt;to the loss of national sovereignty. Moreover, the heavy-handed&lt;br /&gt;Russian treatment of the new Ukrainian state—its unwillingness to&lt;br /&gt;grant recognition of Ukraine's borders, its questioning of Ukraine's&lt;br /&gt;right to Crimea, its insistence on exclusive extraterritorial control&lt;br /&gt;over the port of Sevastopol—gave the aroused Ukrainian nationalTHE&lt;br /&gt;BLACK HOLE 113&lt;br /&gt;ism a distinctively anti-Russian edge. The self-definition of Ukrainian&lt;br /&gt;nationhood, during the critical formative stage in the history of&lt;br /&gt;the new state, was thus diverted from its traditional anti-Polish or&lt;br /&gt;anti-Romanian orientation and became focused instead on opposition&lt;br /&gt;to any Russian proposals for a more integrated CIS, for a special&lt;br /&gt;Slavic community (with Russia and Belarus), or for a Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;Union, deciphering them as Russian imperial tactics.&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine's determination to preserve its independence was encouraged&lt;br /&gt;by external support. Although initially the West, especially&lt;br /&gt;the United States, had been tardy in recognizing the&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical importance of a separate Ukrainian state, by the mid-&lt;br /&gt;1990s both America and Germany had become strong backers of&lt;br /&gt;Kiev's separate identity. In July 1996, the U.S. secretary of defense&lt;br /&gt;declared, "I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as an&lt;br /&gt;independent country to the security and stability of all of Europe,"&lt;br /&gt;while in September, the German chancellor—notwithstanding his&lt;br /&gt;strong support for President Yeltsin—went even further in declaring&lt;br /&gt;that "Ukraine's firm place in Europe can no longer be challenged&lt;br /&gt;by anyone . . . No one will be able any more to dispute&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity." American policy&lt;br /&gt;makers also came to describe the American-Ukrainian relationship&lt;br /&gt;as "a strategic partnership," deliberately invoking the same phrase&lt;br /&gt;used to describe the American-Russian relationship.&lt;br /&gt;Without Ukraine, as already noted, an imperial restoration&lt;br /&gt;based either on the CIS or on Eurasianism was not a viable option.&lt;br /&gt;An empire without Ukraine would eventually mean a Russia that&lt;br /&gt;would become more "Asianized" and more remote from Europe.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, Eurasianism was also not especially appealing to the&lt;br /&gt;newly independent Central Asians, few of whom were eager for a&lt;br /&gt;new union with Moscow. Uzbekistan became particularly assertive&lt;br /&gt;in supporting Ukraine's objections to any elevation of the CIS into&lt;br /&gt;a supranational entity and in opposing the Russian initiatives designed&lt;br /&gt;to enhance the CIS.&lt;br /&gt;Other CIS states, also wary of Moscow's intentions, tended to&lt;br /&gt;cluster around Ukraine and Uzbekistan in opposing or evading&lt;br /&gt;Moscow's pressures for closer political and military integration.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, a sense of national consciousness was deepening in almost&lt;br /&gt;alt of the new states, a consciousness increasingly focused&lt;br /&gt;on repudiating past submission to Moscow as colonialism and on&lt;br /&gt;114 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;eradicating its various legacies. Thus, even the ethnically vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan joined the other Central Asian states in abandoning&lt;br /&gt;the Cyrillic alphabet and replacing it with the Latin script as&lt;br /&gt;adapted earlier by Turkey. In effect, by the mid-1990s a bloc, quietly&lt;br /&gt;led by Ukraine and comprising Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan, and sometimes also Kazakstan, Georgia, and Moldova,&lt;br /&gt;had informally emerged to obstruct Russian efforts to use the CIS&lt;br /&gt;as the tool for political integration.&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian insistence on only limited and largely economic integration&lt;br /&gt;had the further effect of depriving the notion of a "Slavic&lt;br /&gt;Union" of any practical meaning. Propagated by some Slavophiles&lt;br /&gt;and given prominence by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's support, this&lt;br /&gt;idea automatically became geopolitically meaningless once it was&lt;br /&gt;repudiated by Ukraine. It left Belarus alone with Russia; and it also&lt;br /&gt;implied a possible partition of Kazakstan, with its Russian-populated&lt;br /&gt;northern regions potentially part of such a union. Such an&lt;br /&gt;option was understandably not reassuring to the new rulers of '&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan and merely intensified the anti-Russian thrust of their&lt;br /&gt;nationalism, In Belarus, a Slavic Union without Ukraine meant&lt;br /&gt;nothing less than incorporation into Russia, thereby also igniting&lt;br /&gt;more volatile feelings of nationalist resentment.&lt;br /&gt;These external obstacles to a "near abroad" policy were powerfully&lt;br /&gt;reinforced by an important internal restraint: the mood of the&lt;br /&gt;Russian people. Despite the rhetoric and the political agitation&lt;br /&gt;among the political elite regarding Russia's special mission in the&lt;br /&gt;space of the former empire, the Russian people—partially out of&lt;br /&gt;sheer fatigue but also out of pure common sense—showed little&lt;br /&gt;enthusiasm for any ambitious program of imperial restoration.&lt;br /&gt;They favored open borders, open trade, freedom of movement,&lt;br /&gt;and special status for the Russian language, but political integration,&lt;br /&gt;especially if it was to involve economic costs or require&lt;br /&gt;bloodshed, evoked little enthusiasm. The disintegration of the&lt;br /&gt;"union" was regretted, its restoration favored; but public reaction&lt;br /&gt;to the war in Chechnya indicated that any policy that went beyond&lt;br /&gt;the application of economic leverage and/or political pressure&lt;br /&gt;would lack popular support.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, the ultimate geopolitical inadequacy of the "near&lt;br /&gt;abroad" priority was that Russia was not strong enough politically&lt;br /&gt;to impose its will and not attractive enough economically to be&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 115&lt;br /&gt;able to seduce the new states. Russian pressure merely made them&lt;br /&gt;seek more external ties, first and foremost with the West but in&lt;br /&gt;some cases also with China and the key Islamic countries to the&lt;br /&gt;south. When Russia threatened to form its own military bloc in response&lt;br /&gt;to NATO's expansion, it begged the question "With whom?"&lt;br /&gt;And it begged the even more painful answer: at the most, maybe&lt;br /&gt;with Belarus and Tajikistan.&lt;br /&gt;The new states, if anything, were increasingly inclined to distrust&lt;br /&gt;even perfectly legitimate and needed forms of economic integration&lt;br /&gt;with Russia, fearing their potential political consequences.&lt;br /&gt;At the same time, the notions of Russia's alleged Eurasian mission&lt;br /&gt;and of the Slavic mystique served only to isolate Russia further&lt;br /&gt;from Europe and, more generally, from the West, thereby perpetuating&lt;br /&gt;the post-Soviet crisis and delaying the needed modernization&lt;br /&gt;and westernization of Russian society along the lines of what Kemal&lt;br /&gt;Ataturk did in Turkey in the wake of the Ottoman Empire's collapse.&lt;br /&gt;The "near abroad" option thus offered Russia not a geopolitical solution&lt;br /&gt;but a geopolitical illusion.&lt;br /&gt;If not a condominium with America and if not the "near abroad,"&lt;br /&gt;then what other geostrategic option was open to Russia? The failure&lt;br /&gt;of the Western orientation to produce the desired global coequality&lt;br /&gt;with America for a "democratic Russia," which was more&lt;br /&gt;a slogan than reality, caused a letdown among the democrats,&lt;br /&gt;whereas the reluctant recognition that "reintegration" of the old&lt;br /&gt;empire was at best a remote possibility tempted some Russian&lt;br /&gt;geopoliticians to toy with the idea of some sort of counteralliance&lt;br /&gt;aimed at America's hegemonic position in Eurasia.&lt;br /&gt;In early 1996, President Yeltsin replaced his Western-oriented&lt;br /&gt;foreign minister, Kozyrev, with the more experienced but also orthodox&lt;br /&gt;former Communist international specialist Evgenniy Primakov,&lt;br /&gt;whose long-standing interest has been Iran and China.&lt;br /&gt;Some Russian commentators speculated that Primakov's orientation&lt;br /&gt;might precipitate an effort to forge a new "antihegemonic"&lt;br /&gt;coalition, formed around the three powers with the greatest&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical stake in reducing America's primacy in Eurasia. Some&lt;br /&gt;of Primakov's initial travel and comments reinforced that impression.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, the existing Sino-franian connection in weapons&lt;br /&gt;trade as well as the Russian inclination to cooperate in Iran's ef116&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;forts to increase its access to nuclear energy seemed to provide a&lt;br /&gt;perfect fit for closer political dialogue and eventual alliance. The&lt;br /&gt;result could, at least theoretically, bring together the world's leading&lt;br /&gt;Slavic power, the world's most militant Islamic power, and the&lt;br /&gt;world's most populated and powerful Asian power, thereby creating&lt;br /&gt;a potent coalition.&lt;br /&gt;The necessary point of departure for any such counterailiance&lt;br /&gt;option involved a renewal of the bilateral Sino-Russian connection,&lt;br /&gt;capitalizing on the resentment among the political elites of both&lt;br /&gt;states over the emergence of America as the only global superpower.&lt;br /&gt;In early 1996, Yeltsin traveled to Beijing and signed a declaration&lt;br /&gt;that explicitly denounced global "hegemonic" tendencies,&lt;br /&gt;thereby implying that the two states would align themselves&lt;br /&gt;against the United States. In December, the Chinese prime minister,&lt;br /&gt;Li Peng, returned the visit, and both sides not only reiterated&lt;br /&gt;their opposition to an international system "dominated by one&lt;br /&gt;power" but also endorsed the reinforcement of existing alliances.&lt;br /&gt;Russian commentators welcomed this development, viewing it as&lt;br /&gt;a positive shift in the global correlation of power and as an appropriate&lt;br /&gt;response to America's sponsorship of NATO's expansion.&lt;br /&gt;Some even sounded gleeful that the Sino-Russian alliance would&lt;br /&gt;give America its deserved comeuppance.&lt;br /&gt;However, a coalition allying Russia with both China and Iran&lt;br /&gt;can develop only if the United States is shortsighted enough to antagonize&lt;br /&gt;China and Iran simultaneously. To be sure, that eventuality&lt;br /&gt;cannot be excluded, and American conduct in 1995-1996&lt;br /&gt;almost seemed consistent with the notion that the United States&lt;br /&gt;was seeking an antagonistic relationship with both Teheran and&lt;br /&gt;Beijing. However, neither Iran nor China was prepared to cast its&lt;br /&gt;lot strategically with a Russia that was both unstable and weak.&lt;br /&gt;Both realized that any such coalition, once it went beyond some&lt;br /&gt;occasional tactical orchestration, would risk their respective access&lt;br /&gt;to the more advanced world, with its exclusive capacity for&lt;br /&gt;investment and with its needed cutting-edge technology. Russia&lt;br /&gt;had too little to offer to make it a truly worthy partner in an antihegemonic&lt;br /&gt;coalition.&lt;br /&gt;In fact, lacking any shared ideology and united merely by an&lt;br /&gt;"antihegemonic" emotion, any such coalition would be essentially&lt;br /&gt;an alliance of a part of the Third World against the most advanced&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 117&lt;br /&gt;portions of the First World. None of its members would gain much,&lt;br /&gt;and China especially would risk losing its enormous investment inflows.&lt;br /&gt;For Russia, too, "the phantom of a Russia-China alliance . . .&lt;br /&gt;would sharply increase the chances that Russia would once again&lt;br /&gt;become restricted from Western technology and capital," as a critical&lt;br /&gt;Russian geopolitician noted.8 The alignment would eventually&lt;br /&gt;condemn all of its participants, whether two or three in number, to&lt;br /&gt;prolonged isolation and shared backwardness.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, China would be the senior partner in any serious&lt;br /&gt;Russian effort to jell such an "antihegemonic" coalition. Being&lt;br /&gt;more populous, more industrious, more innovative, more dynamic,&lt;br /&gt;and harboring some potential territorial designs on Russia,&lt;br /&gt;China would inevitably consign Russia to the status of a junior&lt;br /&gt;partner, while at the same time lacking the means (and probably&lt;br /&gt;any real desire) to help Russia overcome its backwardness. Russia&lt;br /&gt;would thus become a buffer between an expanding Europe and an&lt;br /&gt;expansionist China.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, some Russian foreign affairs experts continued to entertain&lt;br /&gt;the hope that a stalemate in European integration, including&lt;br /&gt;perhaps internal Western disagreements over the future shape of&lt;br /&gt;NATO, might eventually create at least tactical opportunities for a&lt;br /&gt;Russo-German or a Russo-French flirtation, in either case to the&lt;br /&gt;detriment of Europe's transatlantic connection with America. This&lt;br /&gt;perspective was hardly new, for throughout the Cold War, Moscow&lt;br /&gt;periodically tried to play either the German or the French card.&lt;br /&gt;Nonetheless, it was not unreasonable for some of Moscow's&lt;br /&gt;geopoliticians to calculate that a stalemate in European affairs&lt;br /&gt;could create tactical openings that might be exploited to America's&lt;br /&gt;disadvantage.&lt;br /&gt;But that is about all that could thereby be attained: purely tactical&lt;br /&gt;options. Neither France nor Germany is likely to forsake the&lt;br /&gt;American connection. An occasional flirtation, especially with the&lt;br /&gt;French, focused on some narrow issue, cannot be excluded—but a&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical reversal of alliances would have to be preceded by a&lt;br /&gt;massive upheaval in European affairs, a breakdown in European&lt;br /&gt;unification and in transatlantic ties. And even then, it is unlikely&lt;br /&gt;"Aleksei Bogaturov. "Current Relations and Prospects for Interaction Between&lt;br /&gt;Russia and the United States," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 28,1996.&lt;br /&gt;118 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;that the European states would be inclined to pursue a truly comprehensive&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical alignment with a disoriented Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, none of the counteralliance options, in the final analysis,&lt;br /&gt;offer a viable alternative. The solution to Russia's new geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;dilemmas will not be found in counteralliance, nor will it come&lt;br /&gt;about through the illusion of a coequal strategic partnership with&lt;br /&gt;America or in the effort to create some new politically and economically&lt;br /&gt;"integrated" structure in the space of the former Soviet&lt;br /&gt;Union. All evade the only choice that is in fact open to Russia.&lt;br /&gt;THE DILEMMA OF THE ONE ALTERNATIVE&lt;br /&gt;Russia's only real geostrategic option—the option that could give&lt;br /&gt;Russia a realistic international role and also maximize the opportunity&lt;br /&gt;of transforming and socially modernizing itself—is Europe.&lt;br /&gt;And not just any Europe, but the transatlantic Europe of the enlarging&lt;br /&gt;EU and NATO. Such a Europe is taking shape, as we have&lt;br /&gt;seen in chapter 3, and it is also likely to remain linked closely to&lt;br /&gt;America. That is the Europe to which Russia will have to relate, if it&lt;br /&gt;is to avoid dangerous geopolitical isolation.&lt;br /&gt;For America, Russia is much too weak to be a partner but still&lt;br /&gt;too strong to be simply its patient. It is more likely to become a&lt;br /&gt;problem, unless America fosters a setting that helps to convince&lt;br /&gt;the Russians that the best choice for their country is an increasingly&lt;br /&gt;organic connection with a transatlantic Europe. Although a&lt;br /&gt;long-term Russo-Chinese and Russo-Iranian strategic alliance is&lt;br /&gt;not likely, it is obviously important for America to avoid policies&lt;br /&gt;that could distract Russia from making the needed geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;choice. To the extent possible, American relations with China and&lt;br /&gt;Iran should, therefore, be formulated with their impact on Russian&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical calculations also kept in mind. Perpetuating illusions&lt;br /&gt;regarding grand geostrategic options can only delay the historic&lt;br /&gt;choice that Russia must make in order to bring to an end its deep&lt;br /&gt;malaise.&lt;br /&gt;Only a Russia that is willing to accept the new realities of Europe,&lt;br /&gt;both economic and geopolitical, will be able to benefit internally&lt;br /&gt;from the enlarging scope of transcontinental European&lt;br /&gt;cooperation in commerce, communications, investment, and eduTHE&lt;br /&gt;BLACK HOLE 119&lt;br /&gt;cation. Russia's participation in the Council of Europe is thus a&lt;br /&gt;step very much in the right direction. It is a foretaste of further institutional&lt;br /&gt;links between the new Russia and the growing Europe.&lt;br /&gt;It also implies that if Russia pursues this path, it will have no&lt;br /&gt;choice other than eventually to emulate the course chosen by&lt;br /&gt;post-Ottoman Turkey, when it decided to shed its imperial ambitions&lt;br /&gt;and embarked very deliberately on the road of modernization,&lt;br /&gt;Europeanization, and democratization.&lt;br /&gt;No other option can offer Russia the benefits that a modern,&lt;br /&gt;rich, and democratic Europe linked to. America can. Europe and&lt;br /&gt;America are not a threat to a Russia that is a nonexpansive national&lt;br /&gt;and democratic state. They have no territorial designs on Russia,&lt;br /&gt;which China someday might have, nor do they share an insecure&lt;br /&gt;and potentially violent frontier, which is certainly the case with&lt;br /&gt;Russia's ethnically and territorially unclear border with the Muslim&lt;br /&gt;nations to the south. On the contrary, for Europe as well as for&lt;br /&gt;America, a national and democratic Russia is a geopolitically desirable&lt;br /&gt;entity, a source of stability in the volatile Eurasian complex.&lt;br /&gt;Russia consequently faces the dilemma that the choice in favor&lt;br /&gt;of Europe and America, in order for it to yield tangible benefits, requires,&lt;br /&gt;first of all, a clear-cut abjuration of the imperial past and,&lt;br /&gt;second, no tergiversation regarding the enlarging Europe's political&lt;br /&gt;and security links with America. The first requirement means&lt;br /&gt;accommodation to the geopolitical pluralism that has come to&lt;br /&gt;prevail in the space of the former Soviet Union. Such accommodation&lt;br /&gt;does not exclude economic cooperation, rather on the model&lt;br /&gt;of the old European Free Trade Area, but it cannot include limits on&lt;br /&gt;the political sovereignty of the new states—for the simple reason&lt;br /&gt;that they do not wish it. Most important in that respect is the need&lt;br /&gt;for clear and unambiguous acceptance by Russia of Ukraine's separate&lt;br /&gt;existence, of its borders, and of its distinctive national identity.&lt;br /&gt;The second requirement may be even more difficult to swallow.&lt;br /&gt;A truly cooperative relationship with the transatlantic community&lt;br /&gt;cannot be based on the notion that those democratic states of Europe&lt;br /&gt;that wish to be part of it can be excluded because of a Russian&lt;br /&gt;say-so. The expansion of that community need not be rushed,&lt;br /&gt;and it certainly should not be promoted on an anti-Russian theme.&lt;br /&gt;But neither can it, nor should it, be halted by a political fiat that itself&lt;br /&gt;reflects an antiquated notion of European security relations. An&lt;br /&gt;120 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;expanding and democratic Europe has to be an open-ended historical&lt;br /&gt;process, not subject to politically arbitrary geographic limits.&lt;br /&gt;For many Russians, the dilemma of the one alternative may at&lt;br /&gt;first, and for some time to come, be too difficult to resolve. It will&lt;br /&gt;require an enormous act of political will and perhaps also an outstanding&lt;br /&gt;leader, capable of making the choice and articulating the&lt;br /&gt;vision of a democratic, national, truly modern and European Russia.&lt;br /&gt;That may not happen for some time. Overcoming the post-&lt;br /&gt;Communist and postimperial crises will require not only more&lt;br /&gt;time than is the case with the post-Communist transformation of&lt;br /&gt;Central Europe but also the emergence of a farsighted and stable&lt;br /&gt;political leadership. No Russian Ataturk is now in sight. Nonetheless,&lt;br /&gt;Russians will eventually have to come to recognize that Russia's&lt;br /&gt;national redefinition is not an act of capitulation but one of&lt;br /&gt;liberation.9 They will have to accept that what Yeltsin said in Kiev&lt;br /&gt;in 1990 about a nonimperial future for Russia was absolutely on&lt;br /&gt;the mark. And a genuinely nonimperial Russia will still be a great&lt;br /&gt;power, spanning Eurasia, the world's largest territorial unit by far.&lt;br /&gt;In any case, a redefinition of "What is Russia and where is Russia"&lt;br /&gt;will probably occur only by stages, and it will require a wise&lt;br /&gt;and firm Western posture. America and Europe will have to help.&lt;br /&gt;They should offer Russia not only a special treaty or charter with&lt;br /&gt;NATO, but they should also begin the process of exploring with&lt;br /&gt;Russia the shaping of an eventual transcontinental system of security&lt;br /&gt;and cooperation that goes considerably beyond the loose&lt;br /&gt;structure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe&lt;br /&gt;(OSCE). And if Russia consolidates its internal democratic institutions&lt;br /&gt;and makes tangible progress in free-market-based&lt;br /&gt;economic development, its ever-closer association with NATO and&lt;br /&gt;the EU should not be ruled out.&lt;br /&gt;At the same time, it is equally important for the West, especially&lt;br /&gt;for America, to pursue policies that perpetuate the dilemma&lt;br /&gt;of the one alternative for Russia. The political and economic stabilization&lt;br /&gt;of the new post-Soviet states is a major factor in necessitating&lt;br /&gt;Russia's historical self-redefinition. Hence, support for the&lt;br /&gt;'In early 1996, General AJeksandr Lebed published a remarkable article&lt;br /&gt;("The Fading of Empire or the Rebirth of Russia," Segodnya, April 26, 1996)&lt;br /&gt;that went a long way toward making that case.&lt;br /&gt;THE BLACK HOLE 121&lt;br /&gt;new post-Soviet states—for geopolitical pluralism in the space of&lt;br /&gt;the former Soviet empire—has to be an integral part of a policy designed&lt;br /&gt;to induce Russia to exercise unambiguously its European&lt;br /&gt;option. Among these states, three are geopolitically especially important:&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.&lt;br /&gt;An independent Azerbaijan can serve as a corridor for Western&lt;br /&gt;access to the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. Conversely,&lt;br /&gt;a subdued Azerbaijan would mean that Central Asia can&lt;br /&gt;be sealed off from the outside world and thus rendered politically&lt;br /&gt;vulnerable to Russian pressures for reiritegration. Uzbekistan, nationally&lt;br /&gt;the most vital and the most populous of the Central Asian&lt;br /&gt;states, represents a major obstacle to any renewed Russian control&lt;br /&gt;over the region. Its independence is critical to the survival of&lt;br /&gt;the other Central Asian states, and it is the least vulnerable to&lt;br /&gt;Russian pressures.&lt;br /&gt;Most important, however, is Ukraine. As the EU and NATO expand,&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine will eventually be in the position to choose whether&lt;br /&gt;it wishes to be part of either organization. It is likely that, in order&lt;br /&gt;to reinforce its separate status, Ukraine will wish to join both, once&lt;br /&gt;they border upon it and once its own internal transformation begins&lt;br /&gt;to qualify it for membership. Although that will take time, it is&lt;br /&gt;not too early for the West—while further enhancing its economic&lt;br /&gt;and security ties with Kiev—to begin pointing to the decade&lt;br /&gt;2005-2015 as a reasonable time frame for the initiation of Ukraine's&lt;br /&gt;progressive inclusion, thereby reducing the risk that the Ukrainians&lt;br /&gt;may fear that Europe's expansion will halt on the Polish-&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian border.&lt;br /&gt;Russia, despite its protestations, is likely to acquiesce in the&lt;br /&gt;expansion of NATO in 1999 to include several Central European&lt;br /&gt;countries, because the cultural and social gap between Russia and&lt;br /&gt;Central Europe has widened so much since the fall of communism.&lt;br /&gt;By contrast, Russia will find it incomparably harder to acquiesce in&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine's accession to NATO, for to do so would be to acknowledge&lt;br /&gt;that Ukraine's destiny is no longer organically linked to Russia's.&lt;br /&gt;Yet if Ukraine is to survive as an independent state, it will&lt;br /&gt;have to become part of Central Europe rather than Eurasia, and if&lt;br /&gt;it is to be part of Central Europe, then it will have to partake fully&lt;br /&gt;of Central Europe's links to NATO and the European Union. Russia's&lt;br /&gt;acceptance of these links would then define Russia's own decision&lt;br /&gt;122 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;to be also truly a part of Europe. Russia's refusal would be tantamount&lt;br /&gt;to the rejection of Europe in favor of a solitary "Eurasian"&lt;br /&gt;identity and existence.&lt;br /&gt;The key point to bear in mind is that Russia cannot be in Europe&lt;br /&gt;without Ukraine also being in Europe, whereas Ukraine can&lt;br /&gt;be in Europe without Russia being in Europe. Assuming that Russia&lt;br /&gt;decides to cast its lot with Europe, it follows that ultimately it is in&lt;br /&gt;Russia's own interest that Ukraine be included in the expanding&lt;br /&gt;European structures. Indeed, Ukraine's relationship to Europe&lt;br /&gt;could be the turning point for Russia itself. But that also means&lt;br /&gt;that the defining moment for Russia's relationship to Europe is still&lt;br /&gt;some time off—"defining" in the sense that Ukraine's choice in favor&lt;br /&gt;of Europe will bring to a head Russia's decision regarding the&lt;br /&gt;next phase of its history: either to be a part of Europe as well or to&lt;br /&gt;become a Eurasian outcast, neither truly of Europe nor Asia and&lt;br /&gt;mired in its "near abroad" conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;It is to be hoped that a cooperative relationship between an enlarging&lt;br /&gt;Europe and Russia can move from formal bilateral links to&lt;br /&gt;more organic and binding economic, political, and security ties. In&lt;br /&gt;that manner, in the course of the first two decades of the next century,&lt;br /&gt;Russia could increasingly become an integral part of a Europe&lt;br /&gt;that embraces not only Ukraine but reaches to the Urals and even&lt;br /&gt;beyond. An association or even some form of membership for Russia&lt;br /&gt;in the European and transatlantic structures would in turn&lt;br /&gt;open the doors to the inclusion of the three Caucasian countries—&lt;br /&gt;Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—that so desperately aspire to a&lt;br /&gt;European connection.&lt;br /&gt;One cannot predict how fast that process can move, but one&lt;br /&gt;thing is certain: it will move faster if a geopolitical context is&lt;br /&gt;shaped that propels Russia in that direction, while foreclosing&lt;br /&gt;other temptations. And the faster Russia moves toward Europe,&lt;br /&gt;the sooner the black hole of Eurasia will be filled by a society that&lt;br /&gt;is increasingly modern and democratic. Indeed, for Russia the&lt;br /&gt;dilemma of the one alternative is no longer a matter of making a&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical choice but of facing up to the imperatives of survival.&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 5&lt;br /&gt;The&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;Balkans&lt;br /&gt;IN EUROPE, THE WORD "BALKANS" conjures up images of ethnic&lt;br /&gt;conflicts and great-power regional rivalries. Eurasia, too, has its&lt;br /&gt;"Balkans," but the Eurasian Balkans are much larger, more populated,&lt;br /&gt;even more religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. They&lt;br /&gt;are located within that large geographic oblong that demarcates&lt;br /&gt;the central zone of global instability identified in chapter 2 and&lt;br /&gt;that embraces portions of southeastern Europe, Central Asia and&lt;br /&gt;parts of South Asia, the Persian Gulf area, and the Middle East.&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Balkans form the inner core of that large oblong&lt;br /&gt;(see map on page 124), and they differ from its outer zone in one&lt;br /&gt;particularly significant way: they are a power vacuum. Although&lt;br /&gt;most of the states located in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East&lt;br /&gt;are also unstable, American power is that region's ultimate arbiter.&lt;br /&gt;The unstable region in the outer zone is thus an area of single&lt;br /&gt;power hegemony and is tempered by that hegemony. In contrast,&lt;br /&gt;the Eurasian Balkans are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar&lt;br /&gt;Balkans of southeastern Europe: not only are its political entities&lt;br /&gt;unstable but they tempt and invite the intrusion of more&lt;br /&gt;powerful neighbors, each of whom is determined to oppose the re-&lt;br /&gt;123&lt;br /&gt;124 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Zona 01 instability&lt;br /&gt;Flasli points&lt;br /&gt;gion's domination by another. It is this familiar combination of a&lt;br /&gt;power vacuum and power suction that justifies the appellation&lt;br /&gt;"Eurasian Balkans."&lt;br /&gt;The traditional Balkans represented a potential geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;prize in the struggle for European supremacy. The Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;Balkans, astride the inevitably emerging transportation network&lt;br /&gt;meant to link more directly Eurasia's richest and most industrious&lt;br /&gt;western and eastern extremities, are also geopolitically significant.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, they are of importance from the standpoint of security&lt;br /&gt;and historical ambitions to at least three of their most immediate&lt;br /&gt;and more powerful neighbors, namely, Russia, Turkey, and Iran,&lt;br /&gt;with China also signaling an increasing political interest in the region.&lt;br /&gt;But the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely more important as a&lt;br /&gt;potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural&lt;br /&gt;gas and oil reserves is located in the region, in addition to important&lt;br /&gt;minerals, including gold.&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 125&lt;br /&gt;The world's energy consumption is bound to vastly increase&lt;br /&gt;over the next two or three decades. Estimates by the U.S. Department&lt;br /&gt;of Energy anticipate that world demand will rise by more&lt;br /&gt;than 50 percent between 1993 and 2015, with the most significant&lt;br /&gt;increase in consumption occurring in the Far East. The momentum&lt;br /&gt;of Asia's economic development is already generating massive&lt;br /&gt;pressures for the exploration and exploitation of new sources of&lt;br /&gt;energy, and the Central Asian region and the Caspian Sea basin are&lt;br /&gt;known to contain reserves of natural gas and oil that dwarf those&lt;br /&gt;of Kuwait, the Gulf of Mexico, or the North Sea.&lt;br /&gt;Access to that resource and sharing in its potential wealth represent&lt;br /&gt;objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate corporate&lt;br /&gt;interests, rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations,&lt;br /&gt;and fuel international rivalries. The situation is made all the more&lt;br /&gt;volatile by the fact that the region is not only a power vacuum but&lt;br /&gt;is also internally unstable. Every one of its countries suffers from&lt;br /&gt;serious internal difficulties, all of them have frontiers that are either&lt;br /&gt;the object of claims by neighbors or are zones of ethnic resentment,&lt;br /&gt;few are nationally homogeneous, and some are already&lt;br /&gt;embroiled in territorial, ethnic, or religious violence.&lt;br /&gt;THE ETHNIC CAULDRON&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Balkans include nine countries that one way or another&lt;br /&gt;fit the foregoing description, with two others as potential&lt;br /&gt;candidates. The nine are Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—all of&lt;br /&gt;them formerly part of the defunct Soviet Union—as well as&lt;br /&gt;Afghanistan. The potential additions to the list are Turkey and&lt;br /&gt;Iran, both of them much more politically and economically viable,&lt;br /&gt;both active contestants for regional influence within the Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;Balkans, and thus both significant geostrategic players in the region.&lt;br /&gt;At the same time, both are potentially vulnerable to internal&lt;br /&gt;ethnic conflicts. If either or both of them were to be destabilized,&lt;br /&gt;the internal problems of the region would become unmanageable,&lt;br /&gt;while efforts to restrain regional domination by Russia could even&lt;br /&gt;become futile.&lt;br /&gt;The three states of the Caucasus—Armenia, Georgia, and AzerPopulation&lt;br /&gt;(Million. '95)&lt;br /&gt;Life&lt;br /&gt;Expectancy&lt;br /&gt;Ethnic&lt;br /&gt;Divisions&lt;br /&gt;f95esL)&lt;br /&gt;GDP&lt;br /&gt;($ billion)*&lt;br /&gt;Major&lt;br /&gt;Exports:&lt;br /&gt;*Purchaslne DO&lt;br /&gt;Afghanistan&lt;br /&gt;21.3&lt;br /&gt;45.4&lt;br /&gt;Pashtun&lt;br /&gt;(38%)&lt;br /&gt;Tajik&lt;br /&gt;(25%)&lt;br /&gt;Hazara&lt;br /&gt;(19%)&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(CIQ&lt;br /&gt;&lt;&lt;br /&gt;NA&lt;br /&gt;Wheat&lt;br /&gt;Livestock&lt;br /&gt;Fruits&lt;br /&gt;Carpets&lt;br /&gt;Wool&lt;br /&gt;Gems&lt;br /&gt;wer Darltv: '94.&lt;br /&gt;Armenia&lt;br /&gt;3.6&lt;br /&gt;72.4&lt;br /&gt;Armenian&lt;br /&gt;(93%)&lt;br /&gt;Azeri&lt;br /&gt;(3%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(2%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(2%)&lt;br /&gt;8.1&lt;br /&gt;Gold&lt;br /&gt;Aluminum&lt;br /&gt;Transport eq.&lt;br /&gt;Elec. eq.&lt;br /&gt;as extraDolated ire&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;7.8&lt;br /&gt;71.1&lt;br /&gt;Azeri&lt;br /&gt;(90%)&lt;br /&gt;Dagestani&lt;br /&gt;(3.2%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(2.5%)&lt;br /&gt;Armenian&lt;br /&gt;(2.3%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(2%)&lt;br /&gt;13.8&lt;br /&gt;Oil, Gas&lt;br /&gt;Chemicals&lt;br /&gt;Oilfield eq.&lt;br /&gt;Textiles&lt;br /&gt;Cotton&lt;br /&gt;m World Bank &lt;&lt;br /&gt;Georgia&lt;br /&gt;5.7&lt;br /&gt;73.1&lt;br /&gt;Georgian&lt;br /&gt;(70.1%)&lt;br /&gt;Armenian&lt;br /&gt;(8.1%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(6.3%)&lt;br /&gt;Azeri&lt;br /&gt;(5.7%)&lt;br /&gt;Os set Ian&lt;br /&gt;(3%)&lt;br /&gt;Abkhaz&lt;br /&gt;(1.8%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(5%)&lt;br /&gt;6.0&lt;br /&gt;Citrus fruits&lt;br /&gt;Tea&lt;br /&gt;Wine&lt;br /&gt;Machinery&lt;br /&gt;Ferrous m.&lt;br /&gt;Non-ferrous&lt;br /&gt;m.&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;17.4&lt;br /&gt;68.3&lt;br /&gt;Kazak&lt;br /&gt;(41.9%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(37%)&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian&lt;br /&gt;(5.2%)&lt;br /&gt;German&lt;br /&gt;(4.7%)&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(2.1%)&lt;br /&gt;Tatar&lt;br /&gt;(2%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(7%)&lt;br /&gt;55.2&lt;br /&gt;Oil&lt;br /&gt;Ferrous m.&lt;br /&gt;NonJerrous m.&lt;br /&gt;Chemicals&lt;br /&gt;Grain&lt;br /&gt;Wool&lt;br /&gt;Meat&lt;br /&gt;Coal&lt;br /&gt;Kyrgyzstan&lt;br /&gt;4.8&lt;br /&gt;68.1&lt;br /&gt;Kyrgyz&lt;br /&gt;(52.4%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(21.5%)&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(12.9%)&lt;br /&gt;Ukrainian&lt;br /&gt;(2.5%)&lt;br /&gt;German&lt;br /&gt;(2.4%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(8.3%)&lt;br /&gt;8.4&lt;br /&gt;Wool&lt;br /&gt;Chemicals&lt;br /&gt;Cotton&lt;br /&gt;Ferrous m.&lt;br /&gt;Non-ferrous m.&lt;br /&gt;Shoes&lt;br /&gt;Machinery&lt;br /&gt;Tobacco&lt;br /&gt;st. for 1992. "Turkmenistan is the world's tenth Ian&lt;br /&gt;Tajikistan&lt;br /&gt;6.2&lt;br /&gt;69.0&lt;br /&gt;Tajik&lt;br /&gt;(64.9%)&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(25%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(3.5%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(6.6%)&lt;br /&gt;8.5&lt;br /&gt;Cotton&lt;br /&gt;Aluminum&lt;br /&gt;Fruits&lt;br /&gt;Vegetable oil&lt;br /&gt;Textiles&lt;br /&gt;rest cotton prod&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;4.1&lt;br /&gt;65.4&lt;br /&gt;Turkmen&lt;br /&gt;(73.3%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(9.8%)&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(9%)&lt;br /&gt;Kazak&lt;br /&gt;(2%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(5.9%)&lt;br /&gt;13.1&lt;br /&gt;Natural gas&lt;br /&gt;Cotton**&lt;br /&gt;Petroleum&lt;br /&gt;prod."&lt;br /&gt;Electricity&lt;br /&gt;Textiles&lt;br /&gt;Carpets&lt;br /&gt;uter. It has the&lt;br /&gt;23.1&lt;br /&gt;68.8&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek&lt;br /&gt;(71.4%)&lt;br /&gt;Russian&lt;br /&gt;(8.3%)&lt;br /&gt;Tajik&lt;br /&gt;(4.7%)&lt;br /&gt;Kazak&lt;br /&gt;(4.1%)&lt;br /&gt;Tatar&lt;br /&gt;(2.4%)&lt;br /&gt;Karakalpak&lt;br /&gt;(2.1%)&lt;br /&gt;Other&lt;br /&gt;(7%)&lt;br /&gt;54.5&lt;br /&gt;Cotton&lt;br /&gt;Gold&lt;br /&gt;Natural gas&lt;br /&gt;Mineral&lt;br /&gt;fertilizers&lt;br /&gt;Ferrous metals&lt;br /&gt;Textiles&lt;br /&gt;Food products&lt;br /&gt;world's fifth largest&lt;br /&gt;reserves of natural gas ahd significant oil reserves.&lt;br /&gt;128 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;baijan—can be said to be based on truly historic nations. As a result,&lt;br /&gt;their nationalisms tend to be both pervasive and intense,&lt;br /&gt;and external conflicts have tended to be the key challenge to their&lt;br /&gt;well-being. The five new Central Asian states, by contrast, can be&lt;br /&gt;said to be rather more in the nation-building phase, with tribal&lt;br /&gt;and ethnic identities still strong, making internal dissension the&lt;br /&gt;major difficulty. In either type of state, these vulnerabilities have&lt;br /&gt;tempted exploitation by their more powerful and imperially&lt;br /&gt;minded neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;The Eurasian Balkans are an ethnic mosaic (see preceding table&lt;br /&gt;and map), The frontiers of its states were drawn arbitrarily by Soviet&lt;br /&gt;cartographers in the 1920s and 1930s, when the respective Soviet&lt;br /&gt;republics were formally established. (Afghanistan, never&lt;br /&gt;having been part of the Soviet Union, is the exception.) Their borders&lt;br /&gt;were carved out largely on the ethnic principle, but they also&lt;br /&gt;reflected the Kremlin's interest in keeping the southern region of&lt;br /&gt;the Russian Empire internally divided and thus more subservient.&lt;br /&gt;Accordingly, Moscow rejected proposals by Central Asian nationalists&lt;br /&gt;to meld the various Central Asian peoples (most of&lt;br /&gt;whom were not yet nationalistically motivated) into a single political&lt;br /&gt;unit—to be called "Turkestan"—preferring instead to create&lt;br /&gt;five separate "republics," each with a distinctive new name and jigsaw&lt;br /&gt;borders. Presumably out of a similar calculation, the Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;abandoned plans for a single Caucasian federation. Therefore, it is&lt;br /&gt;not surprising that, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither&lt;br /&gt;the three states of the Caucasus nor the five states of Central Asia&lt;br /&gt;were fully prepared for their newly independent status nor for the&lt;br /&gt;needed regional cooperation.&lt;br /&gt;In the Caucasus, Armenia's less than 4 million people and Azerbaijan's&lt;br /&gt;more than 8 million promptly became embroiled in open&lt;br /&gt;warfare over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a largely Armenianpopulated&lt;br /&gt;enclave within Azerbaijan. The conflict generated largescale&lt;br /&gt;ethnic cleansings, with hundreds of thousands of refugees&lt;br /&gt;and expellees fleeing in both directions. Given the fact that Armenia&lt;br /&gt;is Christian and Azerbaijan Muslim, the war has some overtones&lt;br /&gt;of a religious conflict. The economically devastating war&lt;br /&gt;made it much more difficult for either country to establish itself as&lt;br /&gt;stably independent. Armenia was driven to rely more on Russia,&lt;br /&gt;which had provided significant military help, while Azerbaijan's&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 129&lt;br /&gt;new independence and internal stability were compromised by the&lt;br /&gt;loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan's vulnerability has wider regional implications because&lt;br /&gt;the country's location makes it a geopolitical pivot. It can&lt;br /&gt;be described as the vitally important "cork" controlling access to&lt;br /&gt;the "bottle" that contains the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and&lt;br /&gt;Central Asia. An independent, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, with&lt;br /&gt;pipelines running from it to the ethnically related and politically&lt;br /&gt;supportive Turkey, would prevent Russia from exercising a monopoly&lt;br /&gt;on access to the region and would thus also deprive Russia&lt;br /&gt;of decisive political leverage over the policies of the new&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian states. Yet Azerbaijan is very vulnerable to pressures&lt;br /&gt;from powerful Russia to the north and from Iran to the&lt;br /&gt;south. There are twice as many Azeris—some estimate as many&lt;br /&gt;as 20 million—living in northwestern Iran as in Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;proper. That reality makes Iran fearful of potential separatism&lt;br /&gt;among its Azeris and hence quite ambivalent regarding Azerbaijan's&lt;br /&gt;sovereign status, despite the two nations' shared Muslim&lt;br /&gt;faith. As a result, Azerbaijan has become the object of combined&lt;br /&gt;Russian and Iranian pressures to restrict its dealings with the&lt;br /&gt;West.&lt;br /&gt;Unlike either Armenia or Azerbaijan, both of which are ethnically&lt;br /&gt;quite homogeneous, about 30 percent of Georgia's 6 million&lt;br /&gt;people are minorities. Moreover, these small communities, rather&lt;br /&gt;tribal in organization and identity, have intensely resented Georgian&lt;br /&gt;domination. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ossetians&lt;br /&gt;and the Abkhazians therefore took advantage of internal&lt;br /&gt;Georgian political strife to attempt secession, which Russia quietly&lt;br /&gt;backed in order to compel Georgia to accede to Russian pressures&lt;br /&gt;to remain within the CIS (from which Georgia initially wanted to secede&lt;br /&gt;altogether) and to accept Russian military bases on Georgian&lt;br /&gt;soil in order to seal the area off from Turkey.&lt;br /&gt;In Central Asia, internal factors have been more significant in&lt;br /&gt;promoting instability. Culturally and linguistically, four of the five&lt;br /&gt;newly independent Central Asian states are part of the Turkic&lt;br /&gt;world. Tajikistan is linguistically and culturally Persian, while&lt;br /&gt;Afghanistan (outside of the former Soviet Union) is a Pathan, Tajik,&lt;br /&gt;Pashtun, and Persian ethnic mosaic. All six countries are Muslim.&lt;br /&gt;Most of them, over the years, were under the passing influence of&lt;br /&gt;130 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;the Persian, Turkish, and Russian empires, but that experience has&lt;br /&gt;not served to foster a spirit of a shared regional interest among&lt;br /&gt;them. On the contrary, their diverse ethnic composition makes&lt;br /&gt;them vulnerable to internal and external conflicts, which cumulatively&lt;br /&gt;tempt intrusion by more powerful neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;Of the five newly independent Central Asian states, Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;and Uzbekistan are the most important. Regionally, Kazakstan is&lt;br /&gt;the shield and Uzbekistan is the soul for the region's diverse national&lt;br /&gt;awakenings. Kazakstan's geographic size and location shelter&lt;br /&gt;the others from direct Russian * physical pressure, since&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan alone borders on Russia. However, its population of&lt;br /&gt;about 18 million is approximately 35 percent Russian (the Russian&lt;br /&gt;population throughout the area is steadily declining), with another&lt;br /&gt;20 percent also non-Kazak, a fact that has made it much more difficult&lt;br /&gt;for the new Kazak rulers—themselves increasingly nationalistic&lt;br /&gt;but representing only about one-half of the country's total&lt;br /&gt;population—to pursue the goal of nation building on the basis of&lt;br /&gt;ethnicity and language.&lt;br /&gt;The Russians residing in the new state are naturally resentful of&lt;br /&gt;the new Kazak leadership, and being the formerly ruling colonial&lt;br /&gt;class and thus also better educated and situated, they are fearful&lt;br /&gt;of the loss of privilege. Furthermore, they tend to view the new&lt;br /&gt;Kazak nationalism with barely concealed cultural disdain. With&lt;br /&gt;both the northwestern and northeastern regions of Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;heavily dominated by Russian colonists, Kazakstan would face the&lt;br /&gt;danger of territorial secession if Kazak-Russian relations were to&lt;br /&gt;deteriorate seriously. At the same time, several hundred thousand&lt;br /&gt;Kazaks reside on the Russian side of the state borders and in&lt;br /&gt;northeastern Uzbekistan, the state that the Kazaks view as their&lt;br /&gt;principal rival for Central Asian leadership.&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan is, in fact, the prime candidate for regional leadership&lt;br /&gt;in Central Asia. Although smaller in size and iess endowed&lt;br /&gt;with natural resources than Kazakstan, it has a larger population&lt;br /&gt;(nearly 25 million) and, much more important, a considerably&lt;br /&gt;more homogeneous population than Kazakstan's. Given higher indigenous&lt;br /&gt;birthrates and the gradual exodus of the formerly dominant&lt;br /&gt;Russians, soon about 75 percent of its people will be Uzbek,&lt;br /&gt;with only an insignificant Russian minority remaining largely in&lt;br /&gt;Tashkent, the capital.&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 131&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, the country's political elite deliberately identifies&lt;br /&gt;the new state as the direct descendant of the vast medieval empire&lt;br /&gt;of Tamerlane (1336-1404), whose capital, Samarkand, became the&lt;br /&gt;region's renowned center for the study of religion, astronomy, and&lt;br /&gt;the arts. This lineage imbues modern Uzbekistan with a deeper&lt;br /&gt;sense of historical continuity and regional mission than its neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, some Uzbek leaders see Uzbekistan as the national&lt;br /&gt;core of a single Central Asian entity, presumably with Tashkent as&lt;br /&gt;its capital. More than in any of the other Central Asian states,&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan's political elite and increasingly also its people, already&lt;br /&gt;partake of the subjective makings of a modern nation-state and are&lt;br /&gt;determined—domestic difficulties notwithstanding—never to revert&lt;br /&gt;to colonial status.&lt;br /&gt;That condition makes Uzbekistan both the leader in fostering a&lt;br /&gt;sense of post-ethnic modern nationalism and an object of some uneasiness&lt;br /&gt;among its neighbors. Even as the Uzbek leaders set the&lt;br /&gt;pace in nation building and in the advocacy of greater regional selfsufficiency,&lt;br /&gt;the country's relatively greater national homogeneity&lt;br /&gt;and more intense national consciousness inspire fear among the&lt;br /&gt;rulers of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;that Uzbek regional leadership could evolve into Uzbek regional&lt;br /&gt;domination. That concern inhibits regional cooperation&lt;br /&gt;among the newly sovereign states—which is not encouraged by&lt;br /&gt;the Russians in any case—and perpetuates regional vulnerability.&lt;br /&gt;However, like the others, Uzbekistan is not entirely free of ethnic&lt;br /&gt;tensions. Parts of southern Uzbekistan, particularly around the&lt;br /&gt;historically and culturally important centers of Samarkand and&lt;br /&gt;Bukhara, have significant Tajik populations, which remain resentful&lt;br /&gt;of the frontiers drawn by Moscow. Complicating matters further&lt;br /&gt;is the presence of Uzbeks in western Tajikistan and of both&lt;br /&gt;Uzbeks and Tajiks in Kyrgyzstan's economically important Fergana&lt;br /&gt;Valley (where in recent years bloody ethnic violence has erupted),&lt;br /&gt;not to mention the presence of Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan.&lt;br /&gt;Of the other three Central Asian states that have emerged from&lt;br /&gt;Russian colonial rule—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—&lt;br /&gt;only the third is relatively cohesive ethnically. Approximately 75&lt;br /&gt;percent of its 4.5 million people are Turkmen, with Uzbeks and&lt;br /&gt;Russians each accounting for less than 10 percent. Turkmenistan's&lt;br /&gt;shielded geographic location makes it relatively remote from Rus132&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;sia, with Uzbekistan and Iran of far greater geopolitical relevance&lt;br /&gt;to the country's future. Once pipelines to the area have been developed,&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan's truly vast natural gas reserves augur a&lt;br /&gt;prosperous future for the country's people.&lt;br /&gt;Kyrgyzstan's 5 million people are much more diverse. The Kyrgyz&lt;br /&gt;themselves account for about 55 percent of the total and the&lt;br /&gt;Uzbeks for about 13 percent, with the Russians lately dropping&lt;br /&gt;from over 20 percent to slightly over 15 percent. Prior to independence,&lt;br /&gt;the Russians largely composed the technical-engineering&lt;br /&gt;intelligentsia, and their exodus has hurt the country's economy.&lt;br /&gt;Although rich in minerals and endowed with a natural beauty that&lt;br /&gt;has led some to describe the country as the Switzerland of Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia (and thus potentially as a new tourist frontier), Kyrgyzstan's&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical location, squeezed between China and Kazakstan,&lt;br /&gt;makes it highly dependent on the degree to which Kazakstan itself&lt;br /&gt;succeeds in maintaining its independence.&lt;br /&gt;Tajikistan is only somewhat more ethnically homogeneous. Of&lt;br /&gt;its 6.5 million people, fewer than two-thirds are Tajik and more&lt;br /&gt;than 25 percent are Uzbek (who are viewed with some hostility&lt;br /&gt;by the Tajiks), while the remaining Russians account for only&lt;br /&gt;about 3 percent. However, as elsewhere, even the dominant ethnic&lt;br /&gt;community is sharply—even violently—divided along tribal&lt;br /&gt;lines, with modern nationalism confined largely to the urban political&lt;br /&gt;elite. As a result, independence has produced not only civil&lt;br /&gt;strife but a convenient excuse for Russia to continue deploying&lt;br /&gt;its army in the country. The ethnic situation is even further complicated&lt;br /&gt;by the large presence of Tajiks across the border, in&lt;br /&gt;northeastern Afghanistan. In fact, almost as many ethnic Tajiks&lt;br /&gt;live in Afghanistan as in Tajikistan, another factor that serves to&lt;br /&gt;undermine regional stability.&lt;br /&gt;Afghanistan's current state of disarray is likewise a Soviet&lt;br /&gt;legacy, even though the country is not a former Soviet republic.&lt;br /&gt;Fragmented by the Soviet occupation and the prolonged guerrilla&lt;br /&gt;warfare conducted against it, Afghanistan is a nation-state in name&lt;br /&gt;only. Its 22 million people have become sharply divided along ethnic&lt;br /&gt;lines, with growing divisions among the country's Pashtuns,&lt;br /&gt;Tajiks, and Hazaras. At the same time, the jihad against the Russian&lt;br /&gt;occupiers has made religion the dominant dimension of the&lt;br /&gt;country's political life, infusing dogmatic fervor into already sharp&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 133&lt;br /&gt;political differences. Afghanistan thus has to be seen not only as a&lt;br /&gt;part of the Central Asian ethnic conundrum but also as politically&lt;br /&gt;very much part of the Eurasian Balkans.&lt;br /&gt;Although all of the formerly Soviet Central Asian states, as well&lt;br /&gt;as Azerbaijan, are populated predominantly by Muslims, their political&lt;br /&gt;elites—still largely the products of the Soviet era—are almost&lt;br /&gt;uniformly nonreligious in outlook and the states are formally&lt;br /&gt;secular. However, as their populations shift from a primarily traditional&lt;br /&gt;clannish or tribal identity to a more modern national awareness,&lt;br /&gt;they are likely to become imbued with an intensifying Islamic&lt;br /&gt;consciousness. In fact, an Islamic revival—already abetted from&lt;br /&gt;the outside not only by Iran but also by Saudi Arabia—is likely to&lt;br /&gt;become the mobilizing impulse for the increasingly pervasive new&lt;br /&gt;nationalisms, determined to oppose any reintegration under Russian—&lt;br /&gt;and hence infidel—control.&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, the process of Isiamization is likely to prove contagious&lt;br /&gt;also to the Muslims who have remained within Russia proper. They&lt;br /&gt;number about 20 million—more than twice the number of disaffected&lt;br /&gt;Russians (circa 9.5 million) who continue to live under foreign&lt;br /&gt;rule in the independent Central Asian states. The Russian&lt;br /&gt;Muslims thus account for about 13 percent of Russia's population,&lt;br /&gt;and it is almost inevitable that they will become more assertive in&lt;br /&gt;claiming their rights to a distinctive religious and political identity.&lt;br /&gt;Even if that claim does not take the form of a quest for outright independence,&lt;br /&gt;as it has in Chechnya, it will overlap with the dilemmas&lt;br /&gt;that Russia, given its recent imperial involvement and the&lt;br /&gt;Russian minorities in the new states, will continue to face in Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia.&lt;br /&gt;Gravely increasing the instability of the Eurasian Balkans and&lt;br /&gt;making the situation potentially much more explosive is the fact&lt;br /&gt;that two of the adjoining major nation-states, each with a historically&lt;br /&gt;imperial, cultural, religious, and economic interest in the region—&lt;br /&gt;namely, Turkey and Iran—are themselves volatile in their&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical orientation and are internally potentially vulnerable.&lt;br /&gt;Were these two states to become destabilized, it is quite likely that&lt;br /&gt;the entire region would be plunged into massive disorder, with the&lt;br /&gt;ongoing ethnic and territorial conflicts spinning out of control and&lt;br /&gt;the region's already delicate balance of power severely disrupted.&lt;br /&gt;Accordingly, Turkey and Iran are not only important geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;134 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;players but are also geopolitical pivots, whose own internal condition&lt;br /&gt;is of critical importance to the fate of the region. Both are middle-&lt;br /&gt;sized powers, with strong regional aspirations and a sense of&lt;br /&gt;their historical significance. Yet the future geopolitical orientation&lt;br /&gt;and even the national cohesion of both states remains uncertain.&lt;br /&gt;Turkey, a postimperial state still in the process of redefining its&lt;br /&gt;identity, is pulled in three directions: the modernists would like to&lt;br /&gt;see it become a European state and thus look to the west; the Islamists&lt;br /&gt;lean in the direction of the Middle East and a Muslim community&lt;br /&gt;and thus look to the south; and the historically minded&lt;br /&gt;nationalists see in the Turkic peoples of the Caspian Sea basin and&lt;br /&gt;Central Asia a new mission for a regionally dominant Turkey and&lt;br /&gt;thus look eastward. Each of these perspectives posits a different&lt;br /&gt;strategic axis, and the clash between them introduces for the first&lt;br /&gt;time since the Kemalist revolution a measure of uncertainty regarding&lt;br /&gt;Turkey's regional role.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, Turkey itself could become at least a partial victim&lt;br /&gt;of the region's ethnic conflicts. Although its population of about 65&lt;br /&gt;million is predominantly Turkish, with about 80 percent Turkic&lt;br /&gt;stock (though including a variety of Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians,&lt;br /&gt;Bulgarians, and Arabs), as much as 20 percent or perhaps&lt;br /&gt;even more are Kurdish. Concentrated in the country's eastern regions,&lt;br /&gt;the Turkish Kurds have increasingly been drawn into the&lt;br /&gt;struggle for national independence waged by the Iraqi and Iranian&lt;br /&gt;Kurds. Any internal tensions within Turkey regarding the country's&lt;br /&gt;overall direction would doubtless encourage the Kurds to press&lt;br /&gt;even more violently for a separate national status.&lt;br /&gt;Iran's future orientation is even more problematic. The fundamentalist&lt;br /&gt;Shiite revolution that triumphed in the late 1970s may be&lt;br /&gt;entering its "Thermidorian" phase, and that heightens the uncertainty&lt;br /&gt;regarding Iran's geostrategic role. On the one hand, the collapse&lt;br /&gt;of the atheistic Soviet Union opened up Iran's newly&lt;br /&gt;independent northern neighbors to religious proselytizing but, on&lt;br /&gt;the other, Iran's hostility to the United States has inclined Teheran&lt;br /&gt;to adopt at least a tactically pro-Moscow orientation, reinforced by&lt;br /&gt;Iran's concerns regarding the impact on its own cohesion of Azerbaijan's&lt;br /&gt;new independence.&lt;br /&gt;That concern is derived from Iran's vulnerability to ethnic tensions.&lt;br /&gt;Of the country's 65 million people (almost identical in numTHE&lt;br /&gt;EURASIAN BALKANS 135&lt;br /&gt;ber to Turkey's), only somewhat more than one-half are Persians.&lt;br /&gt;Roughly one-fourth are Azeri, and the remainder include Kurds,&lt;br /&gt;Baluchis, Turkmens, Arabs, and other tribes. Outside of the Kurds&lt;br /&gt;and the Azeris, the others at present do not have the capacity to&lt;br /&gt;threaten Iran's national integrity, especially given the high degree&lt;br /&gt;of national, even imperial, consciousness among the Persians. But&lt;br /&gt;that could change quite quickly, particularly in the event of a new&lt;br /&gt;political crisis in Iranian politics.&lt;br /&gt;Furthermore, the very fact that several newly independent&lt;br /&gt;"stans" now exist in the area and that even the 1 million Chechens&lt;br /&gt;have been able to assert their political aspirations is bound to&lt;br /&gt;have an infectious effect on the Kurds as well as on all the other&lt;br /&gt;ethnic minorities in Iran. If Azerbaijan succeeds in stable political&lt;br /&gt;and economic development, the Iranian Azeris will probably become&lt;br /&gt;increasingly committed to the idea of a greater Azerbaijan.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, political instability and divisions in Teheran could expand&lt;br /&gt;into a challenge to the cohesion of the Iranian state, thereby dramatically&lt;br /&gt;extending the scope and increasing the stakes of what is&lt;br /&gt;involved in the Eurasian Balkans.&lt;br /&gt;THE MULTIPLE CONTEST&lt;br /&gt;The traditional Balkans of Europe involved head-on competition&lt;br /&gt;among three imperial rivals: the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian&lt;br /&gt;Empire, and the Russian Empire. There were also three indirect&lt;br /&gt;participants who were concerned that their European interests&lt;br /&gt;would be adversely affected by the victory of a particular protagonist:&lt;br /&gt;Germany feared Russian power, France opposed Austria-Hungary,&lt;br /&gt;and Great Britain preferred to see a weakening Ottoman&lt;br /&gt;Empire in control of the Dardanelles than the emergence of any one&lt;br /&gt;of the other major contestants in control of the Balkans. In the&lt;br /&gt;course of the nineteenth century, these powers managed to contain&lt;br /&gt;Balkan conflicts without prejudice to anyone's vital interests, but&lt;br /&gt;they failed to do so in 1914, with disastrous consequences for all.&lt;br /&gt;Today's competition within the Eurasian Balkans also directly&lt;br /&gt;involves three neighboring powers: Russia, Turkey, and Iran,&lt;br /&gt;though China may eventually become a major protagonist as well.&lt;br /&gt;Also involved in the competition, but more remotely, are Ukraine,&lt;br /&gt;136 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Pakistan, India, and the distant America. Each of the three principal&lt;br /&gt;and most directly engaged contestants is driven not only by&lt;br /&gt;the prospect of future geopolitical and economic benefits but also&lt;br /&gt;by strong historical impulses. Each was at one time or another either&lt;br /&gt;the politically or the culturally dominant power in the region.&lt;br /&gt;Each views the others with suspicion. Although head-on warfare&lt;br /&gt;among them is unlikely, the cumulative impact of their external rivalry&lt;br /&gt;could contribute to regional chaos.&lt;br /&gt;In the case of the Russians, the attitude of hostility to the Turks&lt;br /&gt;verges on the obsessive. The Russian media portrays the Turks as&lt;br /&gt;bent on control over the region, as instigators of local resistance&lt;br /&gt;to Russia (with some justification in the case of Chechnya), and as&lt;br /&gt;threatening Russia's overall security to a degree that is altogether&lt;br /&gt;out of proportion to Turkey's actual capabilities. The Turks reciprocate&lt;br /&gt;in kind and view their role as that of liberators of their&lt;br /&gt;brethren from prolonged Russian oppression. The Turks and the&lt;br /&gt;Iranians (Persians) have also been historical rivals in the region,&lt;br /&gt;and that rivalry has in recent years been revived, with Turkey projecting&lt;br /&gt;the image of a modern and secular alternative to the Iranian&lt;br /&gt;concept of an Islamic society.&lt;br /&gt;Although each of the three can be said to seek at least a sphere&lt;br /&gt;of influence, in the case of Russia, Moscow's ambitions have a&lt;br /&gt;much broader sweep because of the relatively fresh memories of&lt;br /&gt;imperial control, the presence in the area of several million Russians,&lt;br /&gt;and the Kremlin's desire to reinstate Russia as a major&lt;br /&gt;global power. Moscow's foreign policy statements have made it&lt;br /&gt;plain that it views the entire space of the former Soviet Union as a&lt;br /&gt;zone of the Kremlin's special geostrategic interest, from which outside&lt;br /&gt;political—and even economic—influence should be excluded.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, although Turkish aspirations for regional influence&lt;br /&gt;retain some vestiges of an imperial, albeit more dated, past (the&lt;br /&gt;Ottoman Empire reached its apogee in 1590 with the conquest of&lt;br /&gt;the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, though it did not include Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia), they tend to be more rooted in an ethnic-linguistic sense of&lt;br /&gt;identity with the Turkic peoples of the area (see map on page 137).&lt;br /&gt;Given Turkey's much more limited political and military power, a&lt;br /&gt;sphere of exclusive political influence is simply unattainable.&lt;br /&gt;Rather, Turkey sees itself as potential leader of a loose Turkicspeaking&lt;br /&gt;community, taking advantage to that end of its appealing&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 137&lt;br /&gt;relative modernity, its linguistic affinity, and its economic means to&lt;br /&gt;establish itself as the most influential force in the nation-building&lt;br /&gt;processes underway in the area.&lt;br /&gt;Iran's aspirations are vaguer still, but in the long run no less&lt;br /&gt;threatening to Russia's ambitions. The Persian Empire is a much&lt;br /&gt;more distant memory. At its peak, circa 500 B.C., it embraced the&lt;br /&gt;current territory of the three Caucasian states, Turkmenistan,&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, as well as Turkey,&lt;br /&gt;Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Although Iran's current geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;aspirations are narrower than Turkey's, pointing mainly at&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, the entire Muslim population in the&lt;br /&gt;area—even within Russia itself—is the object of Iranian religious&lt;br /&gt;interest. Indeed, the revival of Islam in Central Asia has become an&lt;br /&gt;organic part of the aspirations of Iran's current rulers.&lt;br /&gt;The competitive interests of Russia, Turkey, and Iran are represented&lt;br /&gt;on the map on page 138: in the case of the geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;138 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;thrust of Russia, by two arrows pointing directly south at Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;and Kazakstan; in Turkey's case, by a single arrow pointing&lt;br /&gt;eastward through Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea at Central Asia;&lt;br /&gt;and in Iran's case, by two arrows aiming northward at Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;and northeast at Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. These&lt;br /&gt;arrows not only crisscross; they can collide.&lt;br /&gt;At this stage, China's role is more limited and its goals less evident.&lt;br /&gt;It stands to reason that China prefers to face a collection of&lt;br /&gt;relatively independent states in the West rather than a Russian&lt;br /&gt;Empire. At a minimum, the new states serve as a buffer, but China&lt;br /&gt;is also anxious that its own Turkic minorities in Xinjiang Province&lt;br /&gt;might see in the newly independent Central Asian states an attractive&lt;br /&gt;example for themselves, and for that reason, China has sought&lt;br /&gt;assurances from Kazakstan that cross-border minority activism&lt;br /&gt;will be suppressed. In the long run, the energy resources of the region&lt;br /&gt;are bound to be of special interest to Beijing, and direct acTHE&lt;br /&gt;EURASIAN BALKANS 139&lt;br /&gt;cess to them, not subject to Moscow's control, has to be China's&lt;br /&gt;central goal. Thus, the overall geopolitical interest of China tends&lt;br /&gt;to clash with Russia's quest for a dominant role and is complementary&lt;br /&gt;to Turkish and Iranian aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;For Ukraine, the central issues are the future character of the&lt;br /&gt;CIS and freer access to energy sources, which would lessen&lt;br /&gt;Ukraine's dependence on Russia. In that regard, closer relations&lt;br /&gt;with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have become important&lt;br /&gt;to Kiev, with Ukrainian support for the more independentminded&lt;br /&gt;states being an extension of Ukraine's efforts to enhance its&lt;br /&gt;own independence from Moscow. Accordingly, Ukraine has supported&lt;br /&gt;Georgia's efforts to become the westward route for Azeri oil&lt;br /&gt;exports. Ukraine has also collaborated with Turkey in order to&lt;br /&gt;weaken Russian influence in the Black Sea and has supported Turkish&lt;br /&gt;efforts to direct oil flows from Central Asia to Turkish terminals.&lt;br /&gt;The involvement of Pakistan and India is more remote still, but&lt;br /&gt;neither is indifferent to what may be transpiring in these new&lt;br /&gt;Eurasian Balkans. For Pakistan, the primary interest is to gain&lt;br /&gt;geostrategic depth through political influence in Afghanistan—and&lt;br /&gt;to deny to Iran the exercise of such influence in Afghanistan and&lt;br /&gt;Tajikistan—and to benefit eventually from any pipeline construction&lt;br /&gt;linking Central Asia with the Arabian Sea. India, in reaction to Pakistan&lt;br /&gt;and possibly concerned about China's long-range influence in&lt;br /&gt;the region, views Iranian influence in Afghanistan and a greater&lt;br /&gt;Russian presence in the former Soviet space more favorably.&lt;br /&gt;Although distant, the United States, with its stake in the maintenance&lt;br /&gt;of geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, looms in&lt;br /&gt;the background as an increasingly important if indirect player,&lt;br /&gt;clearly interested not only in developing the region's resources but&lt;br /&gt;also in preventing Russia from exclusively dominating the region's&lt;br /&gt;geopolitical space. In so doing, America is not only pursuing its&lt;br /&gt;larger Eurasian geostrategic goals but is also representing its own&lt;br /&gt;growing economic interest, as well as that of Europe and the Far&lt;br /&gt;East, in gaining unlimited access to this hitherto closed area.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, at stake in this conundrum are geopolitical power, access&lt;br /&gt;to potentially great wealth, the fulfillment of national and/or religious&lt;br /&gt;missions, and security. The particular focus of the contest,&lt;br /&gt;however, is on access. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, access&lt;br /&gt;to the region was monopolized by Moscow. All rail transport,&lt;br /&gt;140 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;gas and oil pipelines, and even air travel were channeled through&lt;br /&gt;the center. Russian geopoliticians would prefer it to remain so,&lt;br /&gt;since they know that whoever either controls or dominates access&lt;br /&gt;to the region is the one most likely to win the geopolitical and economic&lt;br /&gt;prize.&lt;br /&gt;It is this consideration that has made the pipeline issue so central&lt;br /&gt;to the future of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. If the&lt;br /&gt;main pipelines to the region continue to pass through Russian territory&lt;br /&gt;to the Russian outlet on the Black Sea at Novorossiysk, the&lt;br /&gt;political consequences of this condition will make themselves felt,&lt;br /&gt;even without any overt Russian power plays. The region will remain&lt;br /&gt;a political dependency, with Moscow in a strong position to&lt;br /&gt;determine how the region's new wealth is to be shared. Conversely,&lt;br /&gt;if another pipeline crosses the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;and thence to the Mediterranean through Turkey and if one more&lt;br /&gt;goes to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan, no single power will&lt;br /&gt;have monopoly over access.&lt;br /&gt;The troubling fact is that some elements in the Russian political&lt;br /&gt;elite act as if they prefer that the area's resources not be developed&lt;br /&gt;at all if Russia cannot have complete control over access. Let&lt;br /&gt;the wealth remain unexploited if the alternative is that foreign investment&lt;br /&gt;will lead to more direct presence by foreign economic,&lt;br /&gt;and thus also political, interests. That proprietary attitude is&lt;br /&gt;rooted in history, and it will take time and outside pressures before&lt;br /&gt;it changes.&lt;br /&gt;The Tsarist expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia occurred&lt;br /&gt;over a period of about three hundred years, but its recent&lt;br /&gt;end was shockingly abrupt. As the Ottoman Empire declined in vitality,&lt;br /&gt;the Russian Empire pushed southward, along the shores of&lt;br /&gt;the Caspian Sea toward Persia. It seized the Astrakhan khanate in&lt;br /&gt;1556 and reached Persia by 1607. It conquered Crimea during&lt;br /&gt;1774-1784, then took over the kingdom of Georgia in 1801 and&lt;br /&gt;overwhelmed the tribes astride the Caucasian mountain range&lt;br /&gt;(with the Chechens resisting with unique tenacity) during the second&lt;br /&gt;half of the 1800s, completing the takeover of Armenia by 1878.&lt;br /&gt;The conquest of Central Asia was less a matter of overcoming a&lt;br /&gt;rival empire than of subjugating essentially isolated and quasitribal&lt;br /&gt;feudal khanates and emirates, capable of offering only sporadic&lt;br /&gt;and isolated resistance. Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 141&lt;br /&gt;taken over through a series of military expeditions during the&lt;br /&gt;years 1801-1881, with Turkmenistan crushed and incorporated in&lt;br /&gt;campaigns lasting from 1873 to 1886. However, by 1850, the conquest&lt;br /&gt;of most of Central Asia was essentially completed, though&lt;br /&gt;periodic outbreaks of local resistance occurred even during the&lt;br /&gt;Soviet era.&lt;br /&gt;The collapse of the Soviet Union produced a dramatic historical&lt;br /&gt;reversal. In the course of merely a few weeks in December 1991,&lt;br /&gt;Russia's Asian space suddenly shrank by about 20 percent, and the&lt;br /&gt;population Russia controlled in Asia was cut from 75 million to&lt;br /&gt;about 30 million. In addition, another 18 million residents in the&lt;br /&gt;Caucasus were also detached from Russia. Making these reversals&lt;br /&gt;even more painful to the Russian political elite was the awareness&lt;br /&gt;that the economic potential of these areas was now being targeted&lt;br /&gt;by foreign interests with the financial means to invest in, develop,&lt;br /&gt;and exploit resources that until very recently were accessible to&lt;br /&gt;Russia alone.&lt;br /&gt;Yet Russia faces a dilemma: it is too weak politically to seal off&lt;br /&gt;the region entirely from the outside and too poor financially to develop&lt;br /&gt;the area exclusively on its own. Moreover, sensible Russian&lt;br /&gt;leaders realize that the demographic explosion underway in the&lt;br /&gt;new states means that their failure to sustain economic growth will&lt;br /&gt;eventually create an explosive situation along Russia's entire&lt;br /&gt;southern frontier. Russia's experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya&lt;br /&gt;could be repeated along the entire borderline that stretches&lt;br /&gt;from the Black Sea to Mongolia, especially given the national and&lt;br /&gt;Islamic resurgence now underway among the previously subjugated&lt;br /&gt;peoples.&lt;br /&gt;It follows that Russia must somehow find a way of accommodating&lt;br /&gt;to the new postimperial reality, as it seeks to contain the&lt;br /&gt;Turkish and Iranian presence, to prevent the gravitation of the new&lt;br /&gt;states toward its principal rivals, to discourage the formation of&lt;br /&gt;any truly independent Central Asian regional cooperation, and to&lt;br /&gt;limit American geopolitical influence in the newly sovereign capitals.&lt;br /&gt;The issue thus is no longer that of imperial restoration—&lt;br /&gt;which would be too costly and would be fiercely resisted—but&lt;br /&gt;instead involves creating a new web of relations that would constrain&lt;br /&gt;the new states and preserve Russia's dominant geopolitical&lt;br /&gt;and economic position.&lt;br /&gt;142 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;The chosen instrument for accomplishing that task has primarily&lt;br /&gt;been the CIS, though in some places the use of the Russian military&lt;br /&gt;and the skillful employment of Russian diplomacy to "divide&lt;br /&gt;and rule" has served the Kremlin's interests just as well. Moscow&lt;br /&gt;has used its leverage to seek from the new states the maximum degree&lt;br /&gt;of compliance to its vision of an increasingly integrated "commonwealth"&lt;br /&gt;and has pressed for a centrally directed system of&lt;br /&gt;control over the external borders of the CIS; for closer military integration,&lt;br /&gt;within the framework of a common foreign policy; and&lt;br /&gt;for the further expansion of the existing (originally Soviet) pipeline&lt;br /&gt;network, to the exclusion of any new ones that could skirt Russia.&lt;br /&gt;Russian strategic analyses have explicitly stated that Moscow&lt;br /&gt;views the area as its own special geopolitical space, even if it is no&lt;br /&gt;longer an integral part of its empire.&lt;br /&gt;A clue to Russian geopolitical intentions is provided by the insistence&lt;br /&gt;with which the Kremlin has sought to retain a Russian military&lt;br /&gt;presence on the territories of the new states. Taking&lt;br /&gt;advantage of the Abkhazian secession movement, Moscow obtained&lt;br /&gt;basing rights in Georgia, legitimated its military presence&lt;br /&gt;on Armenian soil by exploiting Armenia's need for support in the&lt;br /&gt;war against Azerbaijan, and applied political and financial pressure&lt;br /&gt;to obtain Kazakstan's agreement to Russian bases; in addition,&lt;br /&gt;the civil war in Tajikistan made possible the continued&lt;br /&gt;presence there of the former Soviet army.&lt;br /&gt;In defining its policy, Moscow has proceeded on the apparent&lt;br /&gt;expectation that its postimperial web of relationships with Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia will gradually emasculate the substance of the sovereignty of&lt;br /&gt;the individually weak new states and that it will place them in a&lt;br /&gt;subordinate relationship to the command center of the "integrated"&lt;br /&gt;CIS. To accomplish that goal, Russia is discouraging the&lt;br /&gt;new states from creating their own separate armies, from fostering&lt;br /&gt;the use of their distinctive languages (in which they are gradually&lt;br /&gt;replacing the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin), from cultivating&lt;br /&gt;close ties with outsiders, and from developing new pipelines directly&lt;br /&gt;to outlets in the Arabian or Mediterranean Seas. If the policy&lt;br /&gt;succeeds, Russia could then dominate their foreign relations and&lt;br /&gt;determine revenue sharing.&lt;br /&gt;In pursuing that goal, Russian spokesmen often invoke, as we&lt;br /&gt;have seen in chapter 4, the example of the European Union. In fact,&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 143&lt;br /&gt;however, Russia's policy toward the Central Asian states and the&lt;br /&gt;Caucasus is much more reminiscent of the Francophone African&lt;br /&gt;community—with the French military contingents and budgetary&lt;br /&gt;subsidies determining the politics and policies of the Frenchspeaking&lt;br /&gt;postcolonial African states.&lt;br /&gt;While the restoration of the maximum feasible degree of Russian&lt;br /&gt;political and economic influence in the region is the overall&lt;br /&gt;goal and the reinforcement of the CIS is the principal mechanism&lt;br /&gt;for achieving it, Moscow's primary geopolitical targets for political&lt;br /&gt;subordination appear to be Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. For a Russian&lt;br /&gt;political counteroffensive to be successful, Moscow must not&lt;br /&gt;only cork access to the region but must also penetrate its geographic&lt;br /&gt;shield.&lt;br /&gt;For Russia, Azerbaijan has to be a priority target. Its subordination&lt;br /&gt;would help to seal off Central Asia from the West, especially&lt;br /&gt;from Turkey, thereby further increasing Russia's leverage vis-a-vis&lt;br /&gt;the recalcitrant Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. To that end, tactical&lt;br /&gt;cooperation with Iran regarding such controversial issues as how&lt;br /&gt;to divide the drilling concessions to the Caspian seabed serves the&lt;br /&gt;important objective of compelling Baku to accommodate itself to&lt;br /&gt;Moscow's wishes. A subservient Azerbaijan would also facilitate&lt;br /&gt;the consolidation of a dominant Russian position in both Georgia&lt;br /&gt;and Armenia.&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan offers an especially tempting primary target as well,&lt;br /&gt;because its ethnic vulnerability makes it impossible for the Kazak&lt;br /&gt;government to prevail in an open confrontation with Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;Moscow can also exploit the Kazak fear of China's growing dynamism,&lt;br /&gt;as well as the likelihood of growing Kazak resentment&lt;br /&gt;over the Sinification of the adjoining Xinjiang Province in China.&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan's gradual subordination would have the geopolitical effect&lt;br /&gt;of almost automatically drawing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan&lt;br /&gt;into Moscow's sphere of control, while exposing both Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;and Turkmenistan to more direct Russian pressure.&lt;br /&gt;The Russian strategy, however, runs counter to the aspirations&lt;br /&gt;of almost all of the states located in the Eurasian Balkans. Their&lt;br /&gt;new political elites will not voluntarily yield the power and privilege&lt;br /&gt;they have gained through independence. As the local Russians&lt;br /&gt;gradually vacate their previously privileged positions, the&lt;br /&gt;new elites are rapidly developing a vested interest in sovereignty, a&lt;br /&gt;144 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;dynamic and socially contagious process. Moreover, the once politically&lt;br /&gt;passive populations are also becoming more nationalistic&lt;br /&gt;and, outside of Georgia and Armenia, also more conscious of their&lt;br /&gt;Islamic identity.&lt;br /&gt;Insofar as foreign affairs are concerned, both Georgia and Armenia&lt;br /&gt;(despite the latter's dependence on Russian support against&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan) would like to become gradually more associated with&lt;br /&gt;Europe. The resource-rich Central Asian states, along with Azerbaijan,&lt;br /&gt;would like to maximize the economic presence on their soil&lt;br /&gt;of American, European, Japanese, and lately Korean capital, hoping&lt;br /&gt;thereby to greatly accelerate their own economic development&lt;br /&gt;and consolidate their independence. To this end, they also welcome&lt;br /&gt;the increasing role of Turkey and Iran, seeing in them a counterweight&lt;br /&gt;to Russian power and a bridge to the large Muslim world&lt;br /&gt;to the south.&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan—encouraged by both Turkey and America—has&lt;br /&gt;thus not only rejected Russian demands for military bases but it&lt;br /&gt;also defied Russian demands for a single pipeline to a Russian Black&lt;br /&gt;Sea port, opting instead for a dual solution involving a second&lt;br /&gt;pipeline through Georgia to Turkey. (A pipeline southward through&lt;br /&gt;Iran, to be financed by an American company, had to be abandoned&lt;br /&gt;because of the U.S. financial embargo on deals with Iran.) In 1995,&lt;br /&gt;amid much fanfare, a new rail link between Turkmenistan and Iran&lt;br /&gt;was opened, making it feasible for Europe to trade with Central Asia&lt;br /&gt;by rail, skirting Russia altogether. There was a touch of symbolic&lt;br /&gt;drama to this reopening of the ancient Silk Route, with Russia thus&lt;br /&gt;no longer able to separate Europe from Asia.&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan has also become increasingly assertive in its opposition&lt;br /&gt;to Russia's efforts at "integration." Its foreign minister declared&lt;br /&gt;flatly in August 1996 that "Uzbekistan opposes the creation&lt;br /&gt;of CIS supranational institutions which can be used as instruments&lt;br /&gt;of centralized control." Its strongly nationalistic posture had already&lt;br /&gt;prompted sharp denunciations in the Russian press concerning&lt;br /&gt;Uzbekistan's&lt;br /&gt;emphatically pro-West orientation in the economy, the harsh&lt;br /&gt;invective apropos integration treaties within the CIS, the decisive&lt;br /&gt;refusal to join even the Customs Union, and a methodical&lt;br /&gt;anti-Russian nationality policy (even kindergartens which use&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 145&lt;br /&gt;Russian are being closed down). ... For the United States,&lt;br /&gt;which is pursuing in the Asia region a policy of the weakening&lt;br /&gt;of Russia, this position is so attractive.1&lt;br /&gt;Even Kazakstan, in reaction to Russian pressures, has come to&lt;br /&gt;favor a secondary non-Russian route for its own outflows. As&lt;br /&gt;Umirserik Kasenov, the adviser to the Kazak president, put it:&lt;br /&gt;It is a fact that Kazakstan's search for alternative pipelines has&lt;br /&gt;been fostered by Russia's own actions, such as the limitation&lt;br /&gt;of shipments of Kazakstan's oil to Novorossiysk and of Tyumen&lt;br /&gt;oil to the Pavlodar Refinery. Turkmenistan's efforts to promote&lt;br /&gt;the construction of a gas line to Iran are partly due to the fact&lt;br /&gt;that the CIS countries pay only 60 percent of the world price or&lt;br /&gt;do not pay for it at all.2&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan, for much the same reason, has been actively exploring&lt;br /&gt;the construction of a new pipeline through Afghanistan&lt;br /&gt;and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, in addition to the energetic construction&lt;br /&gt;of new rail links with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to the&lt;br /&gt;north and with Iran and Afghanistan to the south. Very preliminary&lt;br /&gt;and exploratory talks have also been held among the Kazaks, the&lt;br /&gt;Chinese, and the Japanese regarding an ambitious pipeline project&lt;br /&gt;that would stretch from Central Asia to the China Sea (see map on&lt;br /&gt;page 146). With long-term Western oil and gas investment commitments&lt;br /&gt;in Azerbaijan reaching some $13 billion and in Kazakstan going&lt;br /&gt;well over $20 billion (1996 figures), the economic and political&lt;br /&gt;isolation of this area is clearly breaking down in the face of global&lt;br /&gt;economic pressures and limited Russian financial options.&lt;br /&gt;Fear of Russia has also had the effect of driving the Central&lt;br /&gt;Asian states into greater regional cooperation. The initially dormant&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian Economic Union, formed in January 1993, has&lt;br /&gt;been gradually activated. Even President Nursultan Nazarbayev of&lt;br /&gt;Kazakstan, at first an articulate advocate of a new "Eurasian&lt;br /&gt;Union," gradually became a convert to ideas of closer Central&lt;br /&gt;lZavtm 28 (June 1996).&lt;br /&gt;iUWhat Russia Wants in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia," Nezavisimaya&lt;br /&gt;Gazeta, January 24,1995.&lt;br /&gt;146 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Asian cooperation, increased military collaboration among the region's&lt;br /&gt;states, support for Azerbaijan's efforts to channel Caspian&lt;br /&gt;Sea and Kazak oil through Turkey, and joint opposition to Russian&lt;br /&gt;and Iranian efforts to prevent the sectoral division of the Caspian&lt;br /&gt;Sea's continental shelf and mineral resources among the coastal&lt;br /&gt;states.&lt;br /&gt;Given the fact that the governments in the area tend to be&lt;br /&gt;highly authoritarian, perhaps even more important has been the&lt;br /&gt;personal reconciliation among the principal leaders. It was common&lt;br /&gt;knowledge that the presidents of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and&lt;br /&gt;Turkmenistan were not particularly fond of one another (which&lt;br /&gt;they made eminently plain to foreign visitors), and that personal&lt;br /&gt;antagonism initially made it easier for the Kremlin to play off one&lt;br /&gt;against the other. By the mid-1990s, the three had come to realize&lt;br /&gt;that closer cooperation among them was essential to the preservation&lt;br /&gt;of their new sovereignty, and they began to engage in highly&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 147&lt;br /&gt;publicized displays of their allegedly close relations, stressing that&lt;br /&gt;henceforth they would coordinate their foreign policies.&lt;br /&gt;But more important still has been the emergence within the CIS&lt;br /&gt;of an informal coalition, led by Ukraine and Uzbekistan, dedicated&lt;br /&gt;to the idea of a "cooperative," but not "integrated," commonwealth.&lt;br /&gt;Toward this end, Ukraine has signed agreements on military&lt;br /&gt;cooperation with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Georgia; and&lt;br /&gt;in September 1996, the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;even engaged in the highly symbolic act of issuing a declaration,&lt;br /&gt;demanding that henceforth CIS summits not be chaired by&lt;br /&gt;Russia's president but that the chairmanship be rotated.&lt;br /&gt;The example set by Ukraine and Uzbekistan has had an impact&lt;br /&gt;even on the leaders who have been more deferential to Moscow's&lt;br /&gt;central concerns. The Kremlin must have been especially disturbed&lt;br /&gt;to hear Kazakstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev and Georgia's&lt;br /&gt;Eduard Shevardnadze declare in September 1996 that they would&lt;br /&gt;leave the CIS "if our independence is threatened." More generally,&lt;br /&gt;as a counter to the CIS, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;stepped up their level of activity in the Organization of Economic&lt;br /&gt;Cooperation, a still relatively loose association of the region's Islamic&lt;br /&gt;states—including Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—dedicated to&lt;br /&gt;the enhancement of financial, economic, and transportation links&lt;br /&gt;among its members. Moscow has been publicly critical of these&lt;br /&gt;initiatives, viewing them, quite correctly, as diluting the pertinent&lt;br /&gt;states' membership in the CIS.&lt;br /&gt;In a similar vein, there has been steady enhancement of ties&lt;br /&gt;with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran. The Turkic-speaking&lt;br /&gt;countries have eagerly accepted Turkey's offers of military training&lt;br /&gt;for the new national officer corps and the laying down of the&lt;br /&gt;Turkish welcome mat for some ten thousand students. The fourth&lt;br /&gt;summit meeting of the Turkic-speaking countries, held in Tashkent&lt;br /&gt;in October 1996 and prepared with Turkish backing, focused heavily&lt;br /&gt;on the enhancement of transportation links, on increased trade,&lt;br /&gt;and also on common educational standards as well as closer cultural&lt;br /&gt;cooperation with Turkey. Both Turkey and Iran have been&lt;br /&gt;particularly active in assisting the new states with their television&lt;br /&gt;programming, thereby directly influencing large audiences.&lt;br /&gt;A ceremony in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakstan, in December&lt;br /&gt;1996 was particularly symbolic of Turkey's identification with the&lt;br /&gt;148 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;independence of the region's states. On the occasion of the fifth&lt;br /&gt;anniversary of Kazakstan's independence, the Turkish president,&lt;br /&gt;Suleyman Demirel, stood at the side of President Nazarbayev at&lt;br /&gt;the unveiling of a gold-colored column twenty-eight meters high,&lt;br /&gt;crowned with a legendary Kazak/Turkic warrior's figure atop a&lt;br /&gt;griffinlike creature. At the event, Kazakstan hailed Turkey for&lt;br /&gt;"standing by Kazakstan at every step of its development as an independent&lt;br /&gt;state," and the Turks reciprocated by granting Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;a credit line of $300 million, beyond existing private Turkish&lt;br /&gt;investment of about $1.2 billion.&lt;br /&gt;While neither Turkey nor Iran has the means to exclude Russia&lt;br /&gt;from regional influence, Turkey and (more narrowly) Iran have&lt;br /&gt;thus been reinforcing the will and the capacity of the new states to&lt;br /&gt;resist reintegration with their northern neighbor and former master.&lt;br /&gt;And that certainly helps to keep the region's geopolitical future&lt;br /&gt;open,&lt;br /&gt;NEITHER DOMINION NOR EXCLUSION&lt;br /&gt;The geostrategic implications for America are clear: America is too&lt;br /&gt;distant to be dominant in this part of Eurasia but too powerful not&lt;br /&gt;to be engaged. All the states in the area view American engagement&lt;br /&gt;as necessary to their survival. Russia is too weak to regain&lt;br /&gt;imperial domination over the region or to exclude others from it,&lt;br /&gt;but it is also too close and too strong to be excluded. Turkey and&lt;br /&gt;Iran are strong enough to be influential, but their own vulnerabilities&lt;br /&gt;could make the area unable to cope with both the challenge&lt;br /&gt;from the north and the region's internal conflicts. China is too&lt;br /&gt;powerful not to be feared by Russia and the Central Asian states,&lt;br /&gt;yet its very presence and economic dynamism facilitates Central&lt;br /&gt;Asia's quest for wider global outreach.&lt;br /&gt;It follows that America's primary interest is to help ensure that&lt;br /&gt;no single power comes to control this geopolitical space and that&lt;br /&gt;the global community has unhindered financial and economic access&lt;br /&gt;to it. Geopolitical pluralism will become an enduring reality&lt;br /&gt;only when a network of pipeline and transportation routes links&lt;br /&gt;the region directly to the major centers of global economic activity&lt;br /&gt;via the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas, as well as overland.&lt;br /&gt;THE EURASIAN BALKANS 149&lt;br /&gt;Hence, Russian efforts to monopolize access need to be opposed&lt;br /&gt;as inimical to regional stability.&lt;br /&gt;However, the exclusion of Russia from the area is neither desirable&lt;br /&gt;nor feasible, nor is the fanning of hostility between the area's&lt;br /&gt;new states and Russia. In fact, Russia's active economic participation&lt;br /&gt;in the region's development is essential to the area's stability—&lt;br /&gt;and having Russia as a partner, but not as an exclusive&lt;br /&gt;dominator, can also reap significant economic benefits as a result.&lt;br /&gt;Greater stability and increased wealth within the region would&lt;br /&gt;contribute directly to Russia's well-being and give real meaning to&lt;br /&gt;the "commonwealth" promised by the acronym CIS. But that cooperative&lt;br /&gt;option will become Russia's policy only when much more&lt;br /&gt;ambitious, historically anachronistic designs that are painfully&lt;br /&gt;reminiscent of the original Balkans are effectively precluded.&lt;br /&gt;The states deserving America's strongest geopolitical support&lt;br /&gt;are Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and (outside this region) Ukraine, all&lt;br /&gt;three being geopolitically pivotal. Indeed, Kiev's role reinforces the&lt;br /&gt;argument that Ukraine is the critical state, insofar as Russia's own&lt;br /&gt;future evolution is concerned. At the same time, Kazakstan—given&lt;br /&gt;its size, economic potential, and geographically important location—&lt;br /&gt;is also deserving of prudent international backing and especially&lt;br /&gt;of sustained economic assistance. In time, economic growth&lt;br /&gt;in Kazakstan might help to bridge the ethnic split that makes this&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian "shield" so vulnerable to Russian pressure.&lt;br /&gt;In this region, America shares a common interest not only with&lt;br /&gt;a stable, pro-Western Turkey but also with Iran and China. A gradual&lt;br /&gt;improvement in American-Iranian relations would greatly increase&lt;br /&gt;global access to the region and, more specifically, reduce&lt;br /&gt;the more immediate threat to Azerbaijan's survival. China's growing&lt;br /&gt;economic presence in the region and its political stake in the&lt;br /&gt;area's independence are also congruent with America's interests.&lt;br /&gt;China's backing of Pakistan's efforts in Afghanistan is also a positive&lt;br /&gt;factor, for closer Pakistani-Afghan relations would make international&lt;br /&gt;access to Turkmenistan more feasible, thereby helping to&lt;br /&gt;reinforce both that state and Uzbekistan (in the event that Kazakstan&lt;br /&gt;were to falter).&lt;br /&gt;Turkey's evolution and orientation are likely to be especially&lt;br /&gt;decisive for the future of the Caucasian states. If Turkey sustains&lt;br /&gt;its path to Europe—and if Europe does not close its doors to&lt;br /&gt;150 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Turkey—the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate into&lt;br /&gt;the European orbit, a prospect they fervently desire. But if&lt;br /&gt;Turkey's Europeanization grinds to a halt, for either internal or external&lt;br /&gt;reasons, then Georgia and Armenia will have no choice but&lt;br /&gt;to adapt to Russia's inclinations. Their future will then become a&lt;br /&gt;function of Russia's own evolving relationship with the expanding&lt;br /&gt;Europe, for good or ill.&lt;br /&gt;Iran's role is likely to be even more problematic. A return to a&lt;br /&gt;pro-Western posture would certainly facilitate the stabilization&lt;br /&gt;and consolidation of the region, and it is therefore strategically desirable&lt;br /&gt;for America to encourage such a turn in Iran's conduct. But&lt;br /&gt;until that happens, Iran is likely to play a negative role, adversely&lt;br /&gt;affecting Azerbaijan's prospects, even as it takes positive steps like&lt;br /&gt;opening Turkmenistan to the world and, despite Iran's current fundamentalism,&lt;br /&gt;reinforcing the Central Asians' sense of their religious&lt;br /&gt;heritage.&lt;br /&gt;Ultimately, Central Asia's future is likely to be shaped by an&lt;br /&gt;even more complex set of circumstances, with the fate of its states&lt;br /&gt;determined by the intricate interplay of Russian, Turkish, Iranian,&lt;br /&gt;and Chinese interests, as well as by the degree to which the United&lt;br /&gt;States conditions its relations with Russia on Russia's respect for&lt;br /&gt;the independence of the new states. The reality of that interplay&lt;br /&gt;precludes either empire or monopoly as a meaningful goal for any&lt;br /&gt;of the geostrategic players involved. Rather, the basic choice is between&lt;br /&gt;a delicate regional balance—which would permit the gradual&lt;br /&gt;inclusion of the area in the emerging global economy while the&lt;br /&gt;states of the region consolidate themselves and probably also acquire&lt;br /&gt;a more pronounced Islamic identity—or ethnic conflict, political&lt;br /&gt;fragmentation, and possibly even open hostilities along&lt;br /&gt;Russia's southern frontiers. The attainment and consolidation of&lt;br /&gt;that regional balance has to be a major goal in any comprehensive&lt;br /&gt;U.S. geostrategy for Eurasia.&lt;br /&gt;CHAPTER 6&lt;br /&gt;The&lt;br /&gt;Far Eastern&lt;br /&gt;Anchor&lt;br /&gt;AN EFFECTIVE AMERICAN POLICY for Eurasia has to have a Far&lt;br /&gt;Eastern anchor. That need will not be met if America is excluded&lt;br /&gt;or excludes itself from the Asian mainland. A close&lt;br /&gt;relationship with maritime Japan is essential for America's global&lt;br /&gt;policy, but a cooperative relationship with mainland China is imperative&lt;br /&gt;for America's Eurasian geostrategy. The implications of&lt;br /&gt;that reality need to be faced, for the ongoing interaction in the Far&lt;br /&gt;East between three major powers—America, China, and Japan—&lt;br /&gt;creates a potentially dangerous regional conundrum and is almost&lt;br /&gt;certain to generate geopolitically tectonic shifts.&lt;br /&gt;For China, America across the Pacific should be a natural ally&lt;br /&gt;since America has no designs on the Asian mainland and has historically&lt;br /&gt;opposed both Japanese and Russian encroachments on&lt;br /&gt;a weaker China. To the Chinese, Japan has been the principal enemy&lt;br /&gt;over the last century; Russia, "the hungry land" in Chinese,&lt;br /&gt;has long been distrusted; and India, too, now looms as a potential&lt;br /&gt;rival. The principle "my neighbor's neighbor is my ally" thus&lt;br /&gt;fits the geopolitical and historical relationship between China&lt;br /&gt;and America.&lt;br /&gt;151&lt;br /&gt;152 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;However, America is no longer Japan's adversary across the&lt;br /&gt;ocean but is now closely allied with Japan. America also has strong&lt;br /&gt;ties with Taiwan and with several of the Southeast Asian nations.&lt;br /&gt;The Chinese are also sensitive to America's doctrinal reservations&lt;br /&gt;regarding the internal character of the current Chinese regime.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, America is also seen as the principal obstacle in China's&lt;br /&gt;quest not only to become globally preeminent but even just regionally&lt;br /&gt;predominant. Is a collision between America and China,&lt;br /&gt;therefore, inevitable?&lt;br /&gt;For Japan, America has been the .umbrella under which the&lt;br /&gt;country could safely recover from a devastating defeat, regain its&lt;br /&gt;economic momentum, and on that basis progressively attain a position&lt;br /&gt;as one of the world's prime powers. But the very fact of that&lt;br /&gt;umbrella imposes a limit on Japan's freedom of action, creating the&lt;br /&gt;paradoxical situation of a world-class power being simultaneously&lt;br /&gt;a protectorate. For Japan, America continues to be the vital partner&lt;br /&gt;in Japan's emergence as an international leader. But America is&lt;br /&gt;also the main reason for Japan's continued lack of national self-reliance&lt;br /&gt;in the security area. How long can this situation endure?&lt;br /&gt;In other words, in the foreseeable future two centrally important—&lt;br /&gt;and very directly interacting—geopolitical issues will define&lt;br /&gt;America's role in Eurasia's Far East:&lt;br /&gt;1. What is the practical definition and—from America's point&lt;br /&gt;of view—the acceptable scope of China's potential emergence&lt;br /&gt;as the dominant regional power and of its growing aspirations&lt;br /&gt;for the status of a global power?&lt;br /&gt;2. As Japan seeks to define a global role for itself, how should&lt;br /&gt;America manage the regional consequences of the inevitable&lt;br /&gt;reduction in the degree of Japan's acquiescence in&lt;br /&gt;its status as an American protectorate?&lt;br /&gt;The East Asian geopolitical scene is currently characterized by&lt;br /&gt;metastable power relations. Metastability involves a condition of&lt;br /&gt;external rigidity but of relatively little flexibility, in that regard&lt;br /&gt;more reminiscent of iron than steel. It is vulnerable to a destructive&lt;br /&gt;chain reaction generated by a powerful jarring blow. Today's&lt;br /&gt;Far East is experiencing extraordinary economic dynamism alongTHE&lt;br /&gt;FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 153&lt;br /&gt;side growing political uncertainty. Asian economic growth may in&lt;br /&gt;fact even contribute to that uncertainty, because prosperity obscures&lt;br /&gt;the region's political vulnerabilities even as it intensifies national&lt;br /&gt;ambitions and expands social expectations.&lt;br /&gt;That Asia is an economic success without parallel in human development&lt;br /&gt;goes without saying. Just a few basic statistics dramatically&lt;br /&gt;highlight that reality. Less than four decades ago, East Asia&lt;br /&gt;(including Japan) accounted for a mere 4 percent or so of the&lt;br /&gt;world's total GNP, while North America led with approximately&lt;br /&gt;35-40 percent; by the mid-1990s, the two regions were roughly&lt;br /&gt;equal (in the neighborhood of 25 percent). Moreover, Asia's pace&lt;br /&gt;of growth has been historically unprecedented. Economists have&lt;br /&gt;noted that in the takeoff stage of industrialization, Great Britain&lt;br /&gt;took more than fifty years and America just somewhat less than&lt;br /&gt;fifty years to double their respective outputs per head, whereas&lt;br /&gt;both China and South Korea accomplished the same gain in approximately&lt;br /&gt;ten years. Barring some massive regional disruption,&lt;br /&gt;within a quarter of a century, Asia is likely to outstrip both North&lt;br /&gt;America and Europe in total GNP.&lt;br /&gt;However, in addition to becoming the world's center of economic&lt;br /&gt;gravity, Asia is also its potential political volcano. Although&lt;br /&gt;surpassing Europe in economic development, Asia is singularly deficient&lt;br /&gt;in regional political development. It lacks the cooperative&lt;br /&gt;multilateral structures that so dominate the European political&lt;br /&gt;landscape and that dilute, absorb, and contain Europe's more traditional&lt;br /&gt;territorial, ethnic, and national conflicts. There is nothing&lt;br /&gt;comparable in Asia to either the European Union or NATO. None of&lt;br /&gt;the three regional associations—ASEAN (Association of Southeast&lt;br /&gt;Asian Nations), ARF (Asian Regional Forum, ASEAN's platform for a&lt;br /&gt;political-security dialogue), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation&lt;br /&gt;Group)—even remotely approximates the web of multilateral&lt;br /&gt;and regional cooperative ties that bind Europe together.&lt;br /&gt;On the contrary, Asia is today the seat of the world's greatest&lt;br /&gt;concentration of rising and recently awakened mass nationalisms,&lt;br /&gt;fueled by sudden access to mass communications, hyperactivated&lt;br /&gt;by expanding social expectations generated by growing economic&lt;br /&gt;prosperity as well as by widening disparities in social wealth, and&lt;br /&gt;made more susceptible to political mobilization by the explosive&lt;br /&gt;increase both in population and urbanization. This condition is&lt;br /&gt;154 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;rendered even more ominous by the scale of Asia's arms buildup.&lt;br /&gt;In 1995, the region became—according to the International Institute&lt;br /&gt;of Strategic Studies—the world's biggest importer of arms,&lt;br /&gt;outstripping Europe and the Middle East.&lt;br /&gt;In brief, East Asia is seething with dynamic activity, which so&lt;br /&gt;far has been channeled in peaceful directions by the region's rapid&lt;br /&gt;pace of economic growth. But that safety valve could at some&lt;br /&gt;point be overwhelmed by unleashed political passions, once they&lt;br /&gt;have been triggered by some flash point, even a relatively trivial&lt;br /&gt;one. The potential for such a flash point is present in a large number&lt;br /&gt;of contentious issues, each vulnerable to demagogic exploitation&lt;br /&gt;and thus potentially explosive:&lt;br /&gt;• China's resentment of Taiwan's separate status is intensifying&lt;br /&gt;as China gains in strength and as the increasingly prosperous&lt;br /&gt;Taiwan begins to flirt with a formally separate status&lt;br /&gt;as a nation-state.&lt;br /&gt;• The Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea pose&lt;br /&gt;the risk of a collision between China and several Southeast&lt;br /&gt;Asian states over access to potentially valuable seabed energy&lt;br /&gt;sources, with China imperially viewing the South China&lt;br /&gt;Sea as its legitimate national patrimony.&lt;br /&gt;• The Senkaku Islands are contested by both Japan and China&lt;br /&gt;(with the rivals Taiwan and mainland China ferociously of a&lt;br /&gt;single mind on this issue), and the historical rivalry for regional&lt;br /&gt;preeminence between Japan and China infuses this&lt;br /&gt;issue with symbolic significance as well.&lt;br /&gt;" The division of Korea and the inherent instability of North&lt;br /&gt;Korea—made all the more dangerous by North Korea's&lt;br /&gt;quest for nuclear capability—pose the risk that a sudden explosion&lt;br /&gt;could engulf the peninsula in warfare, which in turn&lt;br /&gt;would engage the United States and indirectly involve Japan.&lt;br /&gt;• The issue of the southernmost Kuril Islands, unilaterally&lt;br /&gt;seized in 1945 by the Soviet Union, continues to paralyze&lt;br /&gt;and poison Russo-Japanese relations.&lt;br /&gt;THE FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 155&lt;br /&gt;PACIFIC OCEAN&lt;br /&gt;INDIAN OCEAN&lt;br /&gt;Uu mid dry ami Territorial&lt;br /&gt;Disputes in Kast tola&lt;br /&gt;3 Chinese Claim&lt;br /&gt;4 China-Vlelnarn Boi»r Friction&lt;br /&gt;5 Parecsl Islands&lt;br /&gt;6. Spratly Islands&lt;br /&gt;7 Prates Island&lt;br /&gt;8 Senkskj Islands i Diao-Yu-Tsi&lt;br /&gt;9 Uancourr Rocks&lt;br /&gt;10 D"iu'iM:n L'np&lt;br /&gt;11 N rrheni V'|-.i,i"s&lt;br /&gt;• Other latent territorial-ethnic conflicts involve Russo-Chinese,&lt;br /&gt;Chinese-Vietnamese, Japanese-Korean, and Chinese-&lt;br /&gt;Indian border issues; ethnic unrest in Xinjiang Province;&lt;br /&gt;and Chinese-Indonesian disputes over oceanic boundaries.&lt;br /&gt;(See map above.)&lt;br /&gt;The distribution of power in the region is also unbalanced.&lt;br /&gt;China, with its nuclear arsenal and its large armed forces, is clearly&lt;br /&gt;the dominant military power (see table on page 156). The Chinese&lt;br /&gt;navy has already adopted a strategic doctrine of "offshore active&lt;br /&gt;defense," seeking to acquire within the next fifteen years an oceangoing&lt;br /&gt;capability for "effective control of the seas within the first island&lt;br /&gt;chain," meaning the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. To&lt;br /&gt;be sure, Japan's military capability is also increasing, and in terms&lt;br /&gt;of quality, it has no regional peer. At present, however, the Japanese&lt;br /&gt;armed forces are not a tool of Japanese foreign policy and are&lt;br /&gt;156 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;Personnel&lt;br /&gt;Total&lt;br /&gt;China 3,030.000&lt;br /&gt;Pakistan 577,000&lt;br /&gt;India 1,100,000&lt;br /&gt;Thailand 295,000&lt;br /&gt;Singapore 55,500&lt;br /&gt;North Korea 1,127,000&lt;br /&gt;South Korea 633,000&lt;br /&gt;Japan 237,700&lt;br /&gt;Taiwan" 442,000&lt;br /&gt;Vietnam 857,000&lt;br /&gt;Malaysia*" 114,500&lt;br /&gt;Philippines 106,500&lt;br /&gt;Indonesia 270,900&lt;br /&gt;Asian Armed Forces&lt;br /&gt;Tanks&lt;br /&gt;Total&lt;br /&gt;Fighters&lt;br /&gt;Total&lt;br /&gt;Surface&lt;br /&gt;Ships&lt;br /&gt;Total&lt;br /&gt;•i&lt;br /&gt;Submarines&lt;br /&gt;Total&lt;br /&gt;(Numbers in parentheses are advanced systems)&lt;br /&gt;9,400 (500)&lt;br /&gt;1,890 (40)&lt;br /&gt;3,500 (2,700)&lt;br /&gt;633 (313)&lt;br /&gt;350 (0)&lt;br /&gt;4,200 (2,225)&lt;br /&gt;1,860 (450)&lt;br /&gt;1,200 (929)&lt;br /&gt;1,400 (0)&lt;br /&gt;1,900 (400)&lt;br /&gt;26 (26)&lt;br /&gt;41 (0)&lt;br /&gt;235 (110)&lt;br /&gt;5,224 (124)&lt;br /&gt;336 (160)&lt;br /&gt;700 (374)&lt;br /&gt;-74 (18)&lt;br /&gt;143 (6)&lt;br /&gt;730 (136)&lt;br /&gt;334 (48)&lt;br /&gt;324 (231)&lt;br /&gt;460 (10)&lt;br /&gt;240 (0)&lt;br /&gt;50 (0)&lt;br /&gt;7 (0)&lt;br /&gt;54 (12)&lt;br /&gt;57 (40)&lt;br /&gt;11 (8)&lt;br /&gt;21 (14)&lt;br /&gt;14 (6)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;3 (0)&lt;br /&gt;17 (9)&lt;br /&gt;62 (40)&lt;br /&gt;38(11)&lt;br /&gt;7 (5)&lt;br /&gt;2 (0)&lt;br /&gt;1 (0)&lt;br /&gt;17 (4)&lt;br /&gt;53 (7)&lt;br /&gt;6 (6)&lt;br /&gt;18 (12)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;23 (0)&lt;br /&gt;3 (3)&lt;br /&gt;17(17)&lt;br /&gt;4 (2)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;0 (0)&lt;br /&gt;2 (2)&lt;br /&gt;"Taiwan has 150 F-16s, 60 Mirage, and 130 other fighter jets on order and several&lt;br /&gt;naval vessels under construction.&lt;br /&gt;'"Malaysia is purchasing 8 F-18s and possibly IS MiG-29s.&lt;br /&gt;Note: Personnel means all active military; tanks are main battle tanks and light&lt;br /&gt;tanks; fighters are air-to-air and ground attack aircraft; surface ships are carriers,&lt;br /&gt;cruisers, destroyers, and frigates;and submarines are all types. Advanced&lt;br /&gt;systems are at least mid-1960s design with advanced technologies, such as laser&lt;br /&gt;range finders for tanks.&lt;br /&gt;Source: General Accounting Office report, "Impact of China's Military Modernization&lt;br /&gt;in the Pacific Region, June 1995.&lt;br /&gt;largely viewed as an extension of the American military presence&lt;br /&gt;in the region.&lt;br /&gt;The emergence of China has already prompted its southeastern&lt;br /&gt;neighbors to be increasingly deferential to Chinese concerns. It is&lt;br /&gt;noteworthy that during the minicrisis of early 1996 concerning Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;(in which China engaged in some threatening military maneuvers&lt;br /&gt;and barred air and sea access to a zone near Taiwan,&lt;br /&gt;precipitating a demonstrative U.S. naval deployment), the foreign&lt;br /&gt;minister of Thailand hastily declared that such a ban was normal,&lt;br /&gt;THE FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 157&lt;br /&gt;his Indonesian counterpart stated that this was purely a Chinese&lt;br /&gt;affair, and the Philippines and Malaysia declared a policy of neutrality&lt;br /&gt;on the issue.&lt;br /&gt;The absence of a regional balance of power has in recent years&lt;br /&gt;prompted both Australia and Indonesia—heretofore rather wary of&lt;br /&gt;each other—to initiate growing military coordination. Both countries&lt;br /&gt;made little secret of their anxiety over the longer-range prospects of&lt;br /&gt;Chinese regional military domination and over the staying power of&lt;br /&gt;the United States as the region's security guarantor. This concern&lt;br /&gt;has also caused Singapore to explore closer security cooperation&lt;br /&gt;with these nations. In fact, throughout the region, the central but&lt;br /&gt;unanswered question among strategists has become this: "For how&lt;br /&gt;long can peace in the world's most populated and increasingly most&lt;br /&gt;armed region be assured by one hundred thousand American soldiers,&lt;br /&gt;and for how much longer in any case are they likely to stay?"&lt;br /&gt;It is in this volatile setting of intensifying nationalisms, increasing&lt;br /&gt;populations, growing prosperity, exploding expectations, and&lt;br /&gt;overlapping power aspirations that genuinely tectonic shifts are&lt;br /&gt;occurring in East Asia's geopolitical landscape:&lt;br /&gt;• China, whatever its specific prospects, is a rising and potentially&lt;br /&gt;dominant power.&lt;br /&gt;• America's security role is becoming increasingly dependent&lt;br /&gt;on collaboration with Japan.&lt;br /&gt;• Japan is groping for a more denned and autonomous political&lt;br /&gt;role.&lt;br /&gt;• Russia's role has greatly diminished, while the formerly&lt;br /&gt;Russian-dominated Central Asia has become an object of international&lt;br /&gt;rivalry.&lt;br /&gt;• The division of Korea is becoming less tenable, making Korea's&lt;br /&gt;future orientation a matter of increasing geostrategic&lt;br /&gt;interest to its major neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;These tectonic shifts give added salience to the two central issues&lt;br /&gt;posed at the outset of this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;158 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;CHINA: NOT GLOBAL BUT REGIONAL&lt;br /&gt;China's history is one of national greatness. The currently intense&lt;br /&gt;nationalism of the Chinese people is new only in its social pervasiveness,&lt;br /&gt;for it engages the self-identification and the emotions of&lt;br /&gt;an unprecedented number of Chinese. It is no longer a phenomenon&lt;br /&gt;confined largely to the students who, in the early years of this&lt;br /&gt;century, formed the precursors of the Kuomintang and the Chinese&lt;br /&gt;Communist Party. Chinese nationalism is now a mass phenomenon,&lt;br /&gt;defining the mindset of the world's most populous state.&lt;br /&gt;That mindset has deep historical roots. History has predisposed&lt;br /&gt;the Chinese elite to think of China as the natural center of&lt;br /&gt;the world. In fact, the Chinese word for China—Chung-kuo, or the&lt;br /&gt;"Middle Kingdom"—both conveys the notion of China's centrality&lt;br /&gt;in world affairs and reaffirms the importance of national unity.&lt;br /&gt;That perspective also implies a hierarchical radiation of influence&lt;br /&gt;from the center to the peripheries, and thus China as the center&lt;br /&gt;expects deference from others.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, since time immemorial, China, with its vast population,&lt;br /&gt;has been a distinctive and proud civilization all its own. That&lt;br /&gt;civilization was highly advanced in all areas: philosophy, culture,&lt;br /&gt;the arts, social skills, technical inventiveness, and political power.&lt;br /&gt;The Chinese recall that until approximately 1600, China led the&lt;br /&gt;world in agricultural productivity, industrial innovation, and standard&lt;br /&gt;of living. But unlike the European and the Islamic civilizations,&lt;br /&gt;which have spawned some seventy-five-odd states, China&lt;br /&gt;has remained for most of its history a single state, which at the&lt;br /&gt;time of America's declaration of independence already contained&lt;br /&gt;more than 200 million people and was also the world's leading&lt;br /&gt;manufacturing power.&lt;br /&gt;From that perspective, China's fall from greatness—the last 150&lt;br /&gt;years of China's humiliation—is an aberration, a desecration of&lt;br /&gt;China's special quality, and a personal insult to every individual Chinese.&lt;br /&gt;It must be erased, and its perpetrators deserve due punishment.&lt;br /&gt;These perpetrators, in varying degrees, have primarily been&lt;br /&gt;four: Great Britain, Japan, Russia, and America—Great Britain, because&lt;br /&gt;of the Opium War and its consequent shameful debasement of&lt;br /&gt;China; Japan, because of the predatory wars spanning the last century,&lt;br /&gt;resulting in terrible (and still unrepented) infliction of suffering&lt;br /&gt;THE FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 159&lt;br /&gt;on the Chinese people; Russia, because of protracted encroachment&lt;br /&gt;on Chinese territories in the North as well as Stalin's domineering insensitivity&lt;br /&gt;toward Chinese self-esteem; and finally America, because&lt;br /&gt;through its Asian presence and support of Japan, it stands in the&lt;br /&gt;way of China's external aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;In the Chinese view, two of these four powers have already&lt;br /&gt;been punished, so to speak, by history. Great Britain is no longer&lt;br /&gt;an empire, and the lowering of the Union Jack in Hong Kong forever&lt;br /&gt;closes that particularly painful chapter. Russia remains next&lt;br /&gt;door, though much diminished in stature, prestige, and territory. It&lt;br /&gt;is America and Japan that pose the most serious problems for&lt;br /&gt;China, and it is in the interaction with them that China's regional&lt;br /&gt;and global role will be substantively defined.&lt;br /&gt;That definition, however, will depend in the first instance on&lt;br /&gt;how China itself evolves, on how much of an economic and military&lt;br /&gt;power it actually becomes. On this score, the prognosis for&lt;br /&gt;China is generally promising, though not without some major uncertainties&lt;br /&gt;and qualifications. Both the pace of China's economic&lt;br /&gt;growth and the scale of foreign investment in China—each among&lt;br /&gt;the highest in the world—provide the statistical basis for the conventional&lt;br /&gt;prognosis that within two decades or so China will become&lt;br /&gt;a global power, roughly on a par with the United States and&lt;br /&gt;Europe (assuming that the latter both unites and expands further).&lt;br /&gt;China might by then have a GDP considerably in excess of Japan's,&lt;br /&gt;and it already exceeds Russia's by a significant margin. That economic&lt;br /&gt;momentum should permit China to acquire military power&lt;br /&gt;on a scale that will be intimidating to all its neighbors, perhaps&lt;br /&gt;even to the more geographically distant opponents of China's aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;Further strengthened by the incorporation of Hong Kong&lt;br /&gt;and Macao, and perhaps also eventually by the political subordination&lt;br /&gt;of Taiwan, a Greater China will emerge not only as the dominant&lt;br /&gt;state in the Far East but as a world power of the first rank.&lt;br /&gt;However, there are pitfalls in any such prognosis for the "Middle&lt;br /&gt;Kingdom's" inevitable resurrection as a central global power,&lt;br /&gt;the most obvious of which pertains to the mechanical reliance on&lt;br /&gt;statistical projection. That very error was made not long ago by&lt;br /&gt;those who prophesied that Japan would supplant the United&lt;br /&gt;States as the world's leading economy and that Japan was destined&lt;br /&gt;to be the new superstate. That perspective failed to take into&lt;br /&gt;160 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;account both the factor of Japan's economic vulnerability and the&lt;br /&gt;problem of political discontinuity—and the same error is being&lt;br /&gt;made by those who proclaim, and also fear, the inevitable emergence&lt;br /&gt;of China as a world power.&lt;br /&gt;First of all, it is far from certain that China's explosive growth&lt;br /&gt;rates can be maintained over the next two decades. An economic&lt;br /&gt;slowdown cannot be excluded, and that by itself would discredit&lt;br /&gt;the conventional prognosis. In fact, for these rates to be sustained&lt;br /&gt;over a historically long period of time would require an unusually&lt;br /&gt;felicitous combination of effective national leadership, political&lt;br /&gt;tranquillity, domestic social discipline, high rates of savings, continued&lt;br /&gt;very high inflow of foreign investment, and regional stability.&lt;br /&gt;A prolonged combination of all of these positive factors is&lt;br /&gt;problematic.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, China's fast pace of growth is likely to produce political&lt;br /&gt;side effects that could limit its freedom of action. Chinese consumption&lt;br /&gt;of energy is already expanding at a rate that far exceeds&lt;br /&gt;domestic production. That excess will widen in any case, but especially&lt;br /&gt;so if China's rate of growth continues to be very high. The&lt;br /&gt;same is the case with food. Even given the slowdown in China's demographic&lt;br /&gt;growth, the Chinese population is still increasing in&lt;br /&gt;large absolute numbers, with food imports becoming more essential&lt;br /&gt;to internal well-being and political stability. Dependence on imports&lt;br /&gt;will not only impose strains on Chinese economic resources&lt;br /&gt;because of higher costs, but they will also make China more vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;to external pressures.&lt;br /&gt;Militarily, China might partially qualify as a global power, since&lt;br /&gt;the very size of its economy and its high growth rates should enable&lt;br /&gt;its rulers to divert a significant ratio of the country's GDP to&lt;br /&gt;sustain a major expansion and modernization of China's armed&lt;br /&gt;forces, including a further buildup of its strategic nuclear arsenal.&lt;br /&gt;However, if that effort is excessive (and according to some Western&lt;br /&gt;estimates, in the mid-1990s it was already consuming about 20&lt;br /&gt;percent of China's GDP), it could have the same negative effect on&lt;br /&gt;China's long-term economic growth that the failed attempt by the&lt;br /&gt;Soviet Union to compete in the arms race with the United States&lt;br /&gt;had on the Soviet economy. Furthermore, a major Chinese effort in&lt;br /&gt;this area would be likely to precipitate a countervailing Japanese&lt;br /&gt;arms buildup, thereby negating some of the political benefits of&lt;br /&gt;THE FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 161&lt;br /&gt;China's growing military prowess. And one must not ignore the&lt;br /&gt;fact that outside of its nuclear forces, China is likely to lack the&lt;br /&gt;means, for some time to come, to project its military power beyond&lt;br /&gt;its regional perimeter.&lt;br /&gt;Tensions within China could also intensify, as a result of the&lt;br /&gt;inevitable unevenness of highly accelerated economic growth,&lt;br /&gt;driven heavily by the uninhibited exploitation of marginal advantages.&lt;br /&gt;The coastal South and East as well as the principal urban&lt;br /&gt;centers—more accessible to foreign investment and overseas&lt;br /&gt;trade—have so far been the major beneficiaries of China's impressive&lt;br /&gt;economic growth. In contrast, the inland rural areas in&lt;br /&gt;general and some of the outlying regions have lagged (with upward&lt;br /&gt;of 100 million rural unemployed).&lt;br /&gt;The resulting resentment over regional disparities could begin&lt;br /&gt;to interact with anger over social inequality. China's rapid growth&lt;br /&gt;is widening the social gap in the distribution of wealth. At some&lt;br /&gt;point, either because the government may seek to limit such differences&lt;br /&gt;or because of social resentment from below, the regional disparities&lt;br /&gt;and the wealth gap could in turn impact on the country's&lt;br /&gt;political stability.&lt;br /&gt;The second reason for cautious skepticism regarding the widespread&lt;br /&gt;prognoses of China's emergence during the next quarter of&lt;br /&gt;a century as a dominating power in global affairs is, indeed, the future&lt;br /&gt;of China's politics. The dynamic character of China's nonstatist&lt;br /&gt;economic transformation, including its social openness to the&lt;br /&gt;rest of the world, is not mutually compatible in the long run with a&lt;br /&gt;relatively closed and bureaucratically rigid Communist dictatorship.&lt;br /&gt;The proclaimed communism of that dictatorship is progressively&lt;br /&gt;less a matter of ideological commitment and more a matter&lt;br /&gt;of bureaucratic vested interest. The Chinese political elite remains&lt;br /&gt;organized as a self-contained, rigid, disciplined, and monopolistically&lt;br /&gt;intolerant hierarchy, still ritualistically proclaiming its fidelity&lt;br /&gt;to a dogma that is said to justify its power but that the same elite is&lt;br /&gt;no longer implementing socially. At some point, these two dimensions&lt;br /&gt;of life will collide head-on, unless Chinese politics begin to&lt;br /&gt;adapt gradually to the social imperatives of China's economics.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, the issue of democratization cannot be evaded indefinitely,&lt;br /&gt;unless China suddenly makes the same decision it made in&lt;br /&gt;the year 1474: to isolate itself from the world, somewhat like con162&lt;br /&gt;THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;temporary North Korea. To do that, China would have to recall its&lt;br /&gt;more than seventy thousand students currently studying in America,&lt;br /&gt;expel foreign businessmen, shut down its computers, and tear&lt;br /&gt;down satellite dishes from millions of Chinese homes. It would be&lt;br /&gt;an act of madness, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps&lt;br /&gt;for a brief moment, in the context of a domestic struggle for power,&lt;br /&gt;a dogmatic wing of the ruling but fading Chinese Communist Party&lt;br /&gt;might attempt to emulate North Korea, but it could not be more&lt;br /&gt;than a brief episode. More likely than not, it would produce economic&lt;br /&gt;stagnation and then prompt a political explosion.&lt;br /&gt;In any case, self-isolation would mean the end of any serious&lt;br /&gt;Chinese aspirations not only to global power but even to regional&lt;br /&gt;primacy. Moreover, the country has too much of a stake in access&lt;br /&gt;to the world, and that world, unlike that of 1474, is simply too intrusive&lt;br /&gt;to be effectively excluded. There is thus no practical, economically&lt;br /&gt;productive, and politically viable alternative to China's&lt;br /&gt;continued openness to the world.&lt;br /&gt;Democratization will thus increasingly haunt China. Neither&lt;br /&gt;that issue nor the related question of human rights can be evaded&lt;br /&gt;for too long. China's future progress, as well as its emergence as a&lt;br /&gt;major power, will thus depend to a large degree on how skillfully&lt;br /&gt;the ruling Chinese elite handles the two related problems of power&lt;br /&gt;succession from the present generation of rulers to a younger&lt;br /&gt;team and of coping with the growing tension between the country's&lt;br /&gt;economic and political systems.&lt;br /&gt;The Chinese leaders might perhaps succeed in promoting a&lt;br /&gt;slow and evolutionary transition to a very limited electoral authoritarianism,&lt;br /&gt;in which some low-level political choice is tolerated,&lt;br /&gt;and only thereafter move toward more genuine political pluralism,&lt;br /&gt;including more emphasis on incipient constitutional rule. Such a&lt;br /&gt;controlled transition would be more compatible with the imperatives&lt;br /&gt;of the increasingly open economic dynamics of the country&lt;br /&gt;than persistence in maintaining exclusive Party monopoly on political&lt;br /&gt;power.&lt;br /&gt;To accomplish such controlled democratization, the Chinese&lt;br /&gt;political elite will have to be led with extraordinary skill, guided by&lt;br /&gt;pragmatic common sense, and stay relatively united and willing to&lt;br /&gt;yield some of its monopoly on power (and personal privilege)—&lt;br /&gt;while the population at large will have to be both patient and unTHE&lt;br /&gt;FAR EASTERN ANCHOR 163&lt;br /&gt;demanding. That combination of felicitous circumstances may&lt;br /&gt;prove difficult to attain. Experience teaches that pressures for&lt;br /&gt;democratization from below, either from those who have felt&lt;br /&gt;themselves politically suppressed (intellectuals and students) or&lt;br /&gt;economically exploited (the new urban labor class and the rural&lt;br /&gt;poor), generally tend to outpace the willingness of rulers to&lt;br /&gt;yield. At some point, the politically and the socially disaffected in&lt;br /&gt;China are likely to join forces in demanding more democracy,&lt;br /&gt;freedom of expression, and respect for human rights. That did&lt;br /&gt;not happen in Tiananmen Square in 1989, but it might well happen&lt;br /&gt;the next time.&lt;br /&gt;Accordingly, it is unlikely that China will be able to avoid a&lt;br /&gt;phase of political unrest. Given its size, the reality of growing regional&lt;br /&gt;differences, and the legacy of some fifty years of doctrinal&lt;br /&gt;dictatorship, such a phase could be disruptive both politically and&lt;br /&gt;economically. Even the Chinese leaders themselves seem to expect&lt;br /&gt;as much, with internal Communist Party studies undertaken&lt;br /&gt;in the early 1990s foreseeing potentially serious political unrest.1&lt;br /&gt;Some China experts have even prophesied that China might spin&lt;br /&gt;into one of its historic cycles of internal fragmentation, thereby&lt;br /&gt;halting China's march to greatness altogether. But the probability&lt;br /&gt;of such an extreme eventuality is diminished by the twin impacts&lt;br /&gt;of mass nationalism and modern communications, both of which&lt;br /&gt;work in favor of a unified Chinese state.&lt;br /&gt;There is, finally, a third reason for skepticism regarding the&lt;br /&gt;prospects of China's emergence in the course of the next twenty or&lt;br /&gt;so years as a truly major—and to some Americans, already menacing—&lt;br /&gt;global power. Even if China avoids serious political disruptions&lt;br /&gt;and even if it somehow manages to sustain its extraordinarily&lt;br /&gt;high rates of economic growth over a quarter of a century—which&lt;br /&gt;are both rather big "ifs"—China would still be relatively very poor.&lt;br /&gt;Even a tripling of GDP would leave China's population in the lower&lt;br /&gt;ranks of the world's nations in per capita income, not to mention&lt;br /&gt;'"Official Document Anticipates Disorder During the Post-Deng Period,™&lt;br /&gt;Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), February 1, 1995, provides a detailed summary of&lt;br /&gt;two analyses prepared lor the Party leadership concerning various forms of&lt;br /&gt;potential unrest. A Western perspective on the same topic is contained in&lt;br /&gt;Richard Baum, "China Alter Deng; Ten Scenarios in Search of Reality," China&lt;br /&gt;Quarterly (March 1996).&lt;br /&gt;164 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD&lt;br /&gt;the actual poverty of a significant portion of its people.2 Its comparative&lt;br /&gt;standing in per capita access to telephones, cars, and&lt;br /&gt;computers, let alone consumer goods, would be very low.&lt;br /&gt;To sum up: even by the year 2020, it is quite unlikely even under&lt;br /&gt;the best of circumstances that China could become truly competitive&lt;br /&gt;in the key dimensions of global power. Even so, however,&lt;br /&gt;China is well on the way to becoming the preponderant regional&lt;br /&gt;power in East Asia. It is already geopoiitically dominant on the&lt;br /&gt;mainland. Its military and economic power dwarfs its immediate&lt;br /&gt;neighbors, with the exception of India. It is, therefore, only natural&lt;br /&gt;that China will increasingly assert itself regionally, in keeping with&lt;br /&gt;the dictates of its history, geography, and economics.&lt;br /&gt;Chinese students of their country's history know that as recently&lt;br /&gt;as 1840, China's imperial sway extended throughout Southeast&lt;br /&gt;Asia, all the way down to the Strait of Malacca, including&lt;br /&gt;Burma, parts of today's Bangladesh as well as Nepal, portions of&lt;br /&gt;today's Kazakstan, all of Mongolia, and the region that today is&lt;br /&
